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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the performance of optimal simple monetary policy rules in 
dynamic macroeconomic models. In keeping with much modem macroeconomics the 
majority of the models considered contain forward-looking rational expectations. 
These expectation terms complicate policy analysis because they introduce time-
inconsistency into optimal policy making. To overcome this problem this thesis 
develops techniques to examine both pre-commitment and discretionary rules. 
Three interrelated issues are focused on in this thesis. The first issue is how to 
construct simple policy rules whose performance closely approximates that of the 
optimal state contingent rule. This thesis argues that rather than comparing a range of 
simple rules and selecting the best one analysis should begin with the optimal state 
contingent rule. State variables can then be excluded from the optimal state 
contingent rule if their policy relevance is 'small'. The key to finding a simple rule 
that performs well is finding a small set of variables that is approximately sufficient 
for the information in the full system. 
The second issue investigated is whether simple rules that have been found to perform 
well in closed economy models also perform well in open economy models. For the 
United States it is widely held that a Taylor type rule closely approximates the optimal 
state contingent rule. In open economy models, however, exchange rate movements 
play an important role and consequently rules such as the Taylor rule that overlook the 
exchange rate may perform poorly. Results obtained in this thesis support the notion 
that rules developed in closed economy models do not perform well in open economy 
models. These results question the usefulness of studies that apply closed economy 
policy rules to open economy models. 
The final issue is whether information about the policy regime implemented by the 
monetary authority can be extracted from the policy rule it employs. A central bank's 
policy objectives and the intensity with which it goes about meeting these objectives 
are unobserved. However, policy reaction functions that relate the monetary 
authority's policy decisions to the state of the economy can be estimated. How policy 
makers respond to the economic state depends on its objectives and preferences . This 
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aspect of the thesis establishes conditions under which infonnation about policy 
preferences and objectives can be uncovered from estimated policy rules. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The introduction of rational expectations into main stream macroeconomi cs in the 
1970s has had major implications for monetary policy. On one level theory predicted 
that policy decisions would be ineffect ive because agents would have already 
accounted for them, and that only unanti cipated policy would effect the economy. By 
their nature these unanticipated poli cy ac ti ons would be random servin g onl y to create 
greater volatility in the economy. On a separate level the potenti al for time-
incon sistency in poli cy deci sion making was believed to rule out control theory where 
the application was an economic model in which ex pectations were formed rati ona ll y. 
In the ea rl y 1980s it was reali zed that the rational expectations hypothesis by itself 
was insuffic ient to generate policy ineffec ti veness. What was also needed was the 
natural rate hypothesis whereby pri ce changes affec ted the suppl y si de of the economy 
only to the extent to whi ch they were unantic ipated . If thi s natura l rate hypothesis did 
not hold in each period, as sti cky price theories and over- lappin g wage contracting 
model s suggested, then a role for poli cy cou ld be motivated. At the same ti me control 
theory found ways to adapt to rational expectati ons. Time-inconsistency occulTed 
because of an inability to pre-commit. Imposin g pre-commitment as an optimi zation 
constraint led to optimal pre-commitment rules. Alternatively, one cou ld accept the 
pl an ner' s inab ility to pre-commit and solve for the opti mal time-consistent pol icy. 
Moreover, it was found that not all c lasses of rational expectation model led to time-
inconsistency. Models where the ex pectati ons were of contemporaneous variables 
and not future va riables were found not to create time- inconsistency (Chow , 1980). 
Even though the control theory techniques have been established and the prominence 
of the po li cy ineffectiveness hypothesis has dec lined, the 1990s have not seen a great 
deal of research into optimal monetary policy in rational expectations model s. There 
are so me notab le exceptions of whi ch almost a ll ass ume pre-commitment before 
solving for the optimal policy rule. A much larger proportion of the monetary po li cy 
literature has shied away from analyzing optimal policy choosing instead to examine 
and contrast various simple rules. 
Against this backdrop this thesis at its widest interpretation examines monetary policy 
in rational expectations models. More specifically a large part of this thesis looks at 
the efficiency of optimal simple policy rules in dynamic open economy macro-
economic models. Simple rules have merit because they are easy to construct, easy to 
evaluate, are highly transparent, and aid communication of policy decisions . 
Moreover, one simple rule - the Taylor rule - has been widely analyzed in closed 
economy settings and has been advocated as a stabilization tool. One focus of this 
thesis is on extending existing analysis of Taylor type rules to open economy models , 
thereby examining whether its performance in open economy models matches that it 
enjoys in closed economy frameworks . 
We begin in Chapter 2 by developing the numerical techniques required to solve for 
optimal simple rules in dynamic rational expectations models. The focus of this 
Chapter differs from standard treatments of optimal control in rational expectations 
models in that it emphasizes optimal simple rules rather than fully optimal rules. In 
particular, Chapter 2 offers a solution method for optimal simple rules in the absence 
of pre-commitment that is new to the literature. The techniques developed in Chapter 
2 are tested on existing models in the literature, and applied widely throughout the 
remainder of this thesis. 
Chapter 3 looks at the stabilizing properties of a specific policy rule: nominal GDP 
targeting. While it might not be the optimal policy rule to apply in any given model it 
is often felt that nominal GDP targeting is a robust policy rule, one that is likely to 
perform reasonably well across a range of plausible models. Chapter 3 formulates an 
economic framework that encompasses many popular theoretical models and uses 
analytical and numerical techniques to establish that where inflation expectations 
contain some forward-looking element nominal GDP targeting is unlikely to create 
instability in the economy. These analytic results confirm what numerical studies on 
more general models have typically found, and demonstrate the sensitivity of Ball's 
(1999) result showing nominal GDP targeting to be unstable. 
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Following our exploration into the stability properties of nominal GDP targeting, 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 turn to the issue of how well optimal simple policy rules perform 
relative to the optimal state contingent rule. Chapter 4 builds a closed economy 
model, and contrasts optimal state contingent policy rules with the Taylor rule and the 
Henderson-McKibbin rule. Both pre-commitment and discretionary equilibria are 
solved for and compared. A version of the open economy Buiter-Miller model is 
constructed in Chapter 5 and using this model consumer price inflation targeting is 
contrasted with non-tradables inflation targeting. Only pre-commitment solutions are 
solved for, but optimal state contingent rules , optimal simple rules , and optimal 
Taylor type rules are considered. This analysis finds that optimal Taylor type rules do 
not perform well in open economy models, but that Taylor type rules extended with 
the inclusion of the real exchange rate perform much better. 
Building on a theme, Chapter 6 turns to an estimated model of the Australian 
economy. In Australia it is a stylized fact that the terms-of-trade and the real 
exchange rate are highly correlated with increases in the terms-of-trade leading to 
appreciations of the real exchange rate. With the terms-of-trade driving the real 
exchange rate Chapter 6 explores which of the terms-of-trade and the real exchange 
rate contains more useful information for policy makers. Simulation results reveal 
that monetary policy is more effective when it responds directly to the real exchange 
rate than it does when it responds directly to the terms-of-trade. Moreover, Taylor 
type rules are notable in this model for their poor performance. In this Australian 
model Taylor types rules are able to mount very little leverage over inflation and the 
output gap, and this compromises their ability to stabilize these variables. 
Methodologically, Chapters 4, 5, and 6 argue that the most nature benchmark against 
which to assess the performance of any simple policy rule is the optimal state 
contingent rule - the policy rule that optimally exploits all available information. The 
fact that a Taylor type rule performs better than a nominal GDP targeting rule in some 
given model is of secondary interest if both rules perform poorly relative to the 
optimal rule. Once the performance of the optimal policy rule is established, optimal 
simple policy rules that perform well can be constructed by individually removing 
state variables from the optimal rule and seeing how the exclusion of that variable 
affects the rule's performance. 
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Chapter 7 turns away from evaluating policy rules and instead looks at how 
information obtained from estimated policy reaction functions can be used to cast 
light of the objectives of policy makers. Consistent with the first part of the thesis the 
framework used is one where rational expectations are present, and where central 
banks optimize to set monetary policy. Chapter 7 establishes a number of 
identification conditions that must hold if the rational expectations model is to be 
identified, and subsequently if the parameters in the policy objective function are to be 
identified. 
The idea behind Chapter 7 rests on the fact that the feedback coefficients in the 
optimal policy rule are nonlinear combinations of the parameters in the economic 
model and those in the objective function. If the economic model can be identified 
and estimated, then these estimated parameters together with estimates of the policy 
feedback coefficients can possibly be used to extract information about the objective 
function parameters. A maintained assumption throughout this process is that the 
policy maker is optimizing some function . 
The final Chapter in this thesis continues with the theme of comparing pre-
commitment and discretionary monetary policy. Chapter 8 takes the canonical ' rules 
vs discretion ' model and builds in an economic cost to anticipated inflation. This cost 
might be motivated by inflation tax considerations, indexing problems, or the menu 
cost/shoe leather cost literature. Chapter 8 shows that such an inflation cost has 
ambiguous implications for the magnitude of the discretionary inflation bias: the bias 
may go up or down. 
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Chapter 2 
SOLVING FOR OPTIMAL SIMPLE RULES IN RATIONAL 
EXPECTATIONS MODELS 
2.1) Introduction 
This chapter shows how to solve for optimal simple policy rules in dynamic rational 
expectations models . Such models naturally contain jump variables, variables that are 
not predetermined. Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Calvo (1978) were the first to 
bring to popular attention the implications these non-predetermined variables have for 
control theory. These implications, forcefully brought home by Barro and Gordon 
(1983), were that dynamic programming did not generate an optimal policy program, 
and that optimal programs were unlikely to be implemented due to time-
inconsistency. This literature recommended that policy makers adhere to simple 
rules. 
Following Barro and Gordon (1983) numerous studies were performed where central 
banks and governments were assumed to follow simple rules. These studies, 
however, found it hard to resist evaluating the economic consequences of these simple 
policy rules, or to argue that one simple rule outperformed another according to some 
cri terion . Of course with a welfare criteria in place advocating one simple rule over 
another implicitly amounts to an inefficient form of numerical optimization. Which 
begs the question of how policy makers should choose the simple rule to implement. 
An alternate strand of the literature sought to develop techniques for applying control 
theory methods to rational expectations models. Initially this literature identified 
rational expectations models in which time-inconsistency did not arise. In this vein 
Taylor (1979) developed a model of overlapping wage contracts where wage 
expectations were formed rationally and solved for an optimal monetary policy rule 
using standard dynamic programming. This was possible because the expectations in 
Taylor's model were contemporaneous. Chow (1980) further argued the case for 
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control theory by formally showing that time-inconsistency would not arise if the 
expectations were not of future variables. Preston and Pagan (1982) followed up this 
point, establishing conditions for stabilizability in models with expectations of 
contemporaneous variables. 
In models with forward-looking rational expectations this strand of the literature did 
not pass up on optimization, but rather chose to formally build the requirement of 
time-consistency into the optimization problem. In this vein Cohen and Michel 
(1984) solved a one state variable problem for the optimal time-consistent rule , and 
subsequently Currie and Levine (1985), Oudiz and Sachs (1985), Mjller and Salmon 
(1985), and Backus and Driffill (1986) largely developed the theory of optimal control 
in rational expectations models. In this literature one can assume the existence of 
some pre-commitment mechanism and then solve for an optimal pre-commitment 
policy rule, or alternatively solve for an optimal time-consistent rule. 
While these optimization techniques have been available for some time, and there is 
an extensive literature on the properties of various monetary policy rules, relatively 
few studies have used control theory to develop policy rules. This is despite the fact 
that optimal rules are the natural benchmark against which to compare simple rules. 
However, Taylor (1979), McKibbin and Sachs (1988, 1991), Svensson (1994, 1998), 
Fair and Howrey (1996), Fuhrer (1997), and Rudebusch (1999) are notable for 
applying control theory to address monetary policy questions. 
Against this background this chapter has two aims. The first is to bring to wider 
attention the central methods in the literature for constructing optimal monetary policy 
rules in dynamic rational expectations models. The second aim is to address a gap in 
this literature. The solution methods currently available can solve for optimal and 
optimal simple pre-commitment rules, but only optimal discretionary rules , not 
optimal simple discretionary rules. This chapter presents methods for solving for 
optimal simple discretionary rules. 
We begin in Section 2.2 by briefly surveying the solution techniques in the literature. 
The emphasis in this Section is on closed-loop solution methods in discrete time 
models. Having discussed the available solution methods, Section 2.3 turns to the 
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outstanding problem of solving for optimal simple discretionary rules. Two methods 
are presented. The first, in Section 2.3.1, relies on matrix decomposition methods for 
solving the rational expectations model, the second, in Section 2.3.2, employs the 
method of undetermined coefficients. In Section 2.4 an example is presented and the 
methods in Section 2.3 applied to it. Section 2.5 concludes. Appendix A applies the 
techniques described in this chapter to a second example, Taylor (1979), while 
Appendix B uses an analytic example to compare the methods in Oudiz and Sachs 
(1985) with those developed here. 
2.2) Existing Approaches 
This Section examines the key papers in the literature, with an emphasis on closed-
loop solution methods for optimal simple rules in discrete time models. The key 
references in this literature are: Oudiz and Sachs (1985); Backus and Driffill (1986); 
and the recent paper by Soderlind (1999). In principle we would like to be able to 
solve for four types of policy rule: optimal pre-commitment rules; optimal simple pre-
commitment rules; optimal discretionary rules; and optimal simple discretionary rules. 
The latter two rules are time-consistent, the former two are only time-consistent in the 
presence of some pre-commitment mechanism. Simple rules are sub-optimal in that 
they exclude information from the policy rule that could improve welfare, as 
measured by some objective function. Each of these key papers solves for optimal 
pre-commitment rules and optimal discretionary rules. In addition, Oudiz and Sachs 
(1985), and Soderlind (1999) present methods for solving for optimal simple pre-
commitment rules. What is absent from this literature is a method of solving for 
optimal simple discretionary rules. 
The solution methods in Oudiz and Sachs (1985), Backus and Driffill (1986), and 
Soderlind (1999) are very similar. Soderlind (1999) follows Oudiz and Sachs' (1985) 
Lagrangean approach to solve for optimal pre-commitment rules; Backus and Driffill 
(1986) use dynamic programming to achieve the same result. Both Soderlind (1999) 
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and Backus and Driffill (1986) draw heavily on Oudiz and Sachs (1985) to solve for 
optimal discretionary rules.! 
All of the solution methods contained in the references above are couched in terms of 
the following linear economic structure 
[ Ylt+1 ]=II1[Ylt]+II2Xt +[Vll+1], E,Y 2t+1 Y 2t 0 
Vlt - iid[O, :E]. (1) 
where Ylt is an (mxl) vector of predetermined variables, Y2t an ((n-m)xl) vector of 
jump, or free, variables, and Xt a (pxl) vector of policy instruments. Model 
coefficients are contained in the (nxn) and (nxp) matrices III and Il2 respectively. 
The expectation of Y2t conditional upon information up to and including time t is 
denoted E,y2t. Period t information, denoted I" is defined as It = {Ylt, Y2t, It.!} . 
Throughout this paper the policy objective function is taken to be 
Loss[O,oo] = tr[Wil], (2) 
where W is a symmetric, positive semi-definite, time-invariant matrix of known 
policy weights, Q is the variance-covariance matrix of the vector containing the 
predetermined variables, the jump variables, and the policy instruments, and 'tr' is the 
trace operator. 
2.2.1) Optimal Pre-Commitment Rules 
Because the focus of this paper is not on solving for optimal pre-commitment rules, 
the treatment given here, which follows Soderlind (1999), but with different notation, 
is brief. Form the Lagrangian 
L=EoL[y~VYt +2y~UXt +x~Rxt]+2p~+1[II1Yt +II2xt +~t -Yl+1], (3) 
t=O 
I See Currie and Levine (1985) for a treatment of optimal pre-commitment rules in continuous time 
models. 
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where Yt = [YltT Y2tT]T, ~l+! = [Vlt+!T (Y2l+rEtY2l+1)T]T, and Pl+! is a vector of Lagrange 
multipliers, and the dynamic constraints come from (1). The matrices V, U, and R are 
components of the weighting matrix W defined in (2). Differentiating (3) with respect 
to Pt+I. Yt and Xt and collecting the first order conditions in matrix form gives 
[I 0 0][ Yt+!] [II! o 0 II; X,+! = - V o 0 - II; E,p ,+! UT 
II2 
-U 
R 
O][Y t] [~t + !] 1 x, + 0 . 
o P, 0 
(4) 
For the purposes of this paper it suffices to stop here. The important message from 
(4) is that the optimal pre-commitment policy rule depends not only on the state 
vector, but also the vector of Lagrange multipliers. Rules that exclude these Lagrange 
multipliers, such as simple rules, cannot be fully optimal and therefore will not be 
certainty equivalent. 
2.2.2) Optimal Simple Pre-Commitment Rules 
Consider the class of macroeconomic models in (1). Take the policy reaction function 
to be 
[YIt] x t =cp . Y 21 (5) 
This policy rule sets the vector of instruments as a function of the vector of state 
variables. Together (1) and (5) imply 
[ Y It+! ] = II[Y It] + [v It+!], E,Y 2t+! Y 2t 0 (6) 
where IT = IT! + IT2<jl. Taking the period t conditional expectation of (6), then 
applying a spectral decomposition to IT gives IT = M'!AM, where A is a matrix with 
the eigenvalues of IT along its leading diagonal , and zeros elsewhere. Partition A as 
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[
AI A-
- 0 , and M confonnably, M = 0] [Mu A2 M21 - , having reordered A such MI'] M22 
that the eigenvalues enter in ascending magnitude. All eigenvalues with modulus less 
than one are contained in Al and all those with modulus greater than one are contained 
in A2. The number of eigenvalues with modulus less than one and greater than one 
define the dimensions of Ai and A2 respectively. Provided a cp exists such that the 
number of eigenvalues in A2 equals the number of jump variables, the system is 
stablizable and has a unique rational expectations equilibrium. If the eigenvalues in 
A2 are distinct, M22 has full rank and can be inverted. To place the system on its 
saddle-arm requires 
Y 2' = -M;~M2IY It . (7) 
If M22 is singular, then a spectral decomposition of II cannot be used and a Jordan 
canonical fonn (Blanchard and Kahn, 1980) or a Schur decomposition (Klein, 2000) 
might be used instead. 
With the jump variables evolving according to (7) and the transition of the 
predetennined variables given in (6), the evolution of the entire system is determined 
as an implicit function of the policy parameters cpo The objective function (2) can be 
evaluated and then minimized with respect to cpo Minimization occurs subject to the 
constraint that the rank of A2 is 'n-m': that the system has a unique rational 
expectations solution. Some elements of q> can be fixed and the remaining 
unconstrained parameters optimized over. 
2.2.3) Optimal Discretionary Rules 
To solve for optimal discretionary rules, Oudiz and Sachs (1985) use dynamic 
programming methods. They summarize their solution procedure as follows: 
'The time-consistent, non-cooperative equilibrium is found as a limit to 
a finite time (T period) problem, for T large. The solution is derived in 
two steps. The finite-horiz.on problem is solved for the last period, T, 
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and then it is solvedfor period t given the solution for period HI. We 
find the limit of the rule for period 0 as T --) 00. ' 
Keep in mind that the optimization and time-recursion take place subject to the 
restriction that the system's rational expectations solution be unique. First take the 
Lagrangean function under pre-commitment, equation (3), and augment it with a 
constraint linking the jump variables to the predetermined variables: 
Y21 =N,Yll' (8) 
Minimization of the Lagrangean function continues as previously, generating a first 
order condition linking the instrument vector to the predetermined variables: 
X, =S,Yll' (9) 
Equations (8) and (9) are then solved simultaneously, (with Nt an implicit function of 
SI> and St an implicit function of Nt), subject to the restriction that Nt places the 
system on its stable manifold. The initial NT is chosen as the solution to the terminal 
period problem. Further details are provided in Backus and Driffill (1986), McKibbin 
and Sachs (1991), and Soderlind (1999). 
2.3) Optimal Simple Discretionary Rules 
Having briefly described existing techniques for solving for optimal rules in dynamic 
rational expectations models we now turn to the outstanding problem of solving for 
optimal simple discretionary rules. The approach we take to discretion is 
conceptually different to the Lagrangean approach discussed in Section 2.2.3. Under 
pre-commitment a policy rule is proposed whose structure cannot be altered as time 
passes. Knowing this agents form their expectations using the proposed rule and the 
feedback coefficients in the proposed rule are then optimized over. With discretion 
we look for a time-consistent rule: a rule that the monetary authority has no incentive 
to alter as time passes. The idea of discretion is implemented by drawing a distinction 
between the rule the monetary authority proposes to follow today and that it proposes 
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to follow in the future . Distinguishing between today ' s rule and the future rule 
captures the notion that today ' s monetary authority cannot tie the hands of future 
policy makers. 
Consider dynamic specifications of the form 
AoY, = A1Y'_1 + A2ESt+l + A3X, + v,, Vt - iid[O,L] (10) 
where Yt is an nxl vector of jump and predetermined variables, Xt is an px l vector of 
policy instruments, and Vt is an nxl vector of stochastic innovations. Ao, AI , A2, and 
A3 are matrices of policy invariant coefficients . The variance-covariance matrix L 
may be singular. Finally, Et is the mathematical expectation operator conditional 
upon period t information, It. As previously defined It = {Yt, It-I}. The model's 
structure and parameters are assumed known . 
Equation (10) is more general than may first appear. Systems with lags of the 
instrument vector or more general lead and lag structures in Yt can all be manipulated 
into the form (10). Moreover, by redefining variables, expanding the state vector, and 
exploiting the law of iterated expectations, expectations of future variables conditional 
on period t-s (s > 0) information are also possible (Binder and Pesaran, 1995). 
Provided A2 has full rank (10) and (1) are largely equivalent. The two specifications 
differ slightly in so much as (10) permits Xt to affect Yt contemporaneously, while in 
(1) a one period control lag is assumed. For the mechanics of the approach described 
below this difference is unimportant, a one period control lag could easil y be 
accommodated. 
The information available to the monetary authority when it sets policy is contained in 
the state vector, Yt.l, and the vector of innovations, Vt. Accordingly it is these 
variables that form the basis of the policy rule. Excluding Vt from the rule imposes 
the restriction that the rule is formed using period t-l information. With simple rules 
some state variables and/or innovation terms are omitted from the policy rule. 
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Alternatively, at the cost of elements in Yt-l and VI expectations of future variables 
may be built into the reaction function 2 
Recall that we draw a distinction between the policy rule proposed for today and that 
proposed for the future. Accordingly we posit the rule 
XI = rplY I-I + rp2E tY 1+1 + rp3 V I (11) 
for today, but a different rule 
X I +j = IjIIY l+j-I + 1j12E '+j Y l+j+1 + 1j13 V ' +j ' 'if j >0. (12) 
for the future. 3 An important special case of (11) and (12) is that where every state 
variable and stochastic innovation is included. In this case expected future variables 
contain no additional information and !jl2 and 'V'2 would naturally be restricted to equal 
null matrices. The special case identified relates to the optimal discretionary rule, 
illustrating that the methods presented below can be applied to solve for optimal as 
well as optimal simple discretionary rules. Two solution methods are presented; the 
first uses matrix decomposition methods to solve the rational expectations model 
while the second employs method of undetermined coefficients and solves a matrix 
quadratic . Uhlig (1999) discusses how these two rational expectations solution 
methods relate to each other. 
2.3.1) A Matrix Decomposition Solution Method 
To solve the system, while capturing the essence of time-consistency, we begin with 
the future period. Defining Zt = [YIT x/f, advancing the time subscript on (10), and 
combining (10) with (12) gives the system 
2 Note that additional information can onl y be obtained from expectations of the future if some 
elements in y,.1 or v, are directly excluded from the rule. In which case placing expected future 
variables in the polic y rule amounts to an indirect way of accessing this information. 
3 Assuming the same policy rule for all future periods is without loss of generality. What is important 
is that policy decisions made today do not constrain future policy makers. Thus indexing the 1jI's by 
time would not alter the solution. Another way of thinking about this is that the optimization problem 
facing today's central bank has already been solved by future central banks. We are looking for a 
stationary solution so all future central banks implement the same policy rule. However, today's 
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A'z t+1 =B'zt +F'E t+1Zt+2 +G'u t+1 , Ut - iid[O,<I>] (13) 
whereA' = [OAo 
pxn 
-A 3 ], 
Ip 
B,=[AI 
\jI3 
Onxn] 
Opxp , 
F,=[A2 
\jI2 
Onxn] 
0pxp , 
and 
G' =[In 
\jI3 
Onxn] . . . T T T . . 
. The vanance-covanance matnx of Ut = [Vt 0] , <1> , IS dIrectly 
0pxp 
and clearly related to the variance-covariance matrix of Vt,~. Provided F' has full 
rank (13), with an expanded state vector to define Ut+2, can be re-expressed as 
[ 
ut+2] [Ut+l 
Zt+I =K Zt +0[u t+J, 
E t+1z t+2 Zt+l 
(14) 
wh'" K e[: 0 O]T 0 : ],"d eel: 0 -~·nn I -~, ~, 0 I The case 0 B' A' 0 0 
where F' is singular is discussed below. Equation (14) has a form analogous to (6), 
and is amenable to a variety of solution methods. Following our discussion of the pre-
commitment case in Section 2.2, take the period t+l conditional expectation of (14) 
and apply a spectral decomposition to K. This decomposition gives K = M·IAM, 
where A contains the eigenvalues of K along its leading diagonal and otherwise equals 
the null matrix. As earlier, we now reorder the eigenvalues in A so that they are in 
ascending magnitude and partition A into A = [A.d o ] , where the dimensions of Al 
A.2 
and A2 are such that any eigenvalues in A2 have modulus greater than one. M is also 
reordered in accordance with A and it is then partitioned as M = [ Mu 
M2I 
M 12 ], 
M22 
conformably with A. Provided the number of eigenvalues in A2 equals the number of 
jump variables in Zt and the eigenvalues in A2 are distinct, M22 is non-singular and the 
unique stable solution is given by 
central bank does not know what the future period' s solution is and must take a guess at it. This guess 
is summarized in (12). 
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-1 [Ut+I] def. • Zt+1 =-M 22M 21 Z, =OIZ, +02Ut+I· (15) 
Where F* is singular (14) is not a valid representation of the system. Instead the 
model must be left in the form 
[I 0 ° 1[ Ut+2 • [0 0 0 ][Ul+l] [I] o I 0 . Zt+1 = 0, 0, I. z, + 0 [U1+2], 
o 0 -F E'+l Z1+2 G B A ZI+1 0 
in which case it can then be solved using one of the methods described in Anderson 
and Moore (1985), King and Watson (1998) or Klein (2000). These methods all 
return a solution in the form of (15). Note that the solution (15) depends on the 
feedback parameters in the future policy reaction function , (12). 
Exploiting the definition of Zt, combining (10) and (11), and inserting the period t 
conditional expectation of (15) into the resulting system gives 
def 
Z, =[A-FO;r1[Bz,_1 +GU,]=OIZ'_1 +02U'+I' (16) 
provided of course that [A-FO j '] is nonsingular. The process driving Zt in (16) 
depends on the future policy rule through 8/ and on today's policy rule through F, B, 
and G. From (16) the unconditional variance-covariance matrix of Zt, Q , is easily 
obtained by solving for the fixed point of 
Q=8IQ8; +82<1>O~ . (17) 
As long as the spectral radius of 8 j is less than one - a result that holds if the system is 
stablizable - Q can be solved from (17) using standard fixed-point solution methods. 
Once Q is obtained the objective function (2) is easily evaluated and can then be 
maximized with respect to <PI. <P2, and <P3 holding constant \lfj , 1jJz, and \lf3. Now 
recognizing that the future monetary authority faces the same optimization problem as 
the current monetary authority we can use the newly optimized values of <pj , <pz, and 
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<P3 as a better guess at the rule applied by the future central bank. That is we set 'lfl = 
<PI , 'lf2 = <P2, and 'lf3 = <P3 , and with this new guess at the future policy reaction function 
re-solve the future period rational expectations model to obtain updated values of 91 * 
and 9t A new solution for (15) is obtained, the current central bank's objective 
function is evaluated and again minimized with respect to <PI, <P2, and <P3 while again 
holding 'lfl' 'lf2, and 'lf3, constant. This iterative procedure is continued until a fixed 
point is obtained whereby the newly optimized feedback parameters in today's policy 
rule equal those proposed in the future policy rule: <PI = 'lfl ' <P2 = 'lf2, and <P3 = 'lf3· 
Note that coefficients in the policy rule can be arbitrarily restricted and hence the 
solution obtained is that for an optimal simple discretionary rule.4 
2.3.2) An Undetermined Coefficients Solution Method 
Section 2.3.1 provided a solution method for optimal simple discretionary rules that 
relied on matri x decomposition methods to solve the underlying rational expectations 
model. Matrix decomposition solution methods are popular because they naturally 
impose the uniqueness and stability conditions arising from transversality conditions. 
But matrix decomposition solution methods are not always the most convenient 
technique to apply to a specific problem. Another popular solution method is the 
method of undetermined coefficients, and in this Section we show how the method of 
undetermined coefficients can be brought to bear in solving for optimal simple 
discretionary rules. 
From (13) the solution to the system is postulated to be 
Zt+l =O;Zt +O;ut+1 , (18) 
where 91* and 92* are parameter matrices whose values have yet to be determined. 
Advancing (18) and taking conditional expectations as necessary and substituting 
back into (13) and equating coefficients gives the restrictions 
4 However, for some simple rule structures convergence may not be obtained. In some cases no stable 
rule of the postulated form exists. More generally the convergence properties of the algorithm 
described are unknown. 
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[A' -C']9; =B' +[D' +F']9;2 
A'9; =F'9;9; +G'. 
(19) 
(20) 
From (20), 92' = [A'-F'Sl'rIG'. Equation (19) is a matrix quadratic in Sl' and thus 
permits multiple solutions. One solution, satisfying McCallum's (1983) continuity 
restriction that Sl * = 0 when B* = 0, designed to rule out sunspots, is 
9; =[(A' -c')-(D' +F')9;r'B' . (21) 
Provided [(A * -C')-(D' +F')Sl *] is non-singular, and (21) is a contraction mapping, 
standard fixed-point techniquesS can be employed to solve for Sl'. In the solution Sl' 
is implicitly a function of the future policy feedback parameters \jIl, \jI2, and \jI3. When 
setting policy today policy makers optimize over cpr, CP2, and CP3 recognizing that the 
decisions they make do not influence \jIr, \jI2, or \jI3. From the viewpoint of today' s 
policy maker the structure of the rule that will be implemented in the future is 
established. So in period t the policy maker can assume that the economy evolves 
according to (18), with the coefficient matrices in (18) given by the solutions to (20) 
and (21). 
Note that S'r and S*2 in (18) depend upon \jIr, \jI2 , and \jI3 but not cpr, CP2 , or CP3. The 
current policy decision cannot influence how expectations are formed, but can alter 
the expectation formed, by changing the state Zt. With Zt+l formed by (18) the 
transition equation for Zt becomes 
d,r 
Z, = [(A-C)-(D+F)9;r' Bz t-l +[A - F9;r'Gu, =91Zt-l +9 2u,. (22) 
Equation (22) expresses Zt as a V AR(l) process. As earlier, Q can now be solved 
numerically using (17) provided the spectral radius of [(A-C)-(D+F)S'lrIB is less 
than one. With the system cast in the form of a V AR(l) process optimization follows 
directly that described in Section 2.3 .1. Guesses at the feedback parameters in the 
future rule are made. Conditional on this guess of the future rule optimal feedback 
5 This is Binder and Pesaran' s (1995) 'brute force' method. 
17 
parameters for today's rule are found, and these are used to revise the guess at the 
future rule. This iterative procedure stops once a fixed point is obtained with \jf1 = <pI, 
\jf2 = <P2, and \jf3 = <P3 occurring naturally as the outcome of the optimization. 
2.4) An Application 
Our example is taken from Clarida, Gali and Gertler's (1999) (CGG) Journal of 
Economic Literature paper. CGG's analysis is theoretical , but we take their New 
Keynesian model and parameterize it for simulation purposes. Their model has two 
key equations: those for the output gap and inflation. Both demand and supply shocks 
are persistent, modeled as simple auto-regressive processes. The model also has a 
policy reaction function determined optimally, so the combined system has five 
equations. Using standard notation, the system is6 
y, = E ,y<+1 -y[i, -E,lI '+l l+ g, 
1I, =E ,lI' +1 +A.y, +u, 
y>O 
A>O 
with the demand and supply shocks modeled respectively as 
g, = ~gt-l + E, 0:S;~<1 
u, = pu ,-I + v, . O:s;p<1 
In matrix notation the CGG model can be written 
[ 1 0 Y][Y' ] [1 y - A. 1 0 1I, = 0 1 o 0 1 i, 0 0 
0] [y'+I] [1 o E, lI'+1 + 0 
o 1'+1 qJI 
o 
O.[g,] ~ u
o
' , 
qJ2 
with the error vector driven by 
(23) 
6 One important parameterization that is worth noting is that the coefficient on the expected inflation 
term in the Phillips curve would more generally equal the discount factor. Here the discount factor is 
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[
gt [11 0 °1[gt_l] [Et 1 ~t = ~ ~ ~ U~_l + ~t • 
As indicated in (23) the monetary authority sets the level of the nominal interest rate 
as a linear function of the two observed structural disturbances gt and Ul in order to 
minimize Loss[O,ooJ = aVar[YlJ + (l-a)Var[n,J. CGG's model assumes that period t 
expectations are formed, and period t policy decisions made, with all agents knowing 
the structure of the economy and aware of all variables dated period t or earlier. Thus 
policy makers know the demand and supply shocks before they set policy. 
Because demand innovations move output and inflation pro-cyclically, it is always 
optimal for policy makers to eliminate the influence of these demand innovations 
from the system - regardless of policy preferences. Consequently the coefficient 
applied to the demand disturbance in the optimal policy reaction function is invariant 
to the weight placed on output in the policy objective function , a . In what follows we 
solve the system using the method of undetermined coefficients, following Section 
2.3.2. 
Table 2.1 presents the optimal policy reaction functions for a range of values of a 
assuming the monetary authority can pre-commit to a course of action .? As expected 
the coefficient applied to the demand disturbance (gt) is invariant to a. Also observe 
that in the extreme cases where a = 0, 1 all volatility in inflation and output 
(respectively) can be completely eliminated. This is a consequence of agents and 
policy makers knowing the disturbances before they make their decisions. 
set to one to make the Phillips curve consistent with the loss function used, which weights the present 
and the future equall y. 
7 For simulation purposes we set: y = 0.8; A = 0.4; )l = 0.5; P = 0.5; and cr, = cr, = 1. The correlation 
between the supply and demand disturbances is set to zero. 
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Table 2.1 - Clarida-Gali-Gertler (1999) model under pre-commitment 
Feedback coefficients Std. Deviations % 
I-a gt Ut Yt 1tt it 
0 1.25 1.00 0.00 2.31 1.85 
0.2 1.25 1.08 0.40 1.99 1.91 
0.4 1.25 1.17 0.86 1.62 1.98 
0.6 1.25 1.28 1.41 1.18 2.06 
0.8 1.25 1.40 2.08 0.65 2.17 
1 1.25 1.56 2.89 0.00 2.31 
Table 2.2 derives optimal discretionary rules for the CGG model. Unsurprisingly, in 
the cases where a = 0, 1 the optimal pre-commitment and discretionary solutions 
coincide. In these two special cases the problem collapses to that where there is one 
instrument matched against a single policy goal. With one instrument and one goal 
the system is controllable, ruling out time-inconsistent behavior. 
Table 2.2 - Clarida-Gali-Gertler (1999) model under discretion 
Feedback coefficients Std. Deviations % 
I-a gt Ut Yt 1tt it 
0 1.25 1.00 0.00 2.31 1.85 
0.2 1.25 1.04 0.21 2.14 1.88 
0.4 1.25 1.10 0.51 1.90 1.92 
0.6 1.25 1.18 0.94 1.56 1.99 
0.8 1.25 1.32 1.62 1.01 2.10 
1 1.25 1.56 2.89 0.00 2.31 
Comparing Tables 2.1 and 2.2 reveals a property derived analytically in CGG: for a 
given value of a the variance of output is higher and the variance of inflation is lower 
under pre-commitment than discretion. CGG point to this property as a benefit 
accruing to pre-commitment, even in the absence of a discretionary bias. 
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Figure 2.1 plots the efficiency frontiers from the CGG model under pre-commitment 
and discretion. These frontiers map out a straight line and it is hard to distinguish 
between them. Clearly it is not the case that the efficiency frontier for the pre-
commitment case dominates that for discretion. So while for a given value of a pre-
commitment generates a lower variance of inflation and a higher variance of output 
than discretion does, by choosing a suitably, discretion can match the variances of 
both inflation and output produced by pre-commitment. Intuitively it is clear that to 
match both the variance of output and inflation the a under discretion must be less 
than that under pre-commitment. This is an example where appointing a Rogoff 
(1985) optimally conservative central banker would eliminate the time-inconsistency. 
2.S) Conclusions 
In dynamic economies where agents' form rational forward-looking expectations 
optimal policy rules are typically time-inconsistent. Control theory has addressed this 
problem by developing techniques to solve for optimal pre-commitment rules and 
optimal time-consistent (discretionary) rules. In the case of pre-commitment the 
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literature contains methods that solve for optimal rules and for optimal simple rules. 
But for discretion solution methods are currently only available to solve for optimal 
discretionary rules. This paper expands on this literature by presenting algorithms 
that solve for optimal simple discretionary rules. 
We began in Section 2.2 by surveying the techniques currently available in the 
literature for solving for optimal rules in rational expectations models. Here, the 
methods in Oudiz and Sachs (1985) that solve for optimal pre-commitment rules , 
optimal discretionary rules, and optimal simple pre-commitment rules in discrete time 
models were focused on. Section 2.3 presented two methods for solving for optimal 
simple discretionary rules. The first method, given in Section 2.3.1 , solves a similar 
class of models to that considered in Oudiz and Sachs (1985). It relies on matrix 
decomposition methods to solve the underlying rational expectations model. Section 
3.2 shows how optimal simple discretionary rules can be solved using the method of 
undetermined coefficients. As natural byproducts Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 also show 
how to solve for optimal simple pre-commitment rules as well as optimal 
discretionary rules. Having presented the solution algorithms, Section 2.4 took a 
recent paper by Clarida, Gali , and Gertler (1999) and applied the methods in Section 
2.3 to their model. 
The techniques derived in this paper are widely applicable. Much of the literature on 
monetary policy considers the properties and relative merits of simple rules. 
Relatively few papers analyze rules constructed using optimization and those that do 
invariably impose pre-commitment as a constraint. Optimal discretionary rules are 
rarely considered, and optimal simple di scretionary rules have been completely 
neglected. Yet only by comparing pre-commitment rules with discretionary rules can 
the advantages of pre-commitment be assessed. Moreover, it is as interesting to 
compare optimal rules with optimal simple rules under discretion as it is for pre-
commitment. 
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Appendix A: Taylor (1979) 
This example comes from Taylor's (1979) Econometrica paper. Taylor's model has 
five equations, two of which are estimated behavioral equations. These two estimated 
equations are for output and inflation respectively. Their structures are as follows 
y, =a,d, +a 2 y,_, +a 3 Y'_2 +a.d ,_, +asE,_,11:, +a 6 E,_, +11" 
11:, =bl11:'_l +b2E,_, +b 3E'_lY' +E,. 
Real money balances are denoted d" 111 and £, are demand and supply innovations 
respectively and the remaining notation is standard. Two identities (Yl.! = Yt.! and £,.! 
= £,.!) are used to manipulate the system into companion form. The fifth equation is a 
policy reaction function linking the policy instrument, d" to the observed state. 
The objective function Taylor uses is a weighted average of the unconditional 
variances of output and inflation with a representing the weight placed on output 
stabilization and I-a that on inflation stabilization. Applying the pre-commitment 
algorithm of Section 2.3.2 to this model produces the following optimal closed-loop 
policy reaction functions 8 
Table 2.3 can be compared to Table II in Taylor (1979); some differences are 
evident9 In light of Chow (1980), Preston and Pagan (1982) it is unsurprising that the 
results in Table 2.3 also pertain to the case of policy discretion. Quite why these 
results differ from those in Taylor is unclear. Notably, the three coefficients that both 
algorithms agree on are those stemming from the demand side of the model. From a 
control perspective it is always optimal to fully offset shocks propagated through the 
demand side of the model because such shocks move output and inflation pro-
cyclically. Observe also that the differences between those here and Taylor's are 
increasing in a. 
8 The simulations use Taylor' s estimated parameters: a, = 0.578; a2 = 1.167; a3 = -0.324; a4 = -0.484; as 
= -0.447; a,; = 0.38; b, = 1; b2 = -0.67; b3 = 0.018. Further 0" = 0.7916% per quarter, o , = 0.3661 % per 
quarter, and the correlation between the demand and supply shocks is 0.012. 
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Table 2.3 - Taylor (1979) model under pre-commitment and discretion 
Feedback coefficients Std. Deviations % 
ex Yt-I Yt-2 1tt-1 Ct_1 dt_1 sd(Yt) sd(1tt) 
0.01 -2.02 0.56 -15.09 9.46 0.84 2.16 1.64 
0.1 -2.02 0.56 -4.32 2.24 0.84 1.36 2.05 
0.2 -2.02 0.56 -2.65 1.12 0.84 1.20 2.30 
0.5 -2.02 0.56 -0.96 -0.02 0.84 1.02 2.92 
0.7 -2.02 0.56 -0.36 -0.42 0.84 0.94 3.46 
0.9 -2.02 0.56 0.19 -0.79 0.84 0.87 4.64 
ex Some Representative Results from Taylor (1979) 
0.01 -2.02 0.56 -15.11 9.49 0.84 2.14 1.64 
0.5 -2.02 0.56 -0.86 -0.09 0.84 1.01 2.88 
0.9 -2.02 0.56 0.29 -0.86 0.84 0.85 3.96 
9 In an effort to understand why these differences are occurring I have also solved the model using 
standard dynamic programming, following Taylor (1979). The results obtained were the same as those 
generated from my algorithm. The reason for these differences in results remains unresolved. 
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Appendix B: A Simple Analytic Example 
Consider the following simple model. Output, y" is described by the process 
y, =~E'Y'+l +yr, +u,. O:o::B:o:: l,y<O (Bl) 
The policy instrument is the real interest rate, rt. Demand shocks, u" follow the AR(1) 
process 
u, = PU'_l + c,. O:O::p<1 
All variables have had their averages removed. The objective function is a weighted 
average of the unconditional variances of output and the policy instrument: 
Loss[O,oo 1 = aVar(y,) + (1- a)Var(r,). O:O::a:O::l (B2) 
Bl) The Optimal Rule under Pre-Commitment using the Method of 
Undetermined Coefficients 
The state variable for the system is the demand shock, u" so the policy reaction 
function takes the form 
r, = qm, (B3) 
Substituting (B3) into (Bl) gives 
y, =~E'Y'+l +(I+y<p)u,. (B4) 
To solve this rational expectations model we posit the solution 
y, = eu, (B5) 
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and proceed to solve for 6. Leading (BS) by one period and taking the conditional 
expectation results in 
E,y'+l =6pu,. (B6) 
Substituting (B6) and (BS) into (B4) and equating coefficients gives 6 = (1 + y<p) , and 
(1- p~) 
therefore from (BS) the solution for output is 
(l+y<p) u 
y, = (l-p~) , (B7) 
The objective function is now written as LOSS[0,ool=Jl+y<PJ2cr~+(I-a)<p 2 cr ~ . 
'1 1- p~ 
Minimizing this loss function with respect to <p produces <p = - ay 2 ' , 
(l-a)(l-p~) +ay 
which is positive under the parameter assumptions above: policy tightens in response 
to positive demand shocks . In the special case where p = 0, ~ does not appear in the 
solution and the forward-looking component of (Bl) is non-consequential. 
B2) The Optimal Rule under Pre-Commitment using Oudiz and Sachs (1985) 
Recall that the model under consideration is 
y, = ~E , y,+, +yr, + u, O~~~I,y<O (BS) 
U, =PU '_l +€ " O~p<1 
Where the problem is to set the real interest rate, r" as a function of Ut to minimize 
(B2). This system can be expressed in matrix form: 
[ U ,+1 ] [ p 0 ] [u , ] [€ ,+t ] E,y '+l = _~ -l(1+y<p) ~-I y, + 0 . (B9) 
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<p is the feedback parameter to be optimally selected in the simple rule rt = <pUt. The 
eigenvalues of the coefficient matrix are clearly p and Wl , thus our assumptions 
regarding these two parameters (0 < p, ~ < 1) ensure that our system has a saddle-
point independent of policy. That the system is stablizable with a unique rational 
expectations solution follows. We assume that these eigenvalues are distinct and 
employ a spectral decomposition to solve the system. 10 Specifically: 
u t +1 _ l+y<p 
[ 
1 
[EtYtJ - I-p~ O][P ~I ][_ Il Y<I> 1 ° ~ 1- P~ ~I~:H'~'l 
Restricting the system to lie on its saddle-arm implies y, = (1+Y<I» u t ' which gives (1- p~) 
the same transition equation for output as that derived using the method of 
undetermined coefficients, equation (B7). Therefore, the optimal value of <p will also 
be the same, given the same objective function. 
83) The Optimal Rule under Discretion using the Method of Undetermined 
Coefficients 
To solve the system we assume that current policy is set using the rule (B3) while 
future policy follows r'+j = 'l'u t+j , \;f j ~ 1. We are looking for a stationary solution, so 
the equilibrium will have \jf = <p, but the important point is that policy makers today 
must optimize over their choice of <p allowing for the fact that the process by which 
agents form their expectations will be a function of 1J! and not ({J. 
Consider the period t+l problem. The transition equation is 
Yt+1 =~Et+tYt+2 + (1+Y'I')U'+I' (BlO) 
Positing the solution 
10 That the eigenvectors have been arbitrarily normalized and not normalized to length one, as is 
common, in no way alters the solution. The normalization applied was chosen for convenience. 
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Y'+l = 9U'+l (Bll) 
and using the method of undetermined coefficients produces the solution for 9: 
I+H' 
9 = I-pP . (BI2) 
Using (BI2) and (Bll) in (BlO) gives y, = [ 1 + Y<P + pp 1 + Y'VJu,. The loss function 
I-pP 
is therefore given by LOSS[0'OO]=Jl+Y<P+pp l+ YIjfJ2cr~+(I-a)<p2cr~, which 
'1 1- pp 
when differentiated with respect to <p - holding ljI constant - gives the first order 
condition 
------''---'-....::. = 2cr u ay 1 + Y<P + pp-- + 2(1- a)<pcr~. dLoss[O,oo] 2 [ I+ YIjf J ' d<p 1- pp (BI3) 
Now, recognizing that the objectives, incentives, and constraints facing future policy 
makers are the same as those faced today, we set Ijf = <p and find the zero of (BI3): 
-ay 
<P = , . (1- a)(I- pP) + ay- (BI4) 
Under our parameter assumptions the feedback coefficient under discretion is positive 
with slightly smaller magnitude than that under commitment, implying a less activist 
stance. The feedback coefficients under pre-commitment and discretion are the same 
only in the special case where p = 0, or ex = 0, 1. The latter two cases correspond to 
situations where the number of instruments equals the number of goals. 
28 
B4) The Optimal Rule under Discretion using Oudiz and Sachs (1985) 
To trans late the example above to one with a finite time horizon the policy loss 
T 
function is taken to be Loss[O, T] = l: a[Yi] 2 + (1- a)[ri]2. The dynamic constraints 
i=O 
are: 
y, =~E,y,+, +yr, +u" 
U,=PU ,_,+E,. 
O::;~::; I , y<O 
O::;p<I 
(BI5) 
(BI6) 
Consider the period T problem. Expected variables can be written as a function of the 
state and therefore 
ETYT+, =HT+,ETu T+, =HT+,PU T, (BI7) 
where HT+I has yet to be determined. Importantly, HT+I is independent of the current 
policy. Substituting (BI7) into (BI5) gives 
YT = (1 + P~HT+ I )u T + yrT· (BI8) 
Equation (BI8) allows a standard dynamic programming solution and we therefore 
proceed to minimize the period T loss function, Loss[T,TJ, subject to (BI8). The first 
order condition gives the policy reaction function 
rT =-ay[(l-a)+ay2r'[I+p~HT+,]uT· (BI9) 
Next substitute (B 19) back into (B 18) producing 
YT =(I-a)[(l-a)+ay2r'[1+p~HT+,]uT =HTu T. 
We look for a time-invariant solution and therefore seek Ho = H generated from the 
time-recursion as T ~ -= of 
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HT = (1-a)[(1-a)+ay 2 r 1[1+ppHT+1 l (B20) 
The fixed-point, H, of (B20) is 
I-a 
H= . (1- a) + ay2 - app (B2l) 
Finally substituting (B2l) into (B19) yields 
-ay 
f [ = ., u t • [(1- a)(l- pP) + ay-l 
(B22) 
The solution given by (B22) is identical to that derived using the method of 
undetermined coefficients, equation (B14). In general numerical methods are needed 
to solve for the fixed-point of (B20). In the example given any sensible value for HT+I 
is permissible as a starting value in the time recursion used to solve for H. This is 
because the system has a saddle-point independently of policy and (B20) is a 
contraction mapping. More generally, the starting value for HT+I must place the 
system on its stable-manifold. To make this clearer, assume that the solution to the 
period T problem gives the feedback rule 
rT = bTu T· (B23) 
where bT is a non-linear function of the system parameters, determined by the period 
T optimization. I I We now allow for the fact the Yt is a jump variable and impose the 
restriction that the system has a saddle-point. To do this , substitute (B23) into (BlS) 
and combine (BlS) with (B16) in matrix form 
[ UT+l ] [ p 0 ][u
T] [lO T+I ] 
ETYT+l = -P-l(l+ybT) p-l YT + 0 . 
(B24) 
II This optimization requires imposing a terminal condition. Here we set ETYT+I = O. Optimizing 
subject to this terminal condition produces the solution ~ = -ay/[(l-a)+CLYJ. This value of ~ would 
be used to initialize the time-recursion. 
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Note that equation (B24) has the same fonn as (B9), and that under the parameter 
assumptions of the model the system is saddle-point stable independent of policy. As 
with the system (B9) for the system to be on its sable-arm requires 
(1+ybT )U
T
. 
YT = (1- p~) 
With output in the last period given by (B25) , 
HT = (1 + yb T ) 
(l-p~) . 
(B25) 
(B26) 
Clearly HT depends on hT. Now consider the period just prior to the terminal period. 
From (B25) ET-1YT = (1 + ybT) PUT_I' which implies 
(1- p~) 
- [1 + P~ybT ]U
T
_1 + yrT _1. YT-l - 1-p~ (B27) 
The next step is to minimize the loss function Loss[T-1,T] subject to (B27) as a 
constraint. This minimization gives the policy reaction function rT_1 = bT_1 U T_1 where 
b T_1 =-y(1-a+ ay 2) -IHT • (B28) 
Finally, use (B28) to find the time-invariant steady-state policy feedback parameter. 
The solution to the problem is found as the joint backward time-recursion of (B26) 
and (B28) until convergence. The solution is 
b -ay (B29) (l-a)(l-p~)+ay2 . 
Equation (B29) is of course identical to (B14). Consequently, Oudiz and Sach' s 
(1985) method produces the same solution as the techniques developed in this paper. 
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Chapter 3 
INSTABILITY UNDER NOl\flNAL GDP TARGETING: THE ROLE OF 
EXPECT A TIONS 
3.1) Introduction 
Over recent years there has been increasing interest in monetary policy, with much of 
this interest focussing upon the properties of monetary policy rules. Whether they 
employ activist or non-activist methods the common basis shared by these rules is that 
they aim to provide the economy with a nominal anchor. Three rules that have 
received particular, and recent, attention are Bryant, Hooper and Mann (1993) (BHM) 
rules (of which Taylor rules - Taylor, 1993 - are a special case), Nominal GDP 
targeting rules (McCallum, 1989a), and inflation forecast targeting rules (Svensson, 
1997a). 
The BHM rule first came to popular attention when Taylor (1993) showed that his 
variant of it could accurately describe actual U.S monetary policy decisions over 
recent years.! It also has the virtue of being simple and easy to compute. Subsequent 
studies have suggested that monetary policy in a range of other countries can be well 
approximated by BHM type rules (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, 1998). One of the 
criticisms leveled at BHM rules is that in their proposed form they are not operational. 
They assume unreali stically that policy makers know the current levels of output, 
potential output, and inflation when they set policy. Publication lags along with 
subsequent data revisions (Orphanides , 1997) suggest that these informational 
requirements are too stringent. 
An operational BHM rule could, therefore, be more usefully based on lagged values 
of these variables or on current expected values formed using period t-l information. 
Rudebusch and Svensson (1998), on the other hand, argue that central banks do have 
information in addition to that held by private agents. While central banks may not 
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know the current values of output and inflation, assuming that they do may usefully 
capture the presence of this additional information. 
Proponents of nominal GDP targeting, McCallum (1989a, 1989b), Hall and Mankiw 
(1994) for example, have emphasised its operationality - it depends only on variables 
known to policy makers - and its robustness. Because policy makers do not know the 
correct specification of the economy they require a rule that performs adequately over 
a range of models rather than optimally over just one. They argue that nominal GDP 
targeting provides such a rule. Finally, Svensson (1997a, 1997b) has argued that a 
central bank's inflation forecasts provide the ideal intermediate target and that 
inflation forecast targeting better captures the forward-looking nature of actual policy 
making. 
In an interesting and important paper, Ball (1999) uses a simple macro-economic 
model to analyse the properties of each of these three policy rules. First Ball (1999) 
finds that a BHM rule is optimal regardless of the preferences of policy makers and, 
moreover, that inflation forecast targeting rules can always be expressed as a BHM 
rule. Thus Ball (1999) unites BHM rules and inflation targeting rules and shows them 
to have many desirable properties. Ironically, Ball (1999) further shows that nominal 
GDP targeting is not robust to his specification. Instead nominal GDP targeting is 
'disastrous' leading to instability in inflation and output. Svensson (1997b) replicates 
Ball's instability result and suggests that it is the stylised fact that policy affects real 
output before inflation that Ball builds into his model that is at the heart of the 
instability result. 
In reply to Ball (1999) and Svensson (1997b), McCallum (1997) argues that the Ball-
Svensson instability result is a special case, and, furthermore, not a very interesting 
case. McCallum (1997) shows that the stability properties of the system come down 
to how the Phillips curve, or supply-side of the economy, is specified. By considering 
a range of five different supply-side formulations - all of which result in stable 
systems - McCallum (1997) concludes that the Ball-Svensson instability result is 
fragile. 
I This does not imply, however, that the US federal Reserve actually follows a Taylor rule when 
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This dependence of the properties of nominal GDP targeting on the supply side of the 
economy parallels an earlier debate between Bean (1983) and West (1986). In an 
early analytical paper examining the properties of nominal GDP targeting, Bean 
(1983) uses a rational expectations model , with inelastic labour supply, and the policy 
objective of stabilising real output, to show that nominal GDP targeting is the optimal 
policy. When labour supply is elastic, Bean (1983) shows that a nominal GDP rule 
responds optimally to demand shocks but is sub-optimal in the face of supply shocks. 
In response to Bean (1983), West (1986) shows that Bean's results depend crucially 
upon how the supply side of the economy is specified. By modifying the supply side 
of the model West (1986) generates results precisely the opposite to those derived by 
Bean (1983). 
In this paper we examine further the nature and robustness of the Ball-Svensson 
instability result. Our examination focuses on the important role expectations play in 
the short-run aggregate supply curve. Ball (1999) uses an accelerationist Phillips 
curve that essentially takes agents' expectation of inflation to equal last period' s 
inflation rate. We show that if inflation expectations are formed using any of a 
number of other processes, then economic stability generally prevails. We further 
show that this is true for nominal GDP growth targeting and nominal GDP level 
targeting. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. We begin in Section 3.2.1 by presenting and 
discussing the Ball-Svensson instability result, and discussing the time-series 
properties of the unstable system. We use Sections 3.2.2, 3.2.3, and 3.2.4 to 
generalise on the accelerationist Phillips curve and show that stability is restored 
under adaptive expectations, fully forward-looking expectations, and partly forward-
looking expectations respectively. Section 3.2.5 provides a discussion of these 
results . 
Section 3.3 turns to nominal GDP level targeting. We begin by outlining the stability 
of the system using the baseline accelerationist Philips curve. Next we examine level 
targeting when private agents form adaptive expectations. We find for both of these 
supply-side specifications that exact level targeting generates identical stability 
making its decisions. 
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properties to growth targeting, and we present a result showing why this must be the 
case. 
Inexact targeting is briefly discussed in Section 3.4. Here we show that when inexact 
targeting rather than exact targeting is applied to Ball ' s (1999) system then the model 
is stable for all plausible parameter values. Sections 3.5 discusses interest rate 
smoothing while Section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2) Growth targeting 
Consider the simple two equation model of inflation and excess demand 
y, = 'AY'_I - yr'_1 + v, ' y> 0, 0::; A::; 1; (1) 
It, = lt ~ + UY '_I + u,' u>o (2) 
where Yt is the output gap measured as a percent, nt is the difference between inflation 
and its target rate, n te is a measure of expected 14, and rt is the difference between the 
real interest rate and its equilibrium level. The stochastic errors, Ut and vt, are 
assumed to be independent iid[O,cr2] processes. 
The instrument available to the monetary authority is assumed to be rt. Policy makers 
actually set the nominal interest rate , but by setting it equal to their desired real 
interest rate plus expected inflation they effectively set rt itself. Setting to one side 
inflation expectations, monetary policy impacts on real demand through the IS curve, 
equation (1), after one period with aggregate demand then having a flow on effect to 
inflation after a further period. With these policy lags the model is best viewed as an 
annual one. 
Policy makers are assumed to target nominal GDP growth . That is they set the current 
level of the real interest rate such that next period' s expected nominal GDP growth 
equals zero2 In mathematical terms rt_l is set so that 
2 A target rate of zero is chosen for simpliCity. Any other rate could be chosen without affecting the 
stability propenies we derive. 
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E,_, (11:, + y, - y'_I) = 0, (3) 
where Et_1 is the mathematical expectations operator conditional upon all information 
dated period t-1 and earlier. The monetary authority, therefore, is assumed to form its 
expectations rationally even if private agents do not. Moreover, we are assuming that 
the monetary authority fully knows the state of the system when it sets its policy 
instrument, ie it sets rt-I with an information set that includes t-1 information. 
Next we examine the stability of output and inflation under a range of assumptions 
about how private agents form their inflation expectations - assuming that monetary 
policy is constrained by equation (3). 
3.2.1) Accelerationist Phillips Curve 
Result one (Ball-Svensson): Assume that the system is given by equations (1), (2), and 
(3) and that nte = 1I:t-l, ie that the short-run Phillips curve is of the 
accelerationist variety. Then the system is unstable with inflation and output 
non-stationary processes. 
Setting nte = nt-I in (2) and substituting (1) and (2) into (3) produces the following 
state-contingent policy reaction function: 3 
1 
rH =-[11:'_1 +(a+A.-1)Y,_t]· y (4) 
Substituting (4) back into (1) and ignoring the stochastic error terms gives us the 
V AR(l) model 
[
y, ] = [1- a -l][Y ,_t] . 
11:, a 1 1I:H 
(5) 
3 Interestingly, we see that the implied policy reaction function from the moment condition (3) is in the 
form of a BHM rule. 
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Stability depends upon the eigenvalues of the coefficient matrix. These eigenvalues 
can be found by solving for the roots of the quadratic 
11 2 -(2-a)Il+1=O. 
These roots are 
Il L2 = (2-a)±~ 
2 
(6) 
For a > 4, one of either Ill, 112 lie outside the unit circle. When a < 4 the modulus of 
III and 112 equal 
J( 2-a)2 (4-a) - +a--, 2 4 
which after canceling terms can be seen to equal 1. Thus when the roots are 
imaginary they lie on the unit circle. Finally, when a = 4 both roots equal -l. 
Consequently, for all values of a > 0 the system is either unstable or has roots on the 
unit circle. In either case Yt and 11:t are non-stationary. This is the Ball-Svensson 
instability result. 
Note that the roots of the system depends only on a and not on f... or y. The 
specification of the IS curve in no way affects the stability of the system (see also 
McCallum, 1997). 
The cause of this instability can best be understood as follows. In period t when 
policy makers are setting rt they do so on the basis that EtTI:t+1 and EtYt are 
predetermined. Thus the policy objective is met by policy makers fixing rt to set 
EtYt+1 appropriately. Policy makers behave this way every period so rt+1 is set taking 
Et+I11:t+2 and Et+lYt+1 as predetermined. Consequently the policy objective is met with 
policy makers only considering the interest rate's effect on the output gap and 
ignoring the subsequent effect the output gap has on inflation. But the output gap 
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pennanently alters the following period's inflation rate. Because of this follow on 
effect, the interest rate setting in period t pennanently effects both Et+l1tt+2 and 
Et+1Yt+l, but this effect is ignored by policy makers when they set rt. Since the channel 
policy makers are ignoring has pennanent implications for inflation in subsequent 
periods policy makers find themselves having to offset the pennanent effect of earlier 
policy decisions. This sets up a pennanent cycle in the interest rate, which transmits 
itself into the output gap and inflation. 
Ball-Svensson instability is an example of instrument instability. One proposed 
solution to instrument instability is to take a more medium tenn or forward-looking 
approach to policy (Holbrook, 1972). In this spirit, Svensson (1997b) shows that if 
monetary policy is constrained by a restriction such as Et.1(1tH I + Yt - Yt-l) = 0, then 
instability would not appear. The intuition here is that monetary policy affects both 
1rt+l and Yt - Yt-l with the same lag, and hence policy makers consider policy's effect 
on both Et1tH 2 and EtYt+l when setting rt. Policy makers no longer find themselves 
having to fully offset earlier policy decisions. Yet constraining Et-1(1tt+l + Yt - Yt-l) is 
unsatisfactory because it has no natural interpretation or justification. 
The policy constraint (3) can be obtained from the first order condition of the 
minimisation problem 
Loss[O,oo]=E'_ILqJi(7t'+i +Y'+i -Y'_I+i)2, 
i=O 
subject to equations (1), (2). 
0<<p::;1 
Accordingly the Ball-Svensson instability result depends upon policy makers being 
constrained by a loss function that has perfect substitutability between inflation and 
output growth. The levels of inflation and output themselves do not matter. But if the 
policy loss only depends upon the level of nominal GDP growth why are we then 
concerned that this loss function leads to infinite variances in output and inflation? 
Afterall, output and inflation do not separately enter the loss function. Alternatively, 
if policy makers are concerned with the variances in inflation and output, why do we 
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impose on them a loss function that states that only the sum of inflation and output 
growth matter? 
To better analyse the statistical nature of the instability present in this system we 
represent the system (5) as 
Yt = (2-a)Yt_l -Yt-2 -U t +V t -Vt_1 (7) 
and 
11: t = (2-a)11: t_1 -11: t_2 +av t_1 +U t -(1-a)u t_1 • (8) 
Equations (7) and (8) have identical autoregressive structures. Therefore any unit 
root(s) present must lie at the same point(s) in the spectrum for both Yt and 71:t. We 
note that in the special case when a = 0 both Yt and 14 contain double unit roots; the 
system is unstable but does not contain a cycle. When a = 2 Yt and 71:t are integrated 
with roots of L = ± i, suggesting a cyclical pattern in which a full cycle is completed 
every four years. Similarly, for a = 4 Yt and 71:t are integrated, each containing the two 
roots L = -1, -1. The root L = -1 indicates the presence of a cycle with a two year 
duration. We note that as a declines from 4 toward 0 the length of the cycle 
increases. 
In the literature on seasonality, roots of L = -1, ± i represent integration at seasonal 
frequencies (Hylleberg, Engle, Granger, and Yoo, 1990). But as we discussed earlier 
our model is best interpreted in annual terms, and hence the roots described above do 
not represent seasonality. Instead they indicate the presence of something akin to a 
business cycle. By targeting nominal GDP in this model, policy makers, instead of 
controlling inflation by eliminating the demand cycle, by their very actions introduce 
a pronounced cycle into the economy. 
3.2.2) Adaptive expectations 
Consider now an alternative form of backward-looking expectations - adaptive 
expectations. Under adaptive expectations we write 
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n; =nH +o(n;_1 -n H ), 0::; 0::; 1. (9) 
When 0 = 0 adaptive expectations simplifies to produce an accelerationist Phillips 
curve. Alternatively, 0 = 1 implies that inflation expectations equal some fixed 
constant. 
Result two: Assume that the system can be represented by equations (1), (2) , and (3) , 
and that inflation expectations are formed adaptively by (9). Then the system 
is stable provided 0 < 0 < 1 and 0 < a < 2. As a increases above 2 stability 
requires smaller values for o. The model is unstable for a ~ 4. 
Introducing the lag operator (Z,.j = Lz,), (9) can be written as 
e (l-o)L 
n =--n 
, (l-oL) , . (10) 
Substituting both (10) and (2) into (3) yields 
E'_llc+(l-L)-I(u, -ou H +aY'_1 -aoy,_J+y, -Yt-lJ=O, 
where c is an arbitrary constant. Multiplying through by the difference operator (I-L) 
and recognizing that E,.ry, = y, + £" where £, is an innovation orthogonal to the 
monetary authority's information set, produces the AR(2) process 
y, + (a - 2)y t-1 + (1- ao)y t-2 = E, + OU t-I . (11) 
Equation (11) will be stable provided the following three conditions are met (see 
Harvey, 1981, or Sargent, 1987): 
a) 1 + (a-2) + (l-ao) > 0; 
b) 1 - (a-2) + (l-ao) > 0; 
c) 1 - (1-all) > O. 
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Because we have assumed that a > 0, condition c) is satisfied provided 0 > O. 
Similarly, condition a) is met if we further restrict 0 < 1. Re-writing condition b) we 
obtain a(1 +0) < 4. Consequently, provided 0 < 0 < 1 the system is stable if 0 < a < 2. 
As a increases above 2 the system requires increasingly smaller values of 0 if stability 
is to be obtained. For a ~ 4 the system is unstable. However, if Svensson (1997b, 
page 20) is correct in his conjecture that a < 1, then the system is stable under 
adaptive expectations except in the extreme cases where 0 = 0, 1. 
3.2.3) Rational expectations 
Now let us assume that inflation expectations are formed by n,e = E t • l 1tt+l. Thus it is 
next period's inflation rate that is relevant for the Phillips curve, and we assume that 
private agents form their expectations rationally using all information dated period t-l 
or earlier. 
Roberts (1995) shows that a Phillips curve with inflation expectations of this form can 
be justified by a number of models including the costly price adjustment model of 
Rotemberg (1982), and the staggered contracts time-dependent pricing model of 
Calvo (1983). In these models it is the firm's inability to set prices costlessly and 
instantaneously that directs firms to anticipate future price movements when setting 
prices today. 
Result three: Assume that the system can be represented by (1), (2), and (3) and that 
1tt
e 
= Et - l1tt+l . Then the system is stable provided 0 < a < 4. 
Using (1), (2) and (3) along with our assumption that n,e = Et . l 1tt+l we obtain the 
optimal state contingent policy reaction function4 
4 We should note that the expectation E,. !1lt+! is not predetermined at time t-l , and that this reduces the 
control lag to inflation to that of output: one period. Svensson (l997b) argues this situation is 
conducive to stability. That it is the expectations channel and not the reduced control lag that is behind 
Result three can be seen by the fact that E,.21lt+! and E,.!1lt+! differ onl y in that with the latter agents 
know u,. ! and v,.!. But E'.21lt+! is predetermined at t-I , and these innovation terms do not affect the 
system' s stabi lity. Thus the stability properties of the system are the same regardless of whether 
expectations are formed using t-l or t-2 information. 
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1 
r'_1 = -[E'_I1t '+1 + (a + A. -1)y '-I ]' 
Y 
Substituting (12) into (1) results in the reduced fonn system 
y, = -E'_I1t'+1 -(a-l)Y'_1 + v, 
1t, =E'_I1t'+1 +aY '_1 +u,. 
The state variables of (13), (14) are YI_I, VI and ul · Thus we posit the solution 
y, =8"Y'_1 +812U, +8I3 v, 
1t, =8 zI Y, _1 +8 zz u, +8 Z3 v,. 
From (15) and (16) 
E '_I 1t '+1 = 821 8" Y'-I' 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
Note that stability of the system depends only upon the magnitude of 8 11 . Substituting 
(15), (16), and (17) into (13) and (14) and equating coefficients gives the following set 
of restrictions on the undetermined coefficients : 
i) 8" =-8 z1 8,, -(a-I); 
ii) 81z =0; 
iii) 813 = I ; 
iv) 8z1 =8 z1 8" +a ; 
v) 8Z2 = 1; 
vi) 8 23 =0. 
We can solve for 8 11 from (i) and (iv) by recognizing that 8 11 + 82 1 = 1. Following 
this strategy we substitute 821 = 1 - 811 into (i) resulting in the quadratic 
8 ;1 -28" + 1-a=O . (18) 
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Solving (18) for 8 11 yields 
811 = li.Ja . 
From (13) and (14), however, we know that when a = 1, Yt-I cannot affect Yt. Then 
McCallum's (1983) minimum state variable criteria dictates that we take the negative 
root, which ensures that our model is stable for all 0 < a < 4. Inflation and the output 
gap are non-stationary when a 2': 4, but a < 4 is the relevant case. Notice, however, 
that for 1 < a < 4, 8 11 is negative implying that output is negatively correlated with its 
own first lag over this parameter range. Under Svensson's (1997b) conjecture that a 
< 1 this correlation is positive. 
3.2.4) Mixed Expectations 
In our final example we consider the generalisation whereby inflation expectations 
contain forward-looking and backward-looking components: 
11:: = ~E t-J1I: t+l + (1- ~)11: ' -i' O:5~:51. (19) 
This specification for inflation expectations arises naturally from the analyses in 
Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.3 . With instability present when ~ = 0 but absent when ~ = 1 it 
is natural to examine f3 values between 0 and 1 to uncover the cross-over point 
between stability and instability. Moreover, equation (19) could arise if some agents 
were forward-looking and others backward-looking (heterogenous expectations) or 
possibly through contracting behaviour. When f3 = 0 equation (19) reduces to the 
accelerationist Phillips curve we studied in Section 3.2.1. Alternatively, when ~ = 1 
we have the fully forward-looking case studied in Section 3.2.3. 
Result four: Assume that the system can be represented by (1), (2), and (3), and that 
inflation expectations are formed by (19). Then for 0 < f3 :5 1 the system is 
stable provided 0 < a < 4. 
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By substituting (19) into (2) and then (1) and (2) into (3) we can easily derive the 
optimal policy reaction function. We then substitute this policy reaction function 
back into (1) to produce the reduced form system below. 
Yt = -~Et_l7Ct+1 -(I-~)7Ct_1 -(a-l)Yt_1 + v t 
7C t =~Et_l7Ct+1 +(I-~)7Ct_1 +aYt_1 +u t · 
(20) 
(21) 
The state variables for this system are: nt.l, Yt. l, Ut and vt. Accordingly we posit the 
solution 
Yt =8 Il Yt_1 + 812 7C t_1 +8 13 u t +8 14 v t 
7C t = 8 21 Yt_1 + 8 22 7C t-l + 8 23 u t + 824 v t · 
(22) 
(23) 
Using (22) and (23) along with (20) and (21) we equate coefficients to derive the 
following restrictions upon 8 11 , 8 12, 621 and 622 (we ignore the remaining coefficients 
because they do not affect the stability of the system). 
i) 811 =-~821811 -~822821 +1-a; 
ii) 612 = -~821812 - ~6~2 -1 + ~ ; 
iii) 6 21 = ~82161l + ~822821 + a; 
iv) 6 22 = ~821612 + ~8~2 + 1- ~. 
From ii) and iv) we observe that 6 12 = - 6n. Similarly, i) and ii) imply the relationship 
6 11 + 621 = 1. Using these relationships we can reduce our system down to two non-
linear simultaneous equations in 621 , 822 . 
~8~2 -(1+~821)822 +1-~ =0 
~8~1 -(~+~822 -1)8 21 -a=O 
From (24) the solutions for 822 are 
(24) 
(25) 
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8 = ~821 + 1 + ~(1 + ~821)2 -4(1- ~)~ 
22 2~ - 2~ . 
However, from Section 3.2.3 we know that when /3 = 1,822 must equal zero because 
1Ct -1 is no longer a member of the minimum set of state variables. Therefore, the 
appropriate root is the negative one and the solution for 822 is 
8
0
? = ~821 + 1 _ ~(1 + ~82Y - 4(1- ~)~ 
-- 2~ 2~ 
(26) 
Similarly, the roots of (25) are 
821 
~ + ~822 -1 + ~(~ + ~822 _1)2 + 4a~ 
2~ 2~ 
But from Section 3.2.3 we know that when /3 = 1, 822 = 0 and 821 = ~(J. . Therefore, the 
appropriate root is the positive one and the solution for 821 is 
8 = ~ + ~822 -1 + ~(~ + ~822 _1)2 + 4a~ 
21 2~ 2~ ' (27) 
Clearly (26) and (27) are not closed form solutions for 821 and 822• However, given 
values for (J. and /3 we can numerically solve for 821 and 822 . Once we know 821 and 
822 we can easily determine the stability of the system by checking the roots of 
~2 -(1-8 21 +822)~+822 =0. 
Performing these numerical simulations reveals that for 0 < (J. < 4, 0 < /3 :5 1, the 
system is stable. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 graph the modulus of the roots of the system 
over these parameter ranges. These figures show that when /3 = 0 the model is 
unstable (the Ball-Svensson result) and that for all other values of /3 the model is 
stable provided 0 < (J. < 4. Thus for plausible values of (J. the system will be stable 
45 
provided private agents ' inflation expectations place some positive weight on future 
inflation outcomes. 
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3.2.5) Expectations and Stability 
We described earlier how the cause of the Ball-Svensson instability was generated by 
the fact that monetary policy affects inflation and real growth with different lags. 
When a temporary positive inflation shocks hits the economy policy makers can 
initially do nothing and the shock passes directly into inflation. In the next period 
policy makers raise the interest rate to lower real demand and hence bring nominal 
GDP growth back to target. The nature of the Phillips curve is such that these policy 
actions are then transmitted permanently into inflation. Thus in following periods 
policy makers find themselves in the position of having to repeatedly offset previous 
policy actions. 
The problem the monetary authority faces is that it cannot exert any leverage over 
inflation, but must act upon it indirectly through real demand, and this takes an 
additional period. However, when agents have forward-looking expectations they 
anticipate future policy actions and moderate their inflation expectations accordingly. 
Through inflation expectations, therefore, the monetary authority has a channel 
through which it can exert some influence over current inflation. By changing the 
timing with which monetary policy affects inflation, inflation expectations eliminate 
any permanent cycle - any cycle that exists will be in the form of damped oscillations. 
Agents do not need to be fully forward-looking to prevent a permanent cycle from 
developing - even a small amount of forward-looking behaviour provides a channel 
through which monetary policy can affect current inflation. 
3.3) Level Targeting 
Having discussed the case of nominal GDP growth targeting we now turn to nominal 
GDP level targeting. Ball (1999) has shown that GDP level targeting with an 
accelerationist Phillips curve also creates instability. Consider the system 
Yt = "AYt_l -yrt-J +v t ' 
1t t = 1t~ + ay t-l + U t ' 
Pt = Pt-l + 7C t , 
y>O,O~A~l; 
0:>0 
(28) 
(29) 
(30) 
47 
where Pt is the (logged) current price level. The monetary authority is assumed to 
choose the interest rate in period t -1 such that 
Et_t(p, +Y,)=z 0< z < 00. (31 ) 
Result five (Ball): Assume that the system can be represented by (28), (29), (30) with 
1It< = 1It-l , and that policy is constrained by (31). Then the system will be 
unstable with properties identical to those of Result one. 
Deriving the optimal policy reaction function, substituting it back into (28), and 
ignoring the constant and innovation terms, which do not affect stability, results in the 
VAR(l) model 
[
y,] [-a -1 
1t, = a 1 
p, a 
-ll[y'-I]. o 1t'_1 
1 P'_I 
Clearly the coefficient matrix is singular and can have at most two non-zero 
eigenvalues. Using a co-factor expansion the eigenvalues of the system can be found 
by solving for J.t in 
11[11 2 - (2 - a)11 + 1] = O. 
As expected one eigenvalue is zero while the remaining two are determined by the 
quadratic expression in the square brackets. However, this quadratic is identical to 
equation (6) used to determine stability under nominal GDP growth targeting with an 
accelerationist Phillips curve. Therefore the stability properties of the model under 
level targeting are the same as those under growth targeting: the model is unstable. 
Result six: Assume that the system can be represented by (28), (29), (30), and (31) 
with inflation expectations formed adaptively through (9). Then the system 
has stability properties identical to those of Result two. 
Equations (28), (29), and (30) become 
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y, = AY'_1 -yr'_l +v" y>O,O::;;A,::;; 1; 
7I, = (l-o)L (1_0L)7I, +aY '_1 +u 
" 
co 0, 0::;; 0::;; 1 (32) 
p, = P'-l + 7I , . (33) 
Canceling terms (32) can be re-written as 
1 
7I , =c+--[(l-oL)u, +aY'_1 -aoy,_? ], 
l-L -
(34) 
where again c is an arbitrary constant. Similarly, (33) can be expressed as 
1 
p, =a+
1
_
L
[7I,l. (35) 
By using (34) and (35) in (31) we produce 
Et-t [ a +_1_[c+_1_((l_OL)U , +aY t-t -aoy ,_? )] + y,] = z . (l-L) (l-L) - (36) 
Multiplying (36) through by (1_L)2 and recognising that y, = E'- JY' + 10, allows us to 
express (36) as the AR(2) process 
y, + (a - 2)y t-t + (1- ao)y ,- 2 = E, + OU '_I· (37) 
Equation (37), however, is simpl y a re-statement of the AR(2) process we derived 
under nominal GDP growth targeting with adaptive expectations (equation 11). 
Clearly the characteristic equations of (37) and (11) are the same and therefore the 
systems have the same roots , implying that their stability properties are identical. As 
with the accelerationist Phillips curve, here again with adaptive expectations we have 
the result that the system' s stability properties are identical under either nominal GDP 
growth or nominal GDP level targeting. 
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That level targeting and growth targeting produce identical stability properties under 
an accelerationist Phillips curve and adaptive expectations is no coincidence. The 
stability properties will be the same regardless of how private agents form their 
expectations. We now show this result. 
Result seven: Assume that the monetary authority knows the system and forms its 
expectations rationally using current period information. Then the stability 
properties of the system under nominal GDP level targeting are identical to 
those under nominal GDP growth targeting. 
Define the current price level as Pt = pt-l + n,. Now general forms of exact nominal 
GDP growth targeting and exact nominal GDP level targeting can be represented by 
the following constraints respectively. 
E t_1(1I: t +Yt -Y t-l)= q , 
E t-l (p, + y,) = z" Zt> 0 V t, 
(growth targeting) 
(level targeting) 
(38) 
(39) 
We assume that qt and Zt are independent of Yt and n, and hence note that setting (38) 
and (39) to target qt and Zt respectively is arbitrary and does not affect the stability of 
the system. By substituting Pt = Pt-l + n, into (39) we obtain 
E '_I(Pt-l +11:, +Y,)=z, (40) 
However, since the monetary authority targets nominal GDP in each period, it must be 
the case that we also have 
E'_2 (P'-l + Y t-l) = Z'_l 
and hence that 
E '_2P '_1 = -E'_2Y'_1 + Z'_l' (41) 
Adding and subtracting E,.2Pt-l from the LHS of (40) and exploiting (41) gives us 
50 
E H (pt-l- E t-2Pt-l +1t t +Yt -Et_ZYt_l)=Zt -Zt_l· (42) 
Now, provided the monetary authority forms its expectations rationally we can define 
pt-I = Et-ZPt-1 + 11t·1 and Yt.1 = Et-2Yt-1 + Et-I, where Et-I and 11t-1 are forecast errors 
orthogonal to the monetary authority 's period t-2 information set, but known to policy 
makers in period t-1. Substituting these definitions into (42) and canceling terms 
yields 
E t_l (1t, +Yt -Yt-l)=Zt -Zt-l-Et-l-Tl H · (43) 
But (43) is identical to (38) where qt = (I-L)zt - EI-I - 11t-l , thus the stability properties 
of the two targeting rules are identical. This result obtains because once we know the 
nominal GDP level forecast error, we can offset this error the next period by 
essentially choosing a time varying growth rate target. However, the result shows that 
whether we offset these forecast errors or not does not alter the system's stability 
properties. 
Note that this result has been derived quite independently of the underlying behavioral 
economic model. The model itself is not important provided the monetary authority 
knows what it is. Moreover, the result has been derived without reference to how 
private agents form their expectations. All that matters is that the monetary authority 
forms its expectations rationally. 
To give an example of the usefulness of Result seven let us consider the simulation 
study of Hall and Mankiw (1994). In their study of how nominal GDP targeting 
would have affected the US economy, Hall and Mankiw (1994) calibrated a small 
stylised model of the US economy. This model's supply side was a Phillips curve 
with adaptive expectations and was in the form of (9) with parameter values (in our 
notation) of 8 = 0.9 and a = 0.05. When applying exact nominal GDP targeting to 
their model they found first that their model was stable and second that nominal GDP 
growth targeting and nominal GDP level targeting produced identical output and 
inflation variances. Commenting on these results Hall and Mankiw (1994) simply 
observed without explanation that 'with perfect achievement of the target, the level 
and growth rate policies are the same.' 
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With <') = 0.9 and a = 0.05 the conditions of Result two and Result six are satisfied. 
Result two tells us that with these parameter values the system will be stable. Result 
six, or the more general Result seven, tells us that not only will the system be stable 
but that the model stability properties will be identical under the two targeting rules. 
3.4) Exact versus Inexact Targeting 
To this point our entire analysis has been couched in terms of exact targeting, rather 
than the less stringent inexact targeting. Exact targeting requires that the monetary 
authority meet its targeted objective up to a random error each and every period. In 
the Ball model studied above the monetary authority is able to achieve this because r,.1 
has leverage over y, even though y,.1 and 11, are predetermined. Inexact targeting on 
the other hand requires only that the monetary authority act to move nominal GDP 
growth (say) back towards the target rate period by period - systematic misses are 
allowed (see Bryant, Hooper and Mann, 1993). 
Again consider the model 
y, = AY'_I -yr'_1 +v" 
7t , = 7tH + aY'_1 + u t' 
y> 0, 0:0; f...:o; 1; 
a>O, 
but now append to it the policy reaction function 
r' _1 =pE'_I(7t, +y, -y'_I)' O<p<oo. 
(44) 
(45) 
(46) 
This policy reaction function is the natural analogue to the exact targeting case 
because in the limit as p --+ 00 exact targeting results. Consequently we must expect 
instability to occur in this limiting situation. We further eliminate the no adjustment 
case, p = 0, because it is not an example of nominal GDP targeting. However, it is 
trivial to show that with the policy instrument held fixed the system is unstable with 11, 
following a random walk. 
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Result eight: Assume that the system can be represented by (44), (45), and (46). Then 
the system is stable provided A < 1 and a < 4. If a > 4, then the system will 
still be stable provided p is 'small '. 
Substituting (46) into (44) gives 
y, = AY'_I - ypE'_IY' - ypE'_I7t, + YPY,_I + v, . (47) 
Taking conditional expectations of (45) and (47) produces 
E,_, 7t , = 7t'_1 + ay,_l' (48) 
and 
(A+YP) Y -~E'_I 7t ,. 
E '_IY' = (l+yp) ,-I ( l+ yp) (49) 
Inserting (48) and (49) in (47) and (45) allows us to derive the reduced form system 
y, (A + yp(l- a» yp 
-'------'--'-'---'-'- Y'-I ---7t t-! +v" (l+yp) l+ yp (50) 
7t ,= 7t t-! + aY'_1 +u,. (51) 
Using (5 1) to solve for n" lagging, substituting into (50), and collecting terms 
produces the AR(2) process for YI (where again error terms have been ignored) 
y, 1 + A + yp(2 - a) A + yp 1 + yp Y'-I - 1 + yp Y'-2 . 
For our system to be stable we now require three conditions to hold: 
i) 1 + A + yp(2 - a) A + yp < 1 
1 +yp l +yp ' (52) 
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ii) 
iii) 
_(1+A+YP(2-a) 1_ A+YP <1 , 
1 + YP ) 1 + YP 
(
A+YP tl. 
l+yp) 
(53) 
(54) 
We consider each of these conditions in tum. First, by cancelling terms, (52) reduces 
to the requirement that -exyp < O. The parameter restrictions we have placed on the 
system mean that this condition is satisfied. Second, provided Ipl < =, (54) amounts 
to the requirement that A. < 1. We had earlier assumed that A. ~ 1 but by ruling out A. = 
1 condition (54) is met. Notice, here, that under exact targeting the stability of the 
system did not depend on the demand side of the model - any value of A. was 
admissible. Now under inexact targeting the demand side of the economy is relevant, 
but only a very mild restriction is placed on it. 
Finally, (53) implies the restriction 
2(1 + A) P < --- , when ex > 4 
y(a-4) 
2(1 + A) P > --- , when ex < 4. 
y(a-4) 
In the unlikely case that ex > 4, stability requires that p be small, and instability is 
associated with large values of p, or, equivalently, more aggressive policy behaviour. 
If we take the more likely case where ex < 4, then the system is stable under our 
assumption that 0 < p < = . 
Consequently, under a very mild restriction upon the demand side of the economy and 
the plausible restriction that ex < 4, the system is stable under inexact targeting. 
Clearly, once we get away from the extreme case of exact targeting, nominal GDP 
growth targeting does not cause instability even if private agents form their inflation 
expectation using a simple naive backward-looking process. 
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3.5) Interest Rate Stabilization 
Along with their other duties, central banks also often have the role of overseeing or 
ensuring the soundness and stability of the financial sector. One way of modelling 
this responsibility is to constrain the movements of financial variables, such as interest 
rates. This process leads to interest rate smoothing. A further reason explaining why 
central banks smooth interest rates is that the costs of reversing a policy decision are 
such that it pays to alter policy stance gradually rather than in large movements (Lowe 
and Ellis, 1997). 
In the Ball-Svensson framework (Section 3.2.1) the instability in 111 and Yt is translated 
into interest rates through the policy reaction function. In this framework the standard 
loss function , which penalises separately deviations of 111 and Yt from their target 
values, results in a stable system. Consequently, we might expect that a loss function 
that imposes stability upon the policy instrument, r" combined with a nominal GDP 
growth target, would also result in a stable system. 
To capture the effects of interest rate stabilization on the economy we assume that the 
central bank minimises the loss function 
1 ~. " Loss[O,oo] = - E t_1 .L,.<P' [(11: t+; + y ,+; - Y'-1+J- + Q(r,+; t], 2 ;:0 (55) 
where Q is the relative weight placed upon financial stability and 0 < <p :0; 1 is the 
discount factor, subject to the transition equations 
[
11:'+1] [1 y;~1 = ~ a °l[ 11:, 1 [01 [U'+1 l [11:' - [ U'+1] Ie ~J :~1 + -oy [d+ V;1 r A :~1 +B[d+ V;1 . (56) 
Denoting the vector [nt y, Yt_dT by Zt the loss function can be written recursively as 
L(z,) = max,[z;Rz, +r,Qr, + <pEt-lL(zt+1)]' (57) 
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where 
[ 
1 1 [ 1 1 -11 R = 1 [1 1 - 1] = 1 1 - 1 . 
-1 -1 -1 1 
The system (56), (57) is an example of the 'stochastic linear optimal regulator 
problem' (Sargent, 1987), and is known to have a solution of the following form: 
L(z,)=z;Pz, +d; 
d=~tr[PQ]; 
1-cp 
r
t 
= -cp(Q + cpBTpB) -I BTpAz,; 
P = R + cpA TpA - cp2 A TpB(Q + cpBTpB)-IB TpA , 
(58) 
(59) 
where .Q is the (singular in our case) variance-covariance matrix of the innovation 
vector rUt Vt O]T. Following Rudebusch and Svensson (1998) and Svensson (1998), in 
the limit as <p -7 1 the loss function (55) converges to the unconditional mean of the 
period loss function. For our problem we define <p = 1 and reinterpret the 
intertemporal loss function as 
Loss[O,=] = Var[1C t + Y t - Y l-i] + QVar[rt ]· 
Consistent with <p = 1, (58) and (59) become 
r, =-CQ+BTpB)-IBTpAz
t 
=-Fz
t
, 
P = R+ATpA -ATpB(Q+BTpB)-IBTpA , 
respectively. Substituting (60) into (56) results in the reduced form system 
Zt+! = [A - BF]z" 
(60) 
(61) 
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where the stochastic error tenns have been ignored. The system's stability properties 
are then determined by the eigenvalues of [A - BF]. 
The parameter Q indexes the degree of interest rate stabilization. We know from 
Section 3.2.1 that when Q = 0 our system is unstable. Similarly, in the limit as Q ~ 
00 the loss function restricts the policy instrument to a constant. This limiting case is 
therefore identical to the inexact targeting case (Section 3.4) where p = O. As we 
mentioned in Section 3.4, this perverse case leads to instability, but is not an example 
of nominal GDP targeting. Nevertheless, in the limiting cases where Q = 0, 00 the 
system is unstable. The remainder of this Section considers the stability of the system 
for Q E (0,00). 
To address this issue we proceed numerically as follows. We allow the parameters a, 
y, A., and Q to vary independently over the closed intervals [0.1 , 4], [0.1,2], [0,1], and 
[0.2,5] in increments 0.1 , 0.1 , 0.1 , and 0.2 respectively. For each of these parameter 
values we construct the matrices A, B, and Q. With R known we then iterate over 
(61) until convergence to establish the P matrix5 The vector F is now easily 
constructed and the stability of the system can be checked by examining the 
eigenvalues of [A - BF]. With 40 different values of a, 20 different values for y, 11 
different values for A., and 25 different values for Q, this process requires solving for 
220,000 different F vectors. With three eigenvalues associated with each [A - BF] 
matrix we generate 660,000 eigenvalues in total. Each of these eigenvalues were 
examined and found to be less than one in magnitude. Thus for all 220,000 
specifications we consider, nominal GDP growth targeting combined with some 
degree of interest rate smoothing did not produce instability. 
3.6) Conclusions 
In this paper we have explored the Ball-Svensson result that nominal GDP targeting 
can cause economic instability. Following McCallum (1997) we have shown that the 
stability properties of the system depend on how the supply side of the economy is 
5 To iterate over P we express the matrix Riccati difference equation in the following iterative form 
Pj., = R+ATpjA-A TpjB[Q+BTpjBf'BTpjA. We begin the iteration with Po = R. 
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specified. This sensitivity to the supply side of the model parallels the earlier debate 
between Bean (1983) and West (1986) on conditions under which nominal GDP 
targeting is optimal. 
We began by outlining the Ball-Svensson instability result , relating it to the timing 
lags with which monetary policy affects output and inflation, and discussed the 
statistical nature of the instability. Concentrating on the role of inflation expectations 
in the Phillips curve, we then extended Ball ' s model to allow for adaptive 
expectations, rational forward-looking expectations, and partly rational forward-
looking and partly backward-looking expectations. For each of these expectations 
processes we showed that, for plausible parameter values, exact nominal GDP growth 
targeting does not lead to instability. 
Turning from nominal GDP growth targeting to level targeting we showed that while 
exact level targeting may generate instability with an accelerationist Phillips curve, 
other expectation formulations result in stability. Specifically, for plausible parameter 
values, we showed that adaptive expectations and forward-looking expectations lead 
to stable models under exact nominal GDP level targeting. Moreover, we derived 
conditions under which a model ' s stability properties when level targeting would be 
the same as those under growth targeting, and showed that Ball's model met these 
conditions. Lastly, we used our results to explain some of the simulations results 
found in Hall and Mankiw (1994). 
In Section 3.4 we explored inexact targeting and found that even if an accelerationist 
Phillips is an appropriate specification of the short-run aggregate supply curve, that 
inexact targeting does not generally lead to instability. 
Finally, in Section 3.5 we presented simulation evidence indicating that nominal GDP 
growth targeting together with the simultaneous objective of smoothing interest rates 
was likely to generate a stable system. This stability arises because the optimal policy 
reaction function has the interest rate as a linear combination of output and inflation. 
With the policy objective function restricting the variance of the interest rate to be 
finite the variances of output and inflation are similarly constrained. Thus ruling out 
Ball-Svensson type instability. 
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The over-riding conclusion of this paper is that while the Ball-Svensson instability 
result is interesting in itself, it appears fragile and does not carryover to more general 
specifications of the Phillips curve, or policy loss function . The analysis in McCallum 
(1997) supports this conclusion. We should point out however that the fact that 
nominal GDP targeting is unlikely to result in instability does not impl y that it should 
be applied in practice. We have not argued that nominal GDP targeting is optimal in 
any sense, but rather that it is unlikely to be 'disastrous. ' 
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Chapter 4 
OPTIMAL INFLA TION TARGETING IN A SIMPLE CLOSED ECONOMY 
MODEL UNDER COMMITMENT AND DISCRETION 
4.1) Introduction 
Viewed as an application of control theory monetary policy has an easy solution. The 
monetary authority is given control over one or more instruments and is assigned an 
objective, or loss function, by the government. With instrument independence, but 
not goal independence, the monetary authority then minimizes this loss function , 
subject to the (dynamic) constraints represented by the structure of the economy. 
From this minimization the monetary authority uncovers the implicit instrument rule it 
should optimally follow. 
But in practice policy makers face several important complications . The macro-
models, which constrain the optimization , are often large making the optimization 
process complicated, and the resulting policy reaction function large and potentially 
unwieldy. Moreover, imprecisely estimated relationships and uncertainty over the 
form of economic relationship to be estimated, cast doubt on the appropriateness and 
robustness of any optimal rule. Finally, the presence of forward-looking expectations 
in the dynamic constraints introduces the possibili ty of time-inconsistency, a 
divergence between the optimal discretionary and optimal commitment rules, 
potentially leading to an inflation bias (see Kydland and Prescott, 1977 or Barro and 
Gordon, 1983). 
For these reasons, among others, a blossoming literature on monetary policy has 
turned away from optimal control, exploring instead the relative properties and merits 
of various simple instrument rules. A short list of such simple instrument rules would 
include: price level targeting; inflation targeting; inexact nominal GDP level targeting; 
inexact nominal GDP growth targeting; the Henderson and McKibbin rule (Henderson 
and McKibbin, 1993); and the popular Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993). One advantage 
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simple rules have over optimal rules is that they are not motivated from the standpoint 
of any given model , suggesting that they may perform well across a range of models . 
Furthermore, they are simple to compute, highly transparent, and can potentially be 
calibrated to loosely replicate historical outcomes. 
But in the presence of forward-looking agents simple rules do not overcome the 
problem of time-inconsistency (Fair and Howrey, 1996). If a simple rule can be 
calibrated to match historical outcomes, then it can also be calibrated to attain some 
other goal. In practice, policy simulations with simple rules have simply assumed the 
existence of some pre-commitment technology. 
Despite the weaknesses of optimal policy rules raised above it remains the case that, 
in the context of any given model, optimal policy rules still provide a valuable 
benchmark against which the performance of simple rules can be compared. Because 
analyses of simple rules assume commitment to these rules, comparisons between 
simple rules and optimal rules should probably take the optimal commitment rule as 
the baseline, rather than the optimal discretionary rule. 
But there are further advantages to analyzing optimal policy rules. By comparing the 
optimal discretionary rule to the optimal commitment rule the practical effects of not 
having a commitment technology can be measured. This measurement can take place 
not just in terms of the variances of variables but also in terms of the feedback 
coefficients applied to variables in the policy rule. Additionally, one would hope that 
the variables entering the optimal policy rule would include in a non-trivial way those 
variables whose movements policy makers use to justify their policy interventions. 
These 'significant', or important, variables should arguably form the basis of any well 
performing simple rule. 
With the prospect that some, or many, variables may enter the optimal rule in a trivial , 
or negligible, way, the possibility presents itself that these variables could be excluded 
from the optimal rule without significantly impairing the rule's performance.! By 
excluding some state variables one may gain some of the simplicity and transparency 
advantages of simple instrument rules while retaining the good properties of fully 
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optimal rules. Such conditionally optimal rules, as we might call them, may be of 
particular use to institutions who wish to analyze or predict central bank behavior but 
who do not have available, or cannot afford, the entire data-set available to the 
monetary authority. 
With these issues in mind, this paper explores two avenues. The first avenue is an 
analysis and comparison of optimal discretionary policy with optimal policy assuming 
commitment. Results from these two optimal policies are contrasted with those 
produced by a Taylor rule and two variants of the Henderson and McKibbin rule. The 
second avenue is an examination of the feasibility and performance of conditionally 
optimal rules. This examination takes place under both discretion and commitment. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 4.2 we outline a simple descriptive closed 
economy macroeconomic model of the type previously used by Ball (1999) and 
Svensson (1997a, 1997b). Using this macroeconomic model Section 4.3 uses both 
analytical methods and simulations to construct and compare the performance of a 
Taylor rule and two Henderson and McKibbin rules with optimal commitment and 
optimal discretionary rules. Variations on the model of Section 4.2 are used to check 
the robustness of the results, and impulse response functions are presented to illustrate 
the properties of each model. Section 4.3 also plots and discusses the efficiency 
frontiers for each model specification. 
Section 4.4 introduces the conditionally optimal rule to be analyzed, and compares its 
structure to a simple inflation targeting rule. Following this introduction, Section 4.4 
addresses whether the conditionally optimal rule can stabilize the economy, and when 
it can asks how effective it is at doing so. As with Section 4.3, the analysis in Section 
4.4 takes place under both discretion and commitment. Section 4.5 concludes and 
discusses further applications of the techniques used in the paper. Appendix A 
contains proofs and technical details, while Appendix B performs sensitivity analysis 
to investigate how robust the results are to the exact parameter values employed. 
1 Cecchetti (1997) argues that . if the solution to the complex problem can be approximated by a 
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4.2) A Simple Closed Economy Model 
To introduce the ideas and techniques used throughout this paper consider the 
following simple closed economy macroeconomic model: 
y, = AY'_1 -y[i, -TjEt-l1t'+1 -(1-Tj)1tt-l]+ V,, 
1t, =8E'_I1t'+1 + (1-8)1tt-l +aY '_1 +u,. 
09.<1 , 0::;11::::;1 , '(>0 
a> 0, 0::; Ii::; 1 
(1) 
(2) 
All variables have been de-meaned and represent: the output gap, Yt: the nominal 
interest rate, it: and inflation, 7t" respectively. Demand and supply innovations are 
represented by Vt and u" and are assumed to follow independent iid[O, a2] processes. 
Finally Et.\ represents the mathematical expectations operator conditional upon period 
t-1 information. Equation (1) is a dynamic IS relationship expressed in real interest 
rate/output gap space, while equation (2) represents a short-run aggregate supply 
curve, or expectations augmented Phillips curve. The nominal interest rate, it, is 
assumed to be the monetary policy instrument. Real interest rate changes effect 
excess demand during the first period with the flow on effect of demand through to 
inflation coming after an additional period. In the special case where Ii = 11 = 0, this 
model has been studied previously by Svensson (1997a, 1997b), Ball (1999), and 
McCallum (1997).2 
In our numerical work we take)'" to equal 0.9, y to equal 0.8, and a to equal 0.4 -
implying a sacrifice rati03 of 2.5 (lIa) when Ii = 11 = O. The standard deviation of 
each innovation is set to one. The timing of events is as follows. At the end of period 
t-1 period t-1 variables are realized. Then, during period t the monetary authority sets 
the value of the nominal interest rate, it. Subsequently, period t shocks, Ut and v" 
occur, and Yt and 7tt are realized. With this timing the monetary authority makes its 
period t policy decision based on period t-1 information and the ex ante distributions 
of the innovations . 
simple rule, there may be substantial virtue in adopting the approximate solution. ' 
2 This model differs slightly in the timing with which the real interest rate impacts on demand fro m that 
used by the authors referenced above. Here we have the impact occurring contemporaneously while 
they impose a one period lag. 
3 Here we define the sacrifice ratio in terms of the transition between two steady states. A sacrifice 
ratio of 2.5 means that if the inflation rate is one percentage point lower in the second steady state than 
the first then the cumulative output loss between the two steady states will be 2.5%. 
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We test the robustness of our results by considering three variants of this model. 
These variants are indexed by their values for 8 and 1'], and are denoted: Model A; 
Model B; and Model C. Model A is backward-looking with 8 = 1'] = 0, Model B has 
rational financial markets, 1'] = 1, but other markets form naive backward-looking 
expectations, 8 = 0, and Model C is fully forward-looking with 8 = 1'] =1. 
4.3) Analysis of Results: Efficiency Frontiers and Impulse Responses 
The loss function faced by the monetary authority when deriving its optimal policy 
rule is4 
Loss[O,oo 1 = (1- ~)Var(y t) + ~Var(7t.) , 0::;~::;1 (3) 
where Var(Yt) and Var(1tt) are the unconditional variances of the output gap and 
inflation 5 Rudebusch and Svensson (1998) and Svensson (1998) show that this loss 
function can be motivated from the standard intertemporal quadratic loss function as 
the limiting case where future losses are valued equally with current losses. 
Two of the model specifications described above - Models Band C - contain 
forward-looking variables. For these models the optimal discretionary rule and the 
optimal commitment rule may differ. Rather than just presenting results for just the 
discretionary case or just the commitment case, this paper presents results for both 
cases. This is done for two reasons. First, it is interesting in itself to see how the 
optimal discretionary and the optimal commitment rules differ in the absence of a 
discretionary inflation bias. 
Second, we wish to compare how simple rules - such as the Taylor rule or a simple 
inflation targeting rule - compare to optimal rules. If the monetary authority 
4 Svensson (l997a) argues that this loss function is consistent with the motivation behind inflation 
targeting. 
5 Because all variables in the system have been demeaned this loss function implicitl y targets a value 
for 1lt of zero. Because of the demeaning, however, this is without loss of generality. Further, although 
it is the inflation rate that is targeting by policy makers, the price level is still determined by the system. 
Each of the model specifications considered are sticky price models and as a result today's price level 
64 
announces that it will follow a Taylor rule and agents believe this, then the monetary 
authority will then face an incentive to depart from the Taylor rule. Because of this 
incentive, simulations performed using a Taylor rule assume that a commitment 
mechanism exists holding the central bank to its rule. For this reason simulation 
results for the Taylor rule should most appropriately be compared to those from the 
optimal commitment rule. But in general central banks do not commit themselves to 
predetermined courses of action. As a consequence, the optimal discretionary rule 
also provides a useful benchmark for comparison. 
4.3.1) Model A 
Model A contains two state variables (excluding the innovations, Ut and v" which are 
not part of the period t-l information set): Yt-I and 11:t.l . Accordingly, the optimal 
policy reaction function may be represented as a linear combination of these two 
variables, with parameters CPI , CP2 respectively. Table 4.1 contains the optimal policy 
rules as well as the variances of inflation, output and the nominal interest rate for both 
'strict inflation targeting' (SIT, ~ = 1) and 'flexible inflation targeting ' (FIT, ~ = 0.5). 
Comparative results for the Taylor rule6 and two Henderson and McKibbin7 rules are 
also included. 
There is no unambiguously superior rule among those in Table 4.l. However, the 
Taylor rule and the second of the two Henderson and McKibbin rules is strictly 
dominated by FIT. Interestingly, Table 4 .1 illustrates that as we move from FIT to 
SIT the optimal policy rule places increased rather than reduced weight on output. By 
placing a larger weight on output SIT is able to dampen future inflationary pressures, 
but at the cost of greater output fluctuations . Further we see that the Taylor rule 
places too little weight on output.8 Also note that the optimal rules apply a coefficient 
greater than one to inflation. This ensures that monetary policy 'leans against the 
wind', and does not accommodate inflation increases . 
is anchored by last period's price level. Under these assumptions the price level will follow a random 
walk. 
6 The Taylor rule considered in this paper is based on the observed variables: y,.!; and ltc.! with 
coefficients of 0.5 and 1.5 respectively. 
7 The two Henderson and McKibbin rules are used here. The first applies the feedback coefficient 1.5 
to both y,.! and ltc.J, the second the feedback coefficient 2. Feedback coefficients less than one generate 
instability. 
8 This result has been derived analytically by Ball (1999). 
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Table 4.1 
Regime Var(Yt) Var(n.) Var(it) <P, (Yt-I) q>z (n.-I) 
FIT 2.42 3.12 7.7 1.535 2.025 
SIT 8.25 2.16 26.47 2.375 4.125 
Taylor 3.41 4.89 8.96 0.5 1.5 
H-M 1.61 5.25 8.37 1.5 1.5 
H-M 2.55 3.55 10.33 2 2 
Among the simple rules the Henderson and McKibbin rule with a feedback coefficient 
of 2 dominates the Taylor rule and comes closest to matching the performance of FIT. 
The Henderson and McKibbin rule with l.5 as its feedback coefficient performs best 
in terms of the output gap 's variance, but worst in terms of inflation's variance. 
To better illustrate the properties of the model, Figures 4 .1 and 4.2 plot impulse 
response functions for independent, temporary, 1 % demand and supply shocks 
respectively. Here we are interpreting v" the innovation to the dynamic IS curve, as 
the demand shock, and u" the innovation in the Phillips curve, as the supply shock. 
These responses are drawn for FIT (~ = 0.5). 
From Figure 4.1 , in period 10 when the demand shock hits , output increases by the 
full 1 % with no inflation or interest rate response. This increase in demand pressure 
flows through to inflation in subsequent periods causing inflation to rise and eliciting 
a tightening in monetary policy. Interest rates rise by more than the rate of inflation 
and the higher real interest rate reduces demand pressure. Excess capacity results, 
lowering inflation . Subsequently, the output gap, inflation, and the nominal interest 
rate all converge geometrically back to baseline. The shock passes through the system 
after about 10 periods. 
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The supply shock impulse responses are plotted in Figure 4.2. In response to the 
supply shock inflation increases directly by the full 1 %. Higher inflation generates a 
policy tightening so the nominal interest rate rises the following period, and rises by 
more than inflation does to generate a real interest rate rise. In turn the higher real 
interest rate dampens demand pressure and the excess capacity puts downward 
pressure on the inflation rate, returning inflation to baseline. As the supply shock 
passes through the system inflation gradually declines and as it does so the output gap 
and interest rate also return to baseline. Again after 10 periods the shock has almost 
completely passed through the system 
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Figure 4.2: Model A - 1 % Supply Shock 
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Finally, we should note that in Model A we arrive at identical policy conclusions 
regardless of whether we consider the real or nominal interest rates as the policy 
instrument. The reason for this is that with backward-looking expectations, inflation 
expectations are a state variable of the system. Hence we can write the optimal rule: 
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i, = <PlY ,-I + <P2 1t '_1 
as 
r, +1t'_1 = <PlY'-1 + <P2 1t ,_i' (4) 
where rl is the real interest rate. Equation (4) can easily be rearranged as 
r, = <PI y'-I + (<P2 -1)1t'_1 . 
Thus the shift to treating the real rather than the nominal interest rate as the policy 
instrument only alters the coefficient on lagged inflation in the optimal policy rule.9 
4.3.2) Model B 
In Model B agents operating in financial markets are forward-looking while the 
remainder are backward-looking. Both YI.! and 1tt .! remain state variables and form 
the basis for the policy rule. Table 4.2 presents simulation results for SIT, FIT, the 
Taylor rule and the two Henderson and McKibbin rules, along with the respective 
feedback coefficients for each policy rule. The first thing we observe from Table 4.2 
is that the Taylor rule performs poorly, generating instability, but that the Henderson 
and McKibbin rule with feedback coefficient of 1.5 performs well. By implication it 
is the low parameter of 0.5 on Yt.! in the Taylor rule that is causing the instability. 
Interestingly, the optimal commitment and optimal discretionary rules coincide, and 
not just in the case of strict inflation targeting, where with one instrument and one 
goal variable we might expect the two rules to be the same. Not only are the 
commitment and discretionary variances the same for a given value of ~, but they are 
also the same as those from Model A. Models A and B differ only in how the 
dynamic IS curve is specified, thus these results underscore the point that it is 
9 When inflation expectations contain some forward· looking element both coefficients in the optimal 
policy rule change when we transform the policy rule from the nominal to real interest rate. When Ii = 
\, n,.1 is no longer a state variable for the system. 
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parameters in the supply side of the system that determine the shape of the efficiency 
frontier. 
Table 4.2 
Regime Var(Yt) Var(711) Var(it) <PI (Yt.l) <i>2 (711.1) 
Discretion FIT 2.42 3.12 6.23 1.804 1.697 
SIT 8.25 2.16 24.58 2.375 3.125 
Commitment FIT 2.42 3.12 6.23 1.804 1.697 
SIT 8.25 2.16 24.58 2.375 3.125 
Taylor = = = 0.5 1.5 
H-M 2.29 3.55 5.44 1.5 1.5 
H-M 3.18 2.65 8.23 2 2 
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 plot the dynamic responses of Model B to demand and supply 
innovations in the case of both policy commitment and policy discretion. With 
private agents forward looking the decisions of the monetary authority are anticipated, 
helping policy makers stabilize the economy. With a 1 % demand shock (Figure 4.3) 
output rises by 1 % and this positive output gap places upward pressure on inflation. 
Anticipating higher inflation policy makers tighten policy and agents anticipating this 
tightening moderate their inflation expectations. The policy tightening leads to an 
excess of capacity that places downward pressure on inflation. As inflation declines, 
policy begins to ease and output starts to rise, returning the economy to baseline. 
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The 1 % supply shock, shown in Figure 4.4, increases inflation by 1 %. However, once 
agents identify the shock the monetary authority lifts the interest rate, contributing to a 
fall in the output gap, which reduces inflationary pressures. Subsequently, policy 
eases and inflation and the output return to baseline. 
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In many ways the simulation results for Model B are similar to those of Model A. 
The key difference is that with forward-looking financial markets inflation 
expectations return to the inflation target faster than lagged inflation does, and this 
allows the monetary authority to shorten the duration of policy activism. 
4.3.3) Model C 
In this model all agents are forward-looking and rational, which, as we might expect, 
greatly helps policy makers achieve their objectives. The forward-looking 
expectation in the short-run aggregate supply curve can be motivated by two period 
overlapping wage contracts (Taylor, 1980), or by price adjustment costs (Roberts, 
1995). Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show that demand and supply shocks pass through the 
economy with only minor disruption when agents are forward-looking and the 
monetary authority can commit to a rule. The analogous shock responses under 
policy discretion, which are depicted in Figures 4.7 and 4.8 , tell a very similar story to 
those produced assuming commitment. 
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Figure 4.8: Model C - Discretionary rule, 1% 
Supply Shock 
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Table 4.3 
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As with Table 4.2, Table 4.3 points to the inferior properties of the simple rules 
relative to either FIT or SIT, under either commitment or discretion . Again - as 
expected - neither FIT nor SIT dominate the other, although with commitment FIT 
seems to gain a large reduction in output ' s variance with only a small increase in 
inflation's variance. This result seems to imply that the variance ' s'acrifice ratio ' in 
the economy is large. 
4.3.4) Efficiency Frontiers 
Efficiency frontiers depict the trade-off between inflation ' s variance and the output 
gap ' s variance as the policy preference parameter ~ varies. Points below and to the 
left of the frontier are infeasible while points above and to the right are sub-optimal. 
Figure 4.9 plots the efficiency frontiers for our three models assuming commitment. 
Model C has an efficiency frontier that strictly dominates those of Models A and B, 
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due, of course, to the fact that all agents in Model C are forward-looking and rational. 
The forward-looking expectations help stabilize the economy and improve the 
variance trade-off available to the monetary authority. 
" Q 
" ~ 
'0 
" 
" 
." ; 
Figure 4.9: Output Gap and Inflation Variance Trade-off under 
Commitment 
3 
+M odel.AandB 
2.5 + 
2 
1.5 
+. , .... 
-. 
0.5 
0 
0 2 3 
Variance of Output Gap 
4 
As noted earlier the efficiency frontiers for Models A and B coincide. Models A and 
B differ only in how inflation expectations are formed in the Fisher equation. 
Consequently, Models A and B differ only in their specifications of the dynamic IS 
curve. The demand side of the economy does not change what monetary policy can 
optimally achieve, but it does change the policy rule needed to achieve it. This point 
can be understood more readily once one appreciates that it is the existence of the 
supply innovation, Ub that produces the variance trade-off to begin with (Clarida, Gali, 
and Gertler, 1999). 
Figure 4.10 plots the corresponding efficiency frontiers for the three models under 
discretion. Again the efficiency frontier for Model C strictly dominates those for 
Models A and B. As with commitment, under discretion the efficiency frontiers for 
Models A and B coincide. 
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Figure 4.10: Output Gap and Inflation Variance Trade-off under 
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4.4) Conditionally Optimal Rules 
8 10 
As outlined in the introduction , conditionally optimal rules are rules that optimize the 
central bank's loss function conditional upon a policy reaction function that excludes 
some state variables. For a conditionally optimal rule to perform well only variables 
that have 'small' coefficients in the optimal rule should be excluded. Conditionally 
optimal rules may be useful because they merge the properties of simple rules with 
those of optimal rules. Any advantages of conditionally optimal rules are likely to 
become clearer in larger scale macroeconomic models. It is in these large models that 
the optimal policy rule becomes truly complicated, and where many variables in the 
rule may have negligible coefficients. With this point in mind, this Section is 
intended only to provide a simple illustration of conditionally optimal rules. 
The model of Section 4.2, together with the assumption that expectations are formed 
using period t-l information, means that the optimal policy rule is a linear 
combination of the two state variables lo Yt.1 and n,.I . Naturally, then, the conditionally 
optimal rule we consider is of the form: II 
it = <r2 1t t_t · 
10 In Model C, which has all agents forward-looking and rational, n,.t is not a state variable for the 
system. 
II The other possible conditional rule: i, = <PlY,. 1 is not formally considered because it has the nominal 
policy instrument responding to a real variable and is therefore likely to lead to indeterminacy (Edey, 
1989). 
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This conditional rule differs from a simple inflation targeting rule only in that the 
parameter <jJ2 is chosen to optimize a loss function and not simply imposed. 
4.4.1) Model A 
Proposition one: The conditional rule will stabilize Model A provided the feedback 
parameter <jJ2 satisfies the restriction 1 < <jJ2 < 1-(A-l)/ay. 
Proof 
See Appendix A. I 
Proposition one is very intuitive. If <jJ2 is less than 1, then the nominal interest rate 
rises less than one-for-one with inflation expectations, so the real interest rate 
declines. A decline in the real interest rate in tum stimulates future inflation. The 
process repeats itself ending in instability. Alternatively, if <jJ2 is too large then 
inflation stimulates a real interest rate rise that it too contractionary, generating 
unstable oscillations. 
Minimizing the loss function , (3), subject to the restrictions imposed by the structure 
of Model A and the conditional rule produces results for SIT and FIT as summarized 
in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4 
Regime Var(Yt) Var(1tt) Var(it) C/ll (Yt.') <i>2 (1tt., 
FIT 10.46 43.88 55.08 0 1.120 
SIT 11.88 43.25 56.08 0 1.139 
Taylor 3.41 4.89 8.96 0.5 1.5 
H-M 1.61 5.25 8.37 1.5 1.5 
H-M 2.55 3.55 10.33 2 2 
Table 4.4 clearly illustrates that while Model A can be stabilized using a policy rule 
based solely of lagged inflation such a rule is not very effective, producing large 
variances in both output and inflation. The simpler rules, which use the optimal 
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information set, but with sub-optimal parameter values, easily dominate both FIT and 
SIT derived as conditionally optimal rules. The underlying reason for the poor 
performance of the conditionally optimal rule in Table 4.4 is the fact that in the 
optimal rule for Model A the coefficient on y,.1 is far from zero. 
4.4.2) Model B 
Model B has forward-looking inflation expectations in financial markets but 
backward-looking inflation expectations elsewhere. However, we know from Section 
4.3 that for Model B the optimal commitment and optimal discretionary rules 
coincide. 
Proposition two: For Model B the conditional rule will only stabilize the economy in 
the event that ay < (I-A)/2 or ay > (3+A)/2. 
Proo!, 
See Appendix A. I 
The numerical model from which our simulations are drawn assumes a = 0.4, Y = 0.8 
and A = 0.9. Consequently, for our system neither the condition that ay < (I-A)/2 nor 
ay > (3+A)/2 hold so the system cannot be stabilized by a conditionally optimal rule 
based on lagged inflation. 
4.4.3) Model C 
In Model C the only period t-I observable state variable is Y'.I , and Table 4.3 clearly 
shows that the economy can be stabilized with policy based solely on this variable. 
However, with forward-looking agents the possibility presents itself that the economy 
can be stabilized using extraneous information, information that is not directly 
informative of the state of the economy; TC'.I is such a variable. Agents will base their 
expectations on TC,·I if they believe policy makers are using this variable to set policy. 
A correlation between n,.1 and both n, and y, is then formed that is available for policy 
makers to exploit. Once agent's inflation expectations depend on TC,.I , n,.1 effectively 
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becomes a state variable containing information exploitable by policy makers. Note 
that this policy channel arises as a simple consequence of self-fulfilling behavior. 
Proposition three: Assuming commitment, for Model C policy makers can stabilize 
the economy using the conditional rule provided 0 < ay < 4. 
Proof 
See Appendix A. I 
Table 4.5 presents simulation results based on the conditionally optimal rule. 
Table 4.5 
Regime Var(Yt) Var(1tt) Var(it) <PI (Yt.l) <P2 (1tt.I) 
Discretion FIT 6.74 4.79 3.31 0 0.831 
SIT 6.24 4.15 3.29 0 0.890 
Commitment FIT 5.88 2.99 4.29 0 1.199 
SIT 7.39 2.73 7.58 0 1.666 
Taylor 4.55 1.73 6.81 0.5 1.5 
H-M 4.56 1.34 13.41 1.5 1.5 
H-M 12.42 1.66 47.55 2 2 
As with Model B, the simple rules (excluding the Henderson and McKibbin rule with 
feedback parameter 2) dominate the conditionally optimal rule for both FIT and SIT. 
What is most interesting about Table 4.5 is that under discretion the variances of 
inflation and the output gap are simultaneously reduced as ~ ~ 1. Appointing a 
central bank governor who cares only about inflation - an 'inflation nutter' is optimal. 
The inability of the central bank to commit to policy announcements, combined with 
the fact that lagged inflation is only a useful variable for policy makers if agents 
believe the rule, leads to an optimal rule where policymakers ' accommodate ' inflation 
increases. As the weight on inflation in the loss function is increased the degree of 
accommodation is reduced, producing a joint reduction in the variances of inflation 
and the output gap. 
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4.5) Conclusions 
In some respects the conclusions drawn here are unsurprising. The more agents look 
to the future the easier it is for policy makers to achieve their policy objectives, the 
more stable the system is, and the quicker the effects of supply and demand shocks 
dissipate. However, there are also a number of results that could not so obviously be 
anticipated: 
i) In a dynamic setting with discretionary policy appointing an ' inflation nutter' 
can be optimal. 
ii) In a relative sense, the simple rules perform best where there is no forward-
looking expectations. With forward-looking agents SIT and FIT dominate all 
three simple rules. 
iii) Sometimes - depending on parameter values and how much information is 
discarded - policy makers can stabilize the economy using conditional rules. 
iv) When all agents are forward-looking and rational , the monetary authority can 
stabilize the economy using variables that, if not used by policy makers, would 
not be informative about the state of the economy. 
v) The three simple rules, which apply sub-optimal coefficients to an optimal 
state variable set, tend to out-perform the conditionally optimal rule we 
consider, which applies optimal coefficients to a sub-optimal state variable set. 
vi) Simple inflation targeting rules perform poorly, particularly in the context of 
models without forward-looking agents. 
While the model of this paper is descriptive and highly simplified it does demonstrate 
that a conditionally optimal inflation targeting rule can stabilize the economy. The 
poor performance of the conditionally optimal rule in this paper stems from the fact 
that with only two state variables in the system a huge amount of information is lost 
when the output gap is omitted from the policy rule. Equivalently, in the optimal rule 
the output gap does not have a coefficient close to zero. To better understand whether 
conditionally optimal rules can make a useful contribution to monetary policy, a 
larger, more comprehensive, model that accounts for a wider range of shocks might be 
used. In light of the fact that currently all explicit inflation targeting countries have 
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large tradable goods sectors, future work on conditionally optimal rules could usefully 
be placed in the context of a small open economy. 
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Appendix A: Conditionally Optimal Rules 
Proof of proposition one: The conditional rule will stabilize Model A provided the 
feedback parameter <jl2 satisfies the restriction 1 < <jl2 < 1+(I-A)/ay. 
Take the system 
y, = AY' _I - y[i , -7t '_I)+ v, 
7t, = 7t H + aY'_1 + u , 
and add to it the policy reaction function : 
i, =<P27t H' 
O$A<I ,y >O 
a>O. 
(AI) 
(A2) 
(A3) 
Eliminating the nominal interest rate from the system, then exploiting the lag operator 
gives the IS curve 
y(l-<p , ) 1 
Y = - 7t +-- v 
, 1- AL ,-I 1 - AL ,. (A4) 
Lagging A4, and substituting into A2, gives the inflation equation 
7t, = (1 + A)7t '_1 + (ay(I-<P2)-A)7t!-2 +av'_1 +u , -AU'_I' which will be stable 
provided 
i) 1 + A + ay(l - <jl2) - A < 1; 
ii) -1-A+ay(I-<jl2)-A<I; 
iii) -ay(1 - <jl2) + A < 1. 
Now (i) requires <jl2 > 1. With a, y > 0 and 0 $ A < 1 condition (ii) always holds when 
(i) does. Finally, condition (iii) requires <jl2 < 1 +(l-A)/ay. Ruling out A = 1, (I-A)/ay 
is always positive, so there exists a range of values for <jl2, 1 < <jl2 < 1+(I-A)/ay, for 
which the system is stable. I 
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Proof of proposition two: For Model B the conditional rule will only stabilize the 
economy in the event that a:y < (1-)..)/2 or a:y > (3+)..)/2. 
The model is 
y, = AYH -y[i, -E'_I IT'+I]+ v, 0:::;).. <1, y> 0 
IT , =IT'_I +aY'_1 +u, a>O. 
i , = <P2 IT H· 
Combining A 7 with AS yields 
y, = AYH -Y<Pz IT ' _1 +yE'_IIT'+1 + v, 
To solve this rational expectations system we propose the solution 
y, =8 1I Y,_1 +8 12 IT'_1 +8 Il v, +8 14 U, 
IT, = 8zIY'_1 + 822IT H +8 2)v , + 8 24 U ,. 
(AS) 
(A6) 
(A7) 
(AS) 
(A9) 
(AlO) 
Now substituting A9 and AlO into AS and A6 and equating coefficients gives 
8 11 = A+y(8 z1 8 11 +8 228 21 ) 
8 12 = - y<pz + y(8 21 8 1z + 8;z) 
8 =a 21 
822 =l. 
Exploiting A14 and A13 we get l 2 8 11 = A + ay and 8 1z 1-ay 
y(l-<P2) 
l-ay 
(All) 
(A12) 
(Al3) 
(A14) 
The system can 
be expressed as the process y, = (1 + 8 11 )y ,-I - (8 11 - a8 1z}y ,-z + t.v, + U, _I' so 
stability requires the three conditions: 
i) 1+a812 < 1; 
Sl 
ii) a8 12 -28 w 1<1; 
iii) a812 -8 11 > -1. 
First consider the case where ay < 1. For condition (i) to hold then requires <1>2 > 1. 
Condition (ii) holds provided <1>2 > (ay-2(I+A»/ay, which is implied by <1>2 > 1. 
Finally condition (iii) holds when <1>2 < (l-A-ay)/ay. For a stabilizing policy rule to 
exist therefore requires (l-A-ay)/ay > 1, which holds when ay < (1-A)/2. So in the 
unlikely case that ay < (1-A)/2 a conditionally optimal rule based on 1tt.1 exists that 
stabilizes the economy. 
Alternatively consider the case where ay > 1. Condition (i) requires <1>2 < 1. 
Similarly, condition (ii) requires <1>2 < (ay-2(1+A»/ay, which implies <1>2 < l. Finally 
condition (iii) holds when <1>2 > (l-ay-A)/ay. Accordingly, stability can be achieved 
provided (ay-2(1+A»/ay > (l-ay-A)/ay. But this restriction only holds when ay> 
(A+3)/2. Therefore a conditionally optimal rule based on nt.1 that stabilizes the 
economy only exists when ay < (1-A)/2 or ay > (3+A)/2. I 
Proof of proposition three: Assuming commitment, for Model C policy makers can 
stabilize the economy using the conditional rule provided 0 < ay < 4. 
Consider the system 
y, = AYt_t -y[i t -Et_11I:t+I]+Vt' 
1I: t = E t_11I: t+1 + aY t_1 + ut' 
it =<il211:t_I' 
O:O;A<l,y>O 
a>O 
(A1S) 
(A16) 
(A17) 
We eliminate the nominal interest rate from the system by substituting A17 into A1S 
giving 
Yt = AY t_1 -Y<il211:t_1 +yE t_11I: t+1 +v t · (A18) 
12 The case where ay = I leads directly to instability. 
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The postulated solution is 
y, =8 I1 Y,_1 +8 121[t-l +813 v , +8 14 U" 
1[, = 8 21 Y'_1 +8 22 1['_1 +8 23 V, +8 24 u ,. 
(AI9) 
(A20) 
Substituting A20 and A19 into A18 and A16 and equating coefficients produces 
811 = Ie + y(8 21 811 +8 22821 ) 
812 = -Y<Jl2 + y(8 21 812 + 8;2) 
821 = a + 8 21 811 + 8 22821 
8 22 = 8 21 812 +8;2 
(A21) 
(A22) 
(A23) 
(A24) 
From A23 and A21 we deduce 811 = Ie + y(8 21 - a) , and similarly from A24 and 
A22,8 12 = -Y<Jl2 + y8 22 · Substituting these relationships back into A23 and A24 
produces the two quadratic equations 8;2 - (1- y8 21 )8 22 - Y<Jl2821 = 0, 
y8;1 + (Ie - ay -1 + 8 22 )8 21 + a = 0, which can be solved as 
822 
(l-y8 21 ) + ~(82Iy-l)2 +4<Jl282IY 
2 - 2 (A25) 
and 
8 = (l+aY-le-8 22 ) + ~(1e+8 22 -aY-l)2 -4ay 
21 2y 2y' (A26) 
Clearly A25 , A26, together with A21 and A22 do not represent a unique solution. 
However, we know that when </l2 = 0, then 822 = 812 = 0, suggesting that we take the 
positive root of A25. Furthermore, when a = A = 0 we expect 811 = 821 = 0 implying 
that the positive root of A26 is the appropriate one. Ignoring the innovation terms our 
system can be written as 
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[ YtJ=[8
11 812J[Yt-IJ. 
IT, 8 21 822 ITt-! 
(A27) 
For our system to be stable we require the eigenvalues of the coefficient matrix in 
A27 to both have a modulus less than one. The two eigenvalues are: 
" = (8 11 + 82z) + ~(811 + 822 )2 - 4(8 128 21 + 811 822 ) 
r 2 2 . (A28) 
Now consider <jJ2 = O. Under this restriction we know that 822 = 812 = 0 and, further 
from A28, that J..l = 0, 811 . Thus we only need to show that 18 11 1 < 1 to prove that the 
system can be stabilized when <jJ2 = O. Under these restrictions 
811 
(1+A.-ay) ~(A.-ay-l)2 -4ay 
-'------'-'- + . 
2 2 
First consider the case where (A.-aY-l)2 < 4ay, which is where 8 11 is complex. The 
modulus of 811 is 
[(' -~ + 1) J' +[ ~4n,- (\-a, -1)' J (A29) 
After expanding, canceling terms, and simplifying, A29 reduces to.Ji. However we 
have restricted 0 :s; 'A < 1, and hence 811 always has a modulus less than one. The 
condition ('A-ay-l)2 < 4ay requires l+ay-2,Jay < 'A < l+ay+2,Jay. But with a, y> 0 
and 'A < 1 the upper constraint is non-binding. Hence provided 'A lies in the parameter 
range l+ay-2,Jay < A < 1 the system will be stable. For this condition to have any 
chance of holding we require 0 < ay < 4. 
Next consider the case where ('A-ay-li = 4ay, i.e. when 'A = l+ay-2,Jay, then 811 will 
have a modulus less than one provided 0 < ay < 4. Finally consider the case where 
('A-ay-l)2 > 4ay, that is where 'A < 1+ ay-2,Jay. Now when 0 < ay < 4, 811 < 1. 
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Furthermore, the function l--.Jay is everywhere below 8 11 over the interval 0 < ay < 4. 
To show this we subtract 1--.Jay from 8 11 giving 
~(A. - ay _1)2 - 4ay A. - (1 + ay - 2.fo.Y) 
--'-------'-------'- + . 
2 2 
(A30) 
But we know that A. -(I+ay-2-.Jay) , which we denote by <jl , is negative. Adding and 
b . 2. 1 . h d fA30' f' d ~q/-4q;.fo.Y q; su tractmg 'I ay m t e square part 0 s lrst term pro uces + - . 
2 2 
That 1--.Jay lies below 8 11 for 0 < ay < 4 now follows directly from the fact that <jl < O. 
The function 1--.Jay, however, lies strictly between -1 and 1 when 0 < ay < 4, which 
completes the proof. I 
Comment: Our method of proving Result three has been to show that when 0 < ay < 4, 
setting <jlz 0 produces a stable system. If <jlz = 0 is the only parameter value 
producing a stable system, then <jlz = 0 is obviously the optimal policy. More 
generally a range of values for <jlz - about 0 - will stabilize the economy and the policy 
maker will choose that value that minimizes the policy loss function. If, however, the 
above condition, 0 < ay < 4, does not hold, then this proof does not rule out that the 
system can be stabilized. It does, however, say that the range of values for <jlz that 
might stabilize the economy under these circumstances does not include <jlz = O. 
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Appendix B: Sensitivity Analysis 
The results of the main text were generated for specific parameter values. Of course 
in practice we are never sure of what the exact parameter values in any given 
economy are. In the absence of analytical solutions for the unconditional variances of 
y" 71:" and i" the robustness of the results can be checked using sensitivity analysis. In 
essence sensitivity analysis amounts to changing the parameters in the model and 
seeing how the variances respond. 
Some observations about the robustness of the simulation results can be made , 
however, without resorting to further simulations. In particular, it is always optimal 
for the monetary authority to offset demand pressures coming through the output gap, 
regardless of the policy preference parameter,~. Demand pressure represents future 
inflationary pressure. Thus by stamping down on demand shocks the monetary 
authority can simultaneously reduce the variances of both the output gap and inflation, 
which is always optimal. Consequently, changes to the parameters in the demand side 
of the economy do not shift the efficiency frontier. Instead, such parameter changes, 
alter the policy rule required to reach any point on the efficiency frontier. The 
variances of y, and 71:, (but not i,) are therefore invariant to the parameters A. and y 
(excluding y = 0). The same, however, cannot be said for parameter changes in the 
Phillips curve, because they do move the efficiency frontier. 
Consider the macroeconomic model given by: 
y, = AYt_' + (1-A)E'_' Yt+l -y[i t -E ,_,7t,+, l +v, 
7t t = E t-l 7t ,+, +ay,_, +u t • 
(B1) 
(B2) 
In the case where A. = 1 the dynamic IS curve (B 1) is the same as that used for Model 
C. Alternatively, when A. = 0, it is the same as that used by Clarida, Gali and Gertler 
(1999) and McCallum (1997), and can be supported by utility maximizing agents. 
The Phillips curve, equation (B2), is also that used in Model C, and it can be derived 
from a firm optimizing in the face of price adjustment costs (Roberts, 1995). Under 
policy commitment this system will produce variances for y, and 71:, identical to those 
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of Model C - independently of the values for)'" and y (excluding y = 0). Similarly, 
replacing Et.jnt+j in equation (B2) with nt.j and setting (J. = 0.4 and assuming 
commitment, the system above will produce variances for Yt and nt identical to those 
of Models A and B. 
By earlier considering two processes for inflation expectations (fully backward and 
fully forward/rational) the robustness of the results to that aspect of the Phillips curve 
has already been considered. It just remains to examine how/whether the results 
change as (J. varies . Figure B4.1 plots how the value of the minimized loss function 
changes as (J. varies between 0 and 1. Models Band C are considered with ~ = 0.5 
under the assumption of policy commitment. The parameters)... an y are kept at 0.9 
and 0.8 respectively. 
OIl 
OIl 
o 
...:l 
Figure B4.1 - Sensitivity of loss function to 
Alpha, assuming Commitment 
1 ~ t ~=-?_~-_ i _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ j ---Model B 
- - - - - Model C 
o 0.2 0.4 0 .6 0.8 
Alpha 
Figure B4.1 illustrates that for Model C the results are very insensitive to the value of 
(J., with the evaluated loss remaining pretty constant for all values of (J. between 0 and 
1. For Model B the evaluated loss is relatively insensitive to values of (J. greater than 
0.2. 
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Chapter 5 
OPTIMAL AND CONDITION ALL Y OPTIMAL TARGETING RULES FOR 
SMALL OPEN ECONOMIES 
5.1) Introduction 
In closed economy macroeconomic models there are three key monetary policy 
transmission mechanisms. The first of these is the demand pressure channel: output 
above capacity places upward pressure on inflation as workers demand higher wages 
in compensation for the increased working hours. The second channel is through 
inflation expectations. If people expect higher inflation in the future then inflation 
will rise now as workers negotiate wage contracts that insure them against future 
expected price rises. Monetary policy credibility plays an important role in anchoring 
inflation expectations. Finally, if collateral is important or if agents are liquidity 
constrained, then there may also be a policy channel through asset markets. 
Over-and-above these channels, monetary policy in small open economies also 
operates through the exchange rate. Interest rate movements affect the nominal 
exchange rate, and the exchange rate in tum influences tradable goods prices, which 
form a component of consumer prices. In theory, the quickest acting of these 
channels should be the expectations channel. In practice the expectations channel 
appears less important for lowering inflation than it does for maintaining a low rate of 
inflation. That is the inflation expectations channel provides a useful long-run anchor 
for inflation but is less effective as a short-run anchor. 
It is a stylized fact however, that monetary policy' s effect on inflation through the 
exchange rate channel is swifter acting than its effect through aggregate demand. 1 As 
a direct consequence, the policy control lag in a small open economy is shorter than 
that of a closed economy. A corollary of this shorter control lag is that in a small 
open economy the effects of policy decisions can be more closely associated with the 
I See Ball (1998) and Reserve Bank of New Zealand (1996). 
88 
decision maker. This may have contributed to the fact that the recent shift toward 
inflation targeting has been concentrated among central banks in small open 
economies. It is these central banks that can be more effectively held accountable for 
their actions. 
When setting monetary policy to meet its objectives, the central bank must take all of 
these channels into account. The task of satisfying these objectives can be viewed as 
an exercise in control theory. The monetary authority sets its instrument (typically a 
short -term nominal interest rate) to minimize the stipulated objective function subject 
to dynamic constraints imposed by the structure of the economy. 
Yet a large part of the literature on monetary policy concerns itself with analyzing the 
relative merits and advantages of different simple instrument rules2 at meeting various 
policy objectives.3 The aim of this literature is to find a simple transparent instrument 
rule that performs well across a range of plausible models, but which is not 
necessarily optimal for any given model. A rule that is optimal in some given model 
may perform poorly - perhaps even generating instability - in the context of another 
economic framework. In the face of uncertainty over which model best reflects 
reality, robustness - not optimality - is the over-riding criteria. 
Nevertheless, the techniques of control theory can still make a useful contribution to 
the analysis of monetary policy and policy rules. In the context of any given model 
the optimal rule provides a benchmark, or lower bound, against which the 
performance of other simple rules can be compared. Moreover, as policy makers form 
stronger views about the structure and interactions of their economy the set of models 
over which a rule needs to be robust declines and the importance of optimality 
increases. And it remains the case that if simple rules are to be useful they must 
incorporate or be based around information that features significantly in the optimal 
rule. 
2 Such simple rules include inexact nominal GDP targeting (McCallum, 1989a, and Bryant, Hooper and 
Mann, 1993), the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993), the Henderson and McKibbin rule (Henderson and 
McKibbin, 1993). Further examples include partial adjustment rules involving deviations of inflation 
from target or deviations of the price level from target (see for example Edey, 1997). 
3 Examples include targeting linear combinations of output' s variance, inflation 's variance, and the 
price level's variance, along with associated special cases (such as inflation targeting and price level 
targeting). 
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It is on this latter point that this paper makes its main contribution. In the context of a 
small open economy we ask the question which variables are important in the optimal 
policy rule (given, of course, some pre-specified objective). Alternatively, we ask the 
question how much is lost if some variables are excluded from the optimal policy rule. 
These rules, which are based on a restricted set of state variables, are called 
conditionally optimal rules, and they will perform well provided the information 
retained in the conditionally optimal rule adequately summarize the current state of 
the system. It is possible that some simple rules (Taylor rule, Henderson and 
McKibbin rule, etc) can be reinterpreted as conditionally optimal rules. That is some 
simple rules may be sub-optimal in the broader context, but optimal conditional upon 
a given information set. Knowing which variables are important for the performance 
of the optimal rule should help in the design of simple instrument rules. 
Rudebusch and Svensson (1998) and Chapter 4 have previously examined 
conditionally optimal rules in the context of closed economy models. In these studies 
conditionally optimal rules performed badly, generally being dominated by simple 
rules such as the Taylor rule. The poor performance of conditionally optimal rules in 
these closed economy environments was due to the fact that the models had few state 
variables to begin with. Too much information was lost when some state variables 
were discarded. Essentially, the optimal policy rules in those models had no state 
variables with coefficients close to zero. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 5.2 introduces the model, which in many 
ways can be viewed as a discrete time version of the Buiter and Miller (1981) model. 
Buiter and Miller (1981) is in tum an extension of Dornbusch ' s (1976) seminal sticky 
price exchange rate model. Section 5.3 considers the stabilizing properties of optimal 
inflation targeting rules for two model specifications. The first where all agents are 
backward-looking; the second where all agents are to some extent forward-looking 
and rational. Impulse response functions are presented to better analyze the effects 
shocks have on the system. 
Conditionally optimal rules are discussed and analyzed in Section 5.4, where it is 
found that rules based on only two or three particular state variables can well 
approximate the optimal rule. Monetary Conditions Indicators (MCIs), indicators that 
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supposedly summarize the stance of monetary policy in small open economies, are 
introduced in Section 5.5 and discussed as a tool for aiding policy makers. Finally, 
Section 5.6 offers concluding comments and directions for future research. Appendix 
A analyses the sensitivity of the results of Section 5.3 to different parameterizations of 
the model. 
5.2) A Small Open Economy Framework 
This Section introduces a small open economy model. The model considered has its 
origins in Dornbusch (1976) and is developed further in Buiter and Miller (1981). Its 
structure is as follows: 
5.2.1) Domestic Economy4 
y, =/cY '_1 -y[i, -n ;,C ]+f.lq t-l + 9Y:_I +v, y, f.l, 8 > 0, 0 ::; A < 1 (1) 
n;'C = oEt-ln:+1 + (1- o)n:_l 0::;8::;1 (2) 
n, = pE '_In ,+1 + (1- p)n t-l + aY'_1 + u , u> 0, 0::; p::; 1 (3) 
rr: = Kn; + (1- K)n , O::;K::;1 (4) 
i f p, = e, + p , (5) 
e, =OE'_le'+1 + (l-o)et-l +i: -it +10, (6) 
q , = e, +P: -P: (7) 
Where: y, = domestic output gap 
TCt = nontradables inflation rate 
Ttt
C 
= consumer price inflation rate 
1t
t
e
.
c 
= expected consumer price inflation rate 
11:t
i 
= import price inflation (in domestic dollars) 
pi = import price level 
Pt
C 
= consumer price level 
p, f = foreign price level 
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i, = domestic nominal interest rate 
. f I, = foreign nominal interest rate 
q, = real exchange rate 
Y, f = foreign output gap 
e, = effective nominal exchange rate 
v, = domestic demand shock 
u, = domestic supply shock 
c, = portfolio preference shock. 
5.2.2) Foreign Economy 
Y; =/cfY;_1 -'/[i; -n;.f]+v; 
n;.f = 1Et-Jn;+1 + (1-1)n;_1 
n; =coE'_ln;+1 + (l-co)n'_1 +afY;_1 +u; 
i; = <p~ Y;_I + <p;n;_1 
Where: f n, = foreign inflation rate 
y> 0, 0 $)...f <1 
0$1$1 
r/ > 0 , 0 $ 0)$1 
n,e,f = foreign expected inflation rate 
v/ = foreign demand shock 
u/ = foreign supply shock. 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
Aside from the interest rates and the inflation rates, all variables are in logs, and all 
price levels are linked to inflation rates using the standard identity. 
Equation (1) is a dynamic IS curve expressed in interest rate/output gap space, but 
where the curve is conditioned upon the real exchange rate, q,_I, and the foreign output 
gap, /'-1' Expectations of consumer price inflation are formed using equation (2)_ 
Nontradables inflation is driven by a Phillips curve, equation (3). Consumer price 
inflation, equation (4), is a weighted average of tradable goods price inflation and 
nontradables inflation, where the weight on tradable goods inflation is the direct 
4 Throughout this paper the domestic economy will be associated with the small open economy and the 
foreign economy with the large economy. 
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exchange rate pass-through coefficient.5 Equation (5) defines import prices in term of 
foreign prices and the' nominal exchange rate. The nominal exchange rate, e" 
represents the number of domestic dollars it takes to purchase one foreign dollar. An 
increase in et represents a nominal exchange rate depreciation. 
We model the nominal exchange rate using (6), which is simply an uncovered interest 
parity (UIP) condition, but with mixed expectations as per equation (2). This UIP 
condition simply states that the expected change in the exchange rate fully offsets the 
foreign-domestic nominal interest rate differential. The real exchange rate is defined 
by equation (7) in terms of consumer prices rather than the nontradable output price. 
However, these two measures of the real exchange rate are related. If we denote qtd as 
the real exchange rate in tenns of domestic goods prices, then qt = (1-K)qtd. 
Consequently, either real exchange rate measure can be used in practice. Throughout 
we define our real exchange rate in terms of consumer prices and to keep things 
consistent we also define our real interest rate in tenns of consumer price inflation. 
The inflation expectation present in the Phillips curve relates to nontradable goods 
prices6 
The foreign sector of the system we model is of the same genre used by Svensson 
(1997a) and Ball (1999). In addition we have an explicit policy reaction function, 
equation (11). 
To reduce the dimensions of our system we exploit the real exchange rate definition 
and write the UIP equation in real tenns. 
q, =q~+1 +[i : -lI~:ll-[i, -lI~:ll+E, . (12) 
Substituting (7) into (5) gives 
p; =q, +P:, (13) 
5 This direct exchange rate pass-through coefficient is a partial elasticity. In the long-run a 1 % 
permanent depreciation of the nominal exchange rate will cause both domestic prices and consumer 
rices to rise by 1 %. Thus the long-run exchange rate pass-through coefficient is one, not K. 
Svensson (1998) in his study of open economy inflation targeting takes the alternati ve approach of 
defining the real exchange using domestic goods prices and then also using expected domestic goods 
inflation when defining the real interest rate. 
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which when differenced produces 
n: = .0.q, +n:. (14) 
Import price inflation, from equation (14), can now be substituted into the definition 
of consumer price inflation, equation (4), resulting in 
c K 
n, = --.0.q, + n,. 
l-K 
(15) 
This simplified model, which excludes the levels of all nominal variables, now 
contains just seven endogenous variables, of which only five are stochastic 
endogenous. The system is: 
y, = AY,_, - y[i , - 8E '_In:+l - (1- 8)n:_ll + Ilq'-l + 8Y:_l + v, 
n, = pE '_ln'+1 + (1- p)n[-[ + aY'_1 + u , 
c K 
n, = --.0.q, + n, 
l-K 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
q, = 8E[-[q'+1 +(1-8)q '_1 +[i: -tE,_ln:+1 -(I-t)n:_I]-[i , -8E[-[n:+1 -(1-8)n:_ll+E , 
(19) 
Y: =AfY:_I-l[i: -tE,_ln :+I-(I-T)n:_I]+v: (20) 
n: = wE [-[n:+1 +(I-w)n:_1 +afY:_I +u: (21) 
i: = <jl~ Y:_I +<jl~n:_1 (22) 
Events occur in this model as follows. At the end of period t-l all t-l variables are 
realized. Then, during period t, policy makers set the level of their instrument and 
expectations are fonned. After policy is set and expectations are fonned shocks occur 
and period t variables are realized. With this timing of events and lag structure the 
model is best thought of as an annual one with policy set and expectations fonned on 
the basis of period t-l infonnation and the ex ante distributions of the shocks. 
The two model specifications considered in this paper, which vary in how 
expectations are fonned, have not been estimated or fonnally calibrated using any 
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economy's data. An advantage of this is that the results produced are not specific to 
anyone country. Following Svensson (1998) the aim has been to set values for a, y, 
8, etc that are not obviously at odds with those one might expect to find if the model 
were estimated. In Appendix A, sensitivity analysis is performed to examine the 
robustness of the results to different parameter settings. 
Considering the foreign economy first we set "Af = 0.9 and I = 0.8 in the dynamic IS 
curve. In the Phillips curve we set a l = 0.4. The parameters <pI, and <p12 are chosen 
using an optimization procedure. The foreign central bank sets <pI, and <p12 to 
minimize the loss function: ? 
Loss f [0,00 1 = (1- ~ f )Var(y:) + ~f Var(n:) (23) 
with ~I = 0.5 , that is with equal weight placed on the unconditional variances of 
output and inflation. 
The parameters in the domestic economy are set in symmetry with those of the foreign 
economl. That is a = 0.4 in the Phillips curve, A = 0.9 , and y = 0.8 in the dynamic IS 
curve. To complete the IS curve specification we set).l = 0.4, and e = 0.1. This value 
for ).l implies that the IS curve has a Monetary Conditions Ratio (MCR) of 2. A 
typical estimate of the MCR for a small open econom/ is between 1.5 and 3.5. Our 
ratio is comfortably within this range. The direct exchange rate pass-through 
coefficient is set equal to 0.3, K = 0.3. We complete the stochastic specification of the 
system by setting cru = crv = crE = cr/ = cr/ = 1, and all covariance terms to zero. With 
only five stochastic endogenous variables (and two identities) the covariance matrix 
for the random disturbances is singular with rank five. 
7 This loss function , as well as that presented later for the domestic monetary authority, is in terms of 
the variances of variables, which assumes that variable averages are being targeted. Ball (1999), Fair 
and Howrey (1996), and Rudebusch and Svensson (1998) also take this approach, which leaves the 
question of what the optimal levels to target is unanswered (see Pagan, 1997). 
8 An advantage of assuming symmetry here is that it makes clear that the differing results between the 
domestic and foreign sectors are due to the small open economy nature of the domestic economy and 
not due to other forms of asymmetry brought about by coefficient differences. 
9 See Duguay (1994), Gerlach and Smets (1996), and Eika, Ericsson, and Nymoen (1996) for typical 
MeR estimates for small open economies. 
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Two model specifications are considered in this paper, each specification differing in 
how expectations are formed. The first model - Model A - has all expectations 
backward-looking. That is Ii = p = 't = (J) = 0 and all agents simply take last period' s 
value of a variable as their expectation of next period' s value. The second model -
Model B - introduces rational forward-looking behavior. Agents operating in 
financial markets are taken to be fully forward-looking and rational (Ii = 't = 1) while 
agents operating in factor markets form mixed expectations (p = (J) = 0.5) . 
5.3) Optimal Policy Rules 
Consider the loss, or objective, function 
Loss[O,oo] = (1- ~)Var(Yt) + ~Var(n;) (24) 
where because policy makers can target either consumer price inflation or 
nontradables inflation nt* may represent either nt or nte. The parameter ~ describes the 
preferences of the monetary authority and it dictates the propensity for policy makers 
to either ' lean against the wind' or accommodate supply shocks. When ~ = 1 the 
policy regime is referred to as Strict Inflation Targeting (SIT): when ~ = 0.5 the 
regime is called Flexible Inflation Targeting (FIT) .1O For a given value of ~ the 
domestic monetary authority minimizes equation (24) subject to the dynamic 
constraints provided by the structure of the economy - either Model A or Model B. 
The method used to solve for these optimal policy rules is described in Chapter 2. 
5.3.1) Model A 
Recall that in Model A all agents are assumed to be naiVe and backward-looking: the 
parameters Ii, p, 't, and (J) are all set to zero. The observed state variables upon which 
the monetary authority bases its feedback policy rule are: Yt. !: nt.! : net.!: qt.! : / t.!: and 
n
f
t.!. Recall also that the foreign policy reaction function is set by minimizing 
equation (23) with ~f = 0.5 . Table 5.1 presents summary simulation results in the 
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fonn of unconditional variances produced by optimal policy rules under a selection of 
policy regimes. The respective optimal policy rules themselves are presented in Table 
5.2. 
Table 5.1: Unconditional Variances for Model A 
Regime Var(Yt) Var(ii) 
FIT(1tt) 2.42 7.70 
SIT(1tt) 8.25 2.16 7.12 22.56 63.90 2.42 3.12 7.70 
FIT(1ttC) 2.52 3.21 4.15 8.55 8.02 2.42 3.12 7.70 
SIT(1ttC) 8.80 3.29 3.02 18.31 11.67 2.42 3.12 7.70 
Table 5.1 shows how the variances of the eight variables in the system (including the 
domestic nominal interest rate) are affected by the particular policy reaction function 
used by policy makers. Unsurprisingly, SIT - based on either nontradables inflation 
or consumer price inflation - leads to greater variances for output and the real 
exchange rate than FIT. For each of the values of ~ considered targeting TttC rather 
than Ttt leads to a lower variance for the real exchange rate and the domestic nominal 
interest rate. Intuitively this result occurs because dampening that variance of 
consumer price inflation requires dampening the variance of tradable goods inflation. 
A volatile nominal interest rate generates a volatile nominal exchange rate, which 
given the sluggish price adjustment present in the model translates into increased 
variances for the real exchange rate and tradable goods prices. 
Table 5.2: Optimal Policy Rules for Model A 
Regime Yt.l 'Tit -1 
FIT(1tt) 1.535 0.000 
SIT(1tt) 2.375 3.125 1.000 0.500 0.125 0.000 
FIT(1ttC) 1.307 0.883 1.000 0.433 0.347 0.173 
SIT(1ttC) 1.206 1.565 1.000 0.293 0.822 0.530 
In Table 5.2 we present the policy reaction functions associated with each of the 
policy regimes considered in Table 5.1. Rows one and two reveal that when domestic 
10 This terminology follows Svensson (1998) . There is, however, no obvious reason why Flexible 
Inflation Targeting could not alternatively be called Flexible Output Targeting. 
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inflation is targeted monetary policy responds similarly to foreign variables and the 
real exchange rate regardless of the policy preference parameter /3. The reason for this 
is that nontradables inflation is affected by foreign variables and the real exchange 
rate only through their influence on excess demand. By setting these coefficients to 
offset foreign demand and supply shocks policy makers can then concentrate on 
minimizing the effects of domestic shocks on output and domestic inflation. Clearly, 
none of the rules in Table 5.2 resembles the Taylor rule. In fact the Taylor rule is sub-
optimal and inefficient for two reasons: first it is based on a sub-optimal set of state 
variables; and second it applies inappropriate coefficients to lagged output and 
inflation. 
To better understand the dynamic properties of Model A, and to appreciate how 
monetary policy responds to shocks, Figures 5.1 through 5.3 present impulse response 
functions for the system. In these impulse response functions the foreign monetary 
authority is assumed to optimize policy over the two foreign state variables (with /3 f = 
0.5) while the domestic monetary authority minimizes a weighted average (/3 = 0.5) of 
the variances of output and consumer price inflation.!! 
In response to a domestic demand shock Figure 5.1 shows that output rises 
immediately by 1 %, the full size of the shock. In the following period the increased 
output gap flows through to higher nontradables inflation and monetary policy 
tightens, raising the nominal interest rate. The higher nominal interest rate brings 
about a rise in the real interest rate which generates an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate and a reduction in tradable goods prices, which lowers consumer price 
inflation . The policy tightening also dampens aggregate demand leading to an excess 
supply of capacity, which in turn places downward pressure on nontradables inflation. 
As nontradable inflationary pressures begin to ease policy loosens, the interest rate 
falls and the real exchange rate starts to appreciate. After 10 periods or so the 
economy has returned to baseline. 
II These impulse response functions trace the effect of temporary I % supply, demand, and portfolio 
preference shocks. However, because each of the disturbance terms has unit variance a I % shock is the 
same as a one standard deviation shock. 
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Figure 5.1: Model A - 1% Demand Shock 
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The effects of a 1 % domestic supply shock are shown in Figure 5.2. Both domestic 
inflation and consumer price inflation rise by 1 % contemporaneously with the shock. 
Subsequently monetary policy tightens raising the nominal interest rate and the 
inflationary pressures subside. The higher interest rate, however, leads to a fall in 
output and an appreciation of the real exchange rate. This excess capacity puts further 
downward pressure on inflation and allows the interest rate to begin to fall . As the 
interest rate falls output recovers and the real exchange rate begins to depreciate, 
returning the economy to baseline. 
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Figure 5.2: Model A-I % Supply Shock 
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Figure 5.3: Model A-I % Portfolio Preference Shock 
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Finally, Figure 5.3 reveals the effects of a portfolio preference shock. This portfolio 
preference shock comes in the form of a preference for domestic agents to hold their 
assets in foreign currency. Its immediate effect is to depreciate the real exchange rate 
by 1 %, which contemporaneously results in a rise in consumer price inflation as 
tradable goods prices rise. Monetary policy tightens in response to the higher 
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consumer price inflation, partly offsetting the stimulus the depreciating real exchange 
rate has on real output. Real output still rises in the short-term. The higher interest 
rate attracts capital back into the country and as the innovation only lasts for one 
period the real exchange rate ends up appreciating and consumer price inflation falls 
below baseline before returning to baseline. 
Figure 5.4: Model A . Efficiency Frontier 
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The efficiency frontier for Model A, which traces out the volatility trade·off between 
the output gap and consumer price inflation as ~ varies, is plotted in Figure 5.4. This 
figure reveals that the standard deviation of consumer price inflation can be reduced 
quite drastically with only a marginal increase in the standard deviation of the output 
gap. Only when the monetary authority clamps down hard on inflation's variance, as 
it does under SIT, does the reduced variance of inflation translate into a large increase 
in the variance of the output gap. 
5.3.2) Model B 
Unlike Model A, which assumes all agents are backward-looking, Model B assumes 
that financial markets form rational forward-looking expectations (8 = T = 1). 
Furthermore, other agents are assumed to form mixed expectations, their expectations 
are partly forward-looking and partly backward-looking (p = (0 = 0.5). Because 
financial market expectations are now forward-looking 110,.1 is now longer a state 
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variable in the system. The set of observable state variables is: Yt-I; 1tt-l; qt-I; /t-I; and 
f 
1t t-i. 
With forward-looking agents in the model the optimal discretionary policy rule and 
the optimal commitment policy rule no longer coincide.12 The results of this Section 
are generated assuming policy commitment. 13 Policy commitment can be achieved by 
either an optimal contracting arrangement between the government and the governor 
(Walsh, 1995) or through reputation effects (Barro and Gordon, 1983). Under policy 
commitment policy makers find the cost of stabilizing inflation, in terms of output's 
variance, lower than under discretion. Consequently, inflation 's variance when there 
is commitment to a rule is lower than that achieved under policy discretion (see 
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, 1999). 
All variances in Table 5.3 are smaller than those in Table 5.1. With forward-looking 
agents and the knowledge that the monetary authority is committed to its policy 
announcements the economy becomes easier to stabilize. The differences between 
Models A and B show up especially in the variances of the real exchange rate and the 
domestic nominal interest rate, indicating the less activist role monetary policy plays 
in stabilizing the economy when agents are forward-looking. 
Table 5.3: Unconditional Variances for Model B 
Regime Var(Yt) Var(ii) 
FIT(rc,) 1.27 3.01 
SIT(rc,) 2.80 1.33 4.18 6.38 26.21 1.27 1.57 3.01 
FIT(rc,') 1.29 1.67 2.97 3.07 5.15 1.27 1.57 3.01 
SIT(rc,') 2.19 1.65 2.74 3.42 5.76 1.27 1.57 3.01 
Table 5.4 presents the policy reaction functions associated with each of the targeting 
regimes shown in Table 5.3. 
12 The policy objective function used throughout this study directs the monetary authority to target 
potential output - not some rate of output above potential. As a consequence the difference between 
the optimal commitment and discretionary rules does not manifest itself in the form of an inflation bias. 
However, the time inconsistency does alter the trade-off between the variances of output and inflation 
facing the monetary authority, which changes the slope of the efficiency frontier. 
13 Assuming commitment has the advantage that the simulation results presented can be easily be 
compared with studies exploring the performance of simple rules, which implicitly assume the 
existence of some pre-commitment technology. 
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Table 5.4: Optimal Policy Rules for Model B 
Regime y,., 1f,., 
FIT(n.) 2.185 -0.221 
SIT(n.) 2.796 1.683 0.710 -0.431 -0.220 
FIT(n.') 1.954 0.770 0.595 -0.257 -0.145 
SIT(n.') 1.707 0.898 0.348 0.062 -0.025 
Of special interest is the fact that with forward-looking agents monetary policy now 
optimally responds negatively to the foreign output gap and foreign inflation 
(excluding SIT(n\) where policy tightens in response to /,.,). In Table 5.2 the 
feedback coefficients applied to /,., and nf,., were positive across all policy regimes 
considered. The intuition behind these negative feedback coefficients is unclear, but 
may well involve the interaction between domestic and foreign monetary policies. 
The foreign monetary authority responds positively (raises interest rates) in response 
to both /,., and nf ,.,. The higher foreign interest rate causes capital to flow from the 
domestic to the foreign economy inducing the exchange rate to depreciate. 
Consequently, movements in the foreign output gap and foreign inflation always 
occur in conjunction with movements to the real exchange rate. Table 5.4 shows that 
domestic monetary policy responds more aggressively to the real exchange rate when 
agents are forward-looking, which may in part explain the negative feedback 
coefficients in columns six and seven of Table 5.4. 
Observe also that as monetary policy places greater weight on stabilizing inflation's 
variance, the feedback coefficient applied to y,., rises under nontradables inflation 
targeting, but falls under consumer price inflation targeting. This feature is also 
present in Table 5.2. Under nontradables inflation targeting a more aggressive 
response to the domestic output gap serves to dampen future inflationary pressures. 
When consumer price inflation is being targeted such a strong response to the 
domestic output gap creates large swings in the domestic interest rate and the 
exchange rate. Volatility in the exchange rate adds directly to volatility in tradables 
inflation, raising the variance of consumer price inflation. Because variability of 
consumer price inflation is to be avoided the response of policy makers is to lower to 
feedback coefficient applied to y,.\ in the optimal policy reaction function. 
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Impulse response functions showing the dynamic responses of Model E 
supply, and portfolio preference innovations are shown in Figures 5.5 
These impulses relate to the policy regime FIT(nC,). 
Figure 5.5: Model B - Commitment, 1% Demand 
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pressures ease, and a negative output gap opens. As inflationary pressures dissipate 
monetary policy eases and the economy returns to baseline. 
Figure 5.6: Model B - Commitment, 1% Supply 
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Figure 5.7: Model B - Commitment, 1 % Portfolio 
Preference Shock 
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The efficiency frontier for Model B is plotted in Figure 5.8. Given the unconditional 
variances shown in Table 5.3 it is no surprise that the efficiency frontier for Model B 
lies closer to the origin than that for Model A. 
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Figure 5.8: Model B - Efficiency Frontier 
1.6 
~ 1.5 
Q. I c3 1.4 
:; 1 ;- 1.3 \ 0 
'e 1.2 
""'" 
~ 1.1 
-d 1 --, .. . .... ----,---en -------r 
1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2 
Std. Dev. of Consumer Price Inflation (% ) 
5.4) Conditionally Optimal Rules 
Having presented simulation results for fully optimizing rules in Section 5.3, this 
Section turns to the relative efficiency and stabilizing properties of conditionally 
optimal rules. Conditionally optimal rules are rules that endeavor to optimize the 
policy maker's objective function conditional upon a restricted state variable set. That 
is , they use a sub-optimal information set to set policy. By construction these 
conditionally optimal rules will have a performance (measured in terms of the policy 
loss function) that is inferior to the optimal rule. Nevertheless, it is useful to examine 
the performance of conditionally optimal rules because through such an analysis one 
can uncover those variables that are of fundamental importance to the performance of 
the optimal rule. Knowing which variables underpin the performance of optimal rules 
is important for explaining the performance of simple. Moreover, this knowledge will 
help in developing other simple rules that perform well. 1 
By way of example, consider Model A under the regimes of nontradable inflation 
targeting (Table 5.1). The coefficients on the two foreign variables: /t-I and 7lt,I are 
each either zero or very close to zero. Removing these two foreign variables from the 
14 Cecchetti (1997) makes the observation that ' .,.if the solution to the complex problem can be 
approximated by a simple rule, there may be substantial virtue in adopting the approximate solution ' . 
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set of state variables forming the policy rule is therefore unlikely to drasticall y 
undermine the performance of the optimal rule . Effectively one might expect the four 
variables: Yt.l; nt.l; net.l; and qt.1 to come close to forming a sufficient statistic for the 
state of the economy. As shown below this is indeed the case. 
In this Section three conditional rules are considered for each of Models A and B. 
The three rules are: 
it = <j)IYt-l + <j)2 1t t-l +<j) 3 1t ~_ 1 + <j)4qt -l; (rule one) 
i t = <j)IYt-l + <j)2 1t t_1 + <j)4qt -l ; (rule two) 
i t = <j)IY t-1 +<j)31t~_1 + <j)4qt-I ' (rule three) 
Rules two and three are nested inside rule one and each of the three rules exclude the 
two foreign variables /t.1 and nft.l . In addition, for Model A, we also consider the two 
rules: 15 
it = <j)IY t-l + <j) 3 1t~_1 ; (rule four) 
it = <j)IY t-l + <j)2 1t t_l' (rule five) 
Rules four and five represent the class of Bryant, Hooper, and Mann (1993) rules. In 
the case where CPI = 0.5 and CP3 = 1.5 rule four can be thought of as a form of Taylor 
rule (similarly when CPI = 0.5 and CP2 = 1.5 in rule five). Alternatively, when CP I = CP3 
(in rule four) and CPI = CP2 (in rule five) rules four and five can be thought of as 
examples of Henderson and McKibbin (1993) rules. Rules two and three generalize 
on the Bryant, Hooper, and Mann class of rules by including the level of the real 
exchange rate. Intuitively, adding the real exchange rate is an obvious and potentiall y 
important extension for a small open economy model. 
The results of this Section can best be illustrated in the form of efficiency frontiers. 
Figure 5.9 plots the efficiency frontiers for the optimal rule, rule one, rule two, and 
rule three for Model A, assuming it is nontradables inflation that is included in the 
15 These two rules were not considered for Model B because convergence problems prevented results 
from being constructed with any useful accuracy. 
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policy objective function. 16 Analogous results for Model B are presented in Figure 
5.11, while Figure 5.10 compares rule four and rule five with the optimal rule for 
Model A. 
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Beginning with Figure 5.9, the efficiency frontiers for the optimal rule and for rule 
one basically lie on top of each other. From a practical standpoint very little is lost by 
excluding the two foreign variables it-I and 1lt_1 from the rule. Rule three is superior 
to rule two except in the extreme case of strict inflation targeting. Thus, conditional 
upon the output gap and the real exchange rate, consumer price inflation contains 
more useful information than nontradables inflation regarding the state of the 
economy. This point is further underscored in Figure 5.10 where rule four (which 
contains Yt-I and nCt_l) is vastly superior to rule five (which uses Yt-I and nt-I) . From 
Figures 5.9 and 5.10, together with Table 5.2, it appears that in Model A the three 
most important state variables are the output gap, consumer price inflation , and the 
real exchange rate. 
16 Results for the case where it is consumer price inflation that is included in the policy objective 
function follow closely those for the nontradable inflation targeting case. 
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Figure 5.10: Model A - Efficiency Frontiers for Rules four and five 
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Figure 5.11 shows that in Model B information is lost when the foreign variables (it-! 
and n f t_l) are excluded. Note that for Model B lagged consumer price inflation is not a 
state variable for the system: it provides no additional information about the state of 
the economy. When the two foreign variables are excluded, however, lagged 
consumer price inflation does become informative, but only marginally so. Rules one 
and two, which only differ in that rule two excludes nC t_l perform nearly identically. 
The fact that rule three performs worse than rule two points to the superior 
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infonnation present in nontradables inflation over consumer price inflation, which is 
the opposite of the result found for Model A. 
It is of interest to know whether either of the conditionally optimal rules generated by 
rule four and rule five look like either the Taylor rule or a Henderson and McKibbin 
rule. For this purpose we represent the Taylor rule as 
it = 0.5y t-l + 1.5<_1' (Taylor) 
where n"t-l may represent either nontradables inflation or consumer price inflation. 
Similarly we represent the Henderson and McKibbin rule as 
it = 0[Yt-l + n;_l]· (HM) 
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 show optimal conditional feedback rules for a number of policy 
regimes generated from Model A. 
Table 5.5: Conditionally Optimal Rules for Model A. Targeting the Output 
Gap and Consumer Price Inflation 
~ Yt.! Itt-I 1tet.] 
Rule four 0.25 1.72 1.588 
0.5 1.585 1.723 
0.75 1.455 1.83 
Rule five 0.25 1.892 1.208 
0.5 1.721 1.271 
0.75 1.499 1.311 
The feedback coefficient on the lagged output gap is much greater than 0.5 for all of 
the policy regimes considered in Table 5.5. The Taylor rule's coefficient of 1.5 on the 
lagged inflation tenn is, however, broadly of the correct magnitude. If we were to set 
(j = 1.6 (roughly), then a Henderson and McKibbin rule would approximate 
reasonably well the simulation results for rule four. 
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Table 5.6: Conditionally Optimal Rules for Model A. Targeting the Output 
Gap and Nontradables Inflation 
(3 Yl-l 1tt-l n\.l 
Rule four 0.25 1.804 1.609 
0.5 1.744 1.779 
0.75 1.697 1.935 
Rule five 0.25 2.14 1.24 
0.5 2.273 1.37 
0.75 2.477 1.541 
Table 5.6 tells a similar story. The feedback coefficient on the output gap for the 
Taylor rule needs to be raised considerably if it is to be interpreted as a conditionally 
optimal rule_ But with (J = 1.7 (or so) a Henderson and McKibbin rule is not 
dissimilar to the conditionally optimal rule generated by rule four. 17 
5.5) The Role of Monetary Conditions Indicators 
Monetary Conditions Indicators (MCI) are meant to be summary indicators of the 
current stance of monetary policy in small open economies. They are formed as a 
linear combination of the interest rate and the exchange rate, and are used by some 
central banks - notably the Bank of Canada and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand -
as operating targets. This Section explores the role Monetary Conditions Indicators 
have in setting monetary policy and asks the question of whether using an MCI can 
lead to improved policy outcomes. Our findings are summarized in two results. 
Proposition one: Using a Monetary Conditions Indicator as an operational target does 
not hamper the monetary authority in meeting its policy objectives. Nor does 
it allow the monetary authority to achieve superior outcomes. 
17 While it is interesting that a Henderson and McKibbin rule based on the lagged output gap and 
lagged consumer price inflation can be viewed (loosely) as a conditionally optimal rule for Model A, it 
is not surpri sing that the Taylor rule cannot. The Taylor rule imposes two restrictions upon the 
feedback coefficients in the conditional rule while the Henderson and McKibbin rule only imposes one. 
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Proof: 
Denoting the vector of known state variables by YI-l the optimal policy reaction 
function has the form: 
i, = Ij/Y'_I' (25) 
where \jf* represents the unigue parameter vector that minimizes the monetary 
authority's objective function. Now define the MCI as l8 
MCI, = E'_l[i, - Xg'-l)· (26) 
This MCl 19 is an operating target that is set as a linear function of the state vector YI_), 
giving 
MCI, = fy ,-I . (27) 
Because the nominal interest rate is set to keep the operating target on track (26) can 
be combined with (27) to produce the implied policy reaction function 
i , = fY' _1 + Xg ,-I . (28) 
Introducing the selection vector s = [0, 0, .. , 1,0, .. ,0], where the 1 corresponds g'_I , 
(28) can be written as 
i, = [f + xs)y t-1 (29) 
Thus for the Henderson and McKibbin rule we have a degree of freedom with which to fit the rule to 
the data. 
IS By defini ng our Mel as we have, and recognizing that with q,., predetermined when it is set, the Mel 
can be manipulated as one wou ld a policy instrument. Viewed in this way the result of this proof is 
unsurprising. 
'9 As we have defined it, our Mel is a combination of the nominal interest and the real exchange rate. 
This differs from the Mels used by policy makers, which are typically based on nominal variables . 
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With the vector f and the parameter X free to be chosen by the policy maker it is 
always possible to choose a vector f, f*, such that f* + XS = 'V'*. Accordingly, when 
using an Mel as an operating target one can always re-create the optimal policy rule.2o 
I 
Proposition two: When monetary policy is based on a restricted set of state variables, 
using an Mel as an operational target may produce better outcomes than the 
conditionally optimal rule. 
Proof 
The conditionally optimal rule is based on a subset of the complete set of state 
variables. Let us denote the variables included in the rule by the vector Zt, where Zt = 
Kyto and K is a conformable selection matrix. We write the conditionally optimal rule 
as 
it = ",··Zt_t, (30) 
where 'V'** is the unique parameter vector that optimizes the policy maker's loss 
function. As before our Mel is defined as the linear combination 
MCI, =E'_l[i, -Xqt-1j. (31) 
Similarly, the optimal rule will express the operational target as a linear combination 
of the included state variables 
Mel, = fZ'_1 . (32) 
Now substituting (32) into (31) and re-arranging produces the relationship 
i, = fZ'_1 + Xq'-l ' (33) 
20 Svensson (1998) also finds this result in his model, which uses a different definition of the Mer. 
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Remembering that the policy maker can choose the vector f and the parameter X two 
possibilities present themselves. First, if qt-! is an element of Zt.J, then a vector f , f* , 
can always be found, for any choice of X, such that the conditional Mel rule (32) 
replicates the conditionally optimal rule. The conditional Mel rule cannot improve 
upon the optimal conditional rule. Second, if qt.l is not an element of the vector Zt·J, 
then by setting f = '1'** in equation (33) with X = 0 the monetary authority can 
replicate the conditional optimal rule. However, with X a free parameter and qt·! 
representing additional information , the policy maker can always find a value for X 
such that the conditionally optimal Mel rule outperforms the conditionally optimal 
instrument rule 2 ! 
I 
Ii 5.6) Conclusions 
If I 
The first part of this paper considered the stabilizing properties of optimal rules under 
a number of targeting regimes. These optimal rules were expressed in the form of 
feedback relationships, which allowed us to visually assess the respecti ve 
contributions various state variables made to the optimal policy rule. When agents 
form rational forward-looking inflation expectations we found that the system was 
easier to stabilize with the variances of all variables lower than those generated under 
extrapolative expectations. 
In the second part of the paper the stabilizing properties of conditionally optimal rules 
were examined. Overall foreign variables - specifically the lagged foreign output gap 
and lagged foreign inflation - were found to be relatively unimportant; omitting these 
two variables from the rule did not seriously detract from its performance. The 
process by which inflation expectations were formed was found to alter the relative 
performance of consumer price inflation and nontradables inflation in the optimal 
rule. When financial market expectations were formed in a simple backward manner, 
consumer price inflation was found to be more informative than nontradables 
21 The key reason why using an MCI produces superior outcomes is that it exploits a broader 
information set. Because the real exchange rate is likely to feature as an important variable in any 
small open economy policy reaction function , it is unlikely that using an MCI as an operational target 
wi ll produce superior economic outcomes in practice. 
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inflation. When financial market expectations were formed rationally the opposite 
was the case. 
Of the three principle conditional rules considered in this paper the best perlorming 
was rule one, which only excluded the two foreign variables. Given that this 
conditional rule encompasses the other conditional rules considered this result is 
unsurprising. More interesting is the fact that rule two (based on Yt-I , 1tt- I, and qt-I) and 
rule three (based on Yt-I, net_I , and qt-I) perform well relative to the fully optimal rule. 
Indeed, in Model A, where agents form backward-Iooldng expectations, the 
conditional rule containing only Yt-I and net_1 performs surprisingly well. None of 
these conditionally optimal rules , however, correspond to the Taylor rule, but for 
values of the policy preference parameter, ~ , between about 0.25 and 0.75 the 
conditionally optimal rule using Yt-I and n et_1 resembles a Henderson and McKibbin 
rule. 
This paper also examined the role of Monetary Conditions Indicators as a tool for 
setting monetary policy in small open economies with relatively large tradable goods 
sectors. For plausible contexts in which the central bank accounts for the exchange 
rate when setting the nominal interest rate no advantages to using an MCI were found. 
This result confirms the finding of Svensson (1998). 
Throughout our analysis we have assumed that the model structure, parameter values, 
and ex ante distributions of disturbances are known with certainty. The only 
uncertainty present in the model relates to the realization of the structural 
disturbances. But clearly while our assumption of model certainty is a common and 
convenient one it is far from realistic. In practice neither policy makers nor private 
agents know the true structure of the economy, and this uncertainty is likely to affect 
their decisions. Uncertainty about the structure of the economy can be allowed for 
with optimizing agents through the use of risk-sensitive optimal control (Whittle, 
1990) or robust optimal control (Zhou, Doyle and Glover, 1996). Applying risk-
sensitive optimal control to our analysis may well be a fruitful avenue for further 
research. 
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Finally, one weakness of this paper is that the model supporting it has not been 
estimated. In one sense this is an advantage because it does not tie the analysis down 
to a specific country's economy, but is it also a disadvantage in that it no policy 
recommendations can be made. Exploring conditionally optimal rules within the 
context of an estimated model for a small open economy is an obvious direction for 
further analysis. 
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Appendix A: Some Sensitivity Analysis for Section 5.3. 
This appendix investigates the robustness of the results presented in Section 5.3 to 
different parameterizations of the model. The system has fourteen parameters: too 
many to be systematically explored, especially if interactions between parameters are 
also considered. The two specifications considered in the text of the paper go some 
way toward illustrating how the process by which expectations are formed affects the 
results. So the sensitivity of our results to changes in the parameters p, 8, "t, and ill is 
not considered here. The parameters in the foreign sector of the model CAf, r:/, and -() 
are also not considered because they are likely to only have a second order effect on 
the variances of domestic variables. This leaves the six domestic parameters: a ; K; A; 
Y; /-l; and 8. 
To analyze the sensitivity of the model to changes in these six parameters, we evaluate 
the minimized policy loss function as these six parameters vary between 0.05 and 
0.95 . Both Model A and Model B of Section 5.3 are considered and the policy regime 
maintained throughout is FIT(nC,) (~ = 0.5) for the domestic monetary authority and 
FIT(n,) (~f = 0.5) for the foreign monetary authority. Results are summarized in 
figures AS.l and AS.2. 
Figure AS.l shows that Model A is most sensitive to a and K. These two parameters 
are the inverse of the sacrifice ratio and the direct exchange rate pass-through 
coefficient respectively. That our results are sensitive to the values of these two 
parameters is perhaps not surprising given that both are of direct importance to the 
policy transmission mechanism. The results are also sensitive to y. However, the 
minimized loss function is relatively flat locally about the values of a (0.4) and y (0.8) 
chosen. For K our results are quite robust for values less than that chosen (0.3), but 
sensitive to values above 0.3 . 
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For Model B the results are simi I ar: our results are most sensitive to the parameters a 
and K, while the parameter y does not appear as important. 
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Chapter 6 
EXPLORING THE ROLE OF THE TERMS-OF-TRADE IN AUSTRALIAN 
MONETARY POLICY 
6.1) Introduction 
This paper inquires into the information content of the terms-of-trade as a measure of 
external competitiveness for Australian monetary policy. Accepting that the terms-of-
trade drives the real exchange rate , and the real exchange rate has important effects on 
aggregate demand, we ask how important is the terms-of-trade as a state variable in 
the optimal monetary policy rule? This inquiry is not a theoretical one, but is based 
on a well known, data based, model of the Australian economy: the de Brouwer-
O'Regan model. A second objective of the paper is to investigate the usefulness of 
Taylor type rules in a small open economy. Taylor type rules have been shown to 
perform well for the United States (Rudebusch and Svensson, 1998, and Rudebusch 
1999), but they ignore measures of external competitiveness , suggesting they may not 
perform well in small open economies. We consider both inflation targeting and price 
level targeting objecti ves. 
In many small open economy models the real exchange rate and the terms of trade 
coincide. Such models typically have the home economy producing an importable 
and an exportable and solve for an interior solution; the forms of the production and 
utility functions rule out boundary solutions. When a third good - a non-tradable 
good - is introduced the real exchange rate and the terms-of-trade may differ, and how 
the real exchange rate is measured becomes an issue. 
A country's terms-of-trade is defined as the ratio of its export price relative to its 
import price, measured in terms of that country' s dollars. The terms-of-trade 
therefore measures how many foreign goods can be imported for an additional home 
good exported. The real exchange rate is typically defined as the ratio of the foreign 
country price level to the home country price level, once both price levels are 
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measured in tenns of the same currency. As such the real exchange rate measures 
how many home goods must be given up in exchange for a single foreign good. With 
an importable, an exportable, and a non-traded good there are three prices and two 
relevant relative prices. Choosing the import price as the numeraire the relative prices 
of interest are the tenns-of-trade and the non-traded price relative to the import price 
(Pitchford, 1993). 
Measuring the prices of non-traded goods is difficult. As a consequence standard 
practice is to employ a real exchange rate measured using the ratio of national price 
levels. Provided all relative prices are constant whether one uses non-traded goods 
prices or aggregate price levels is immaterial. When relative prices are allowed to 
vary Dwyer and Lowe (1993) show how tenns-of-trade changes affect the real 
exchange rate. The relationship between the real exchange rate and the tenns-of-trade 
depends on whether the nominal exchange rate is fixed or floating, and on whether the 
tenns-of-trade change arises through an import or an export price change. Gruen and 
Dwyer (1995) use a small theoretical model to show that with a fixed exchange rate 
tenns-of-trade increases are inflationary, and that with a floating exchange rate the 
effect of tenns-of-trade rises on inflation is ambiguous. 
Empirically the Australian evidence is that the tenns-of-trade is a stationary variable 
(the tenns-of-trade decline around a detenninistic trend, Gruen and Kortian , 1996), 
and that there is a strong relationship between the tenns-of-trade and the real 
exchange rate. Increases in the tenns-of-trade cause the real exchange rate to 
appreciate (Blundell-Wignell and Gregory, 1990). These stylized facts are built into 
models of the Australian economy, particularly that of de Brouwer and O'Regan 
(1997). 
Using closed-loop control methods this study expresses the optimal policy reaction 
function as a linear combination of the system's state variables. Then using exact 
methods, rather than stochastic simulations, unconditional variances for each variable 
in the system are obtained. These techniques allow us to integrate points on the 
efficiency frontier, policy reaction functions, with parameters in the policy objective 
function. Moreover, they allow us to easily optimize over a restricted set of state 
variables to assess the relative contributions the real exchange rate and the tenns-of-
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trade have to the location of the efficiency frontier. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the following Section the basic economic 
model underlying the paper is discussed. The model itself is a simplified version of 
the de Brouwer-O'Regan model, revised and estimated using data up to June 1998. 
Section 6.3 describes the policy rules considered in the study and summarizes the 
results. Both inflation targeting and price level targeting are examined. Section 6.4 
examines how dynamic homogeneity affects the slope of the efficiency frontier. 
Section 6.5 concludes. 
6.2) Model Outline 
The model analyzed in this paper is a slightly simplified version of the de Brouwer-
O'Regan model. For the most part the simplifications made are those necessary to 
convert the model to a V AR(2) process. Expressing the model as a V AR(2) process is 
useful because it facilitates solving for the optimal policy rule. 
The model is: 
y, =O.75Y' _1 -O.lqt-l +O.05Tt-l -O.22[it-l -41t '_I ]+P t (1) 
1t t =-.16Pt-l +.llc'_l +.05p; _1 +.15Llct-l +.16Y '_2 - .18Llc t_2 + .021t; _2 +e, (2) 
q, = l.09LlTt + O.63qt-l + O.25T'_1 + O.66[i' _1 - 41t' _l l + v t (3) 
c t =O.9c t_1 +O.IPt-l +O.2Yt-l +0.421t t_1 +O.581t'_2 +c t (4) 
p; = .581t t -.58q t +.66p;_1 +. 191t t-l +.34Pt_l +.05qt_l -.211t;_1 +.19qt_2 +11, (5) 
Tt =1.68Tt_1 -O.8ITt_2 +CD t (6) 
Where: Yt = domestic output 
qt = real exchange rate 
Tt = terms-of-trade 
nt = quarterly consumer price inflation 
it = annualized nominal short term interest rate 
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p, = level of consumer prices 
c, = unit labor costs 
pi, = level of import prices (in domestic dollars) 
7i, = quarterly import price inflation. 
All variables are represented as deviations from steady-state. Each stochastic 
innovation is assumed to be a zero mean white noise process, uncorrelated with the 
other shocksl Equation (1) is a dynamic open economy IS curve. The output gap 
depends on its lag, the real exchange rate, the terms-of-trade, and an ex post measure 
of the real interest rate. Consumer price inflation is modeled using a mark-up pricing 
equation, (2). The terms-of-trade and the ex post real interest rate drive the real 
exchange rate, equation (3), shocks to which are propagated by the lagged real 
exchange rate. The unit labor costs equation, equation (4), restricts unit labor costs to 
equal the price level in the long-run, with the change in unit labor costs equaling the 
consumers' price inflation rate. Equation (5) describes the evolution of import prices. 
Import prices rise proportionally with foreign price level increases and depreciations 
in the nominal exchange rate in the long-run. The stochastic process underlying the 
terms-of-trade is summarized in equation (6). Note that while static homogeneity 
holds for each of consumer prices, import prices, and unit labor costs, dynamic 
homogeneity only holds for unit labor costs2 
More generally the de Brouwer-O 'Regan model contains foreign variables, such as 
foreign output, foreign prices, and the foreign interest rate. This paper does not 
consider foreign variables as a source of shocks and excludes these variables from the 
system. The main reason for this exclusion is that each foreign variable in the de 
Brouwer-O 'Regan model is modeled autoregressively without interaction . 
Consequently, foreign demand can rise above potential without affecting foreign 
prices, and foreign interest rates can rise without reducing foreign demand. Without 
these interactions foreign shocks are unlikely to propagate into the domestic economy 
realistically, and hence they are omitted. 
1 The variances of p" e" v" t" Ti" and Ole are 0.2855, 0.0454, 8.172,0.07427,0.7704, and 3.0276 
respectively. At time of writing these variances come from the most recently estimated equations, 
using data extending to 1998q2. The exact sample sizes and periods differ across equations. 
2 For this reason this paper does not consider the policy implications of changes to the central banks 
inflation target, preferring to keep the inflation target constant. 
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Aside from the coefficients on the real exchange rate and the terms-of-trade in 
equation (1), and the long-run of the unit labor costs equation, all coefficients are 
estimated. The two non-estimated coefficients in equation (1) have their values taken 
from Shuetrim and Thompson (1999). The long-run of the unit labor costs equation, 
equation (4), is chosen to impose the theoretical property of static homogeneity, but 
with an adjustment speed slow enough to only marginally affect the short-run 
dynamics. In addition there are several identities linking levels and growth rates. 
In this model the instrument of monetary policy is the nominal interest rate. Because 
prices adjust slowly in the model , increases in the nominal interest rate raise the real 
interest rate, which in turn causes the real exchange rate to appreciate. The higher real 
interest rate and real exchange rate dampen aggregate demand, which lowers output 
and the mark-up in the price equation. Price changes eventually pass-through fully 
into unit labor costs. The change in the real exchange rate also has a direct impact on 
prices through its effect on traded goods prices. 
The model has several key features. The first is that monetary policy is not all that 
effective in the model , having a relatively weak influence on aggregate demand. The 
real interest rate does have a large influence on the real exchange rate, but the real 
exchange rate too has a very modest affect on aggregate demand. Consequently, 
monetary policy has only weak influence on firms ' mark-Ups, and gains most of its 
kick through the direct exchange rate channel into prices. 
The second key feature is that dynamic homogeneity does not hold in the modeL It 
follows that the model's steady-state has real variables affected by nominal variables, 
and inflation is not super-neutraL The absence of dynamic homogeneity has an 
impact on the slope of the policy efficiency frontiers derived later. In particular, 
dynamic homogeneity appears necessary if standard rectangular efficiency frontiers 
are to be obtained. 
The final key feature of the model is the reliance of the real exchange rate on the 
terms-of-trade. Real interest rate differentials are important for the real exchange rate, 
but more important is the terms-of-trade. Movements in these two driving factors are 
propagated through time by the lagged real exchange rate. From equation (3), 
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increases in the terms-of-trade are found to generate numerically large appreciations 
in the real exchange rate. 
To complete the model specification we summarize the policy makers ' preferences 
through all objective function 
Loss[O,oo] = aVar[y,] + ~Var[1t ; ] + yVar[p,]. a,~, y::::O 
The terms Var[y.] , Var[na,] and Var[p,] each represent unconditional variances.3 This 
objective function can be motivated from an intertemporal objective function under 
the assumption of zero discounting (see Rudebusch and Svensson , 1998, and 
Svensson, 1998). Under inflation targeting we set y = 0 and restrict a + ~ = 1; under 
price level targeting we set ~ = 0 and restrict a + y =l. 
6.3) Study Design and Results 
In this Section we consider optimal simple inflation and price level targeting rules , 
and their effects on the economy as summarized by unconditional standard deviations. 
Of interest is how these standard deviations change, particularly those of output, 
inflation, and the price level, as the real exchange rate and the terms-of-trade are 
alternately included and excluded from the policy rule. Both inflation targeting and 
price level targeting regimes are considered. 
Because dynamic homogeneity does not hold in the model it is worthwhile discussing 
the nature of the policy regime. In models where the Classical dichotomy holds in the 
long-run the issue of what price level or rate of inflation to target is of second-order 
importance. In such models the nominal steady-state does not impose a real cost, so 
the natural question to address is that of how monetary policy can minimize the cost 
of bringing the economy to its steady-state. In models like that used in this paper 
where the Classical dichotomy does not hold in the long-run , the issue of what price 
level or inflation rate to target is important. For every nominal steady-state there is an 
3 In all simulations it is the annualized inflation rate (11" = 4xn.) that enters the policy loss function. 
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associated real steady-state. The question of what inflation rate should optimally be 
targeted is an interesting one, and one that could potentially be explored in the de 
Brouwer-O'Regan model. However we do not investigate that question in this paper. 
Instead we assume that the monetary authority has chosen the inflation rate or price 
level it wants to target. Associated with this nominal target is some real steady-state. 
The monetary authority is then assumed to respond to shocks by returning the 
economy to this steady-state in a way that minimizes the costs of doing so. These 
costs are defined by the quadratic policy objective function above. Implicitly we are 
assuming that the unconditional means of inflation and the price level can be chosen 
independently of a, 0, and y. 
For purposes of exposition it is convenient to present the results in two subsections: 
inflation targeting and price level targeting. 
6.3.1) Inflation Targeting 
For inflation targeting the policy loss function is taken to be 
Loss[O,=] = aVar[Yt] + (1- a)Var[lI;] 0::; a::; 1. 
The policy preference parameter a regulates how the policy maker trades-off the 
variances of output and inflation in response to supply shocks. It also indexes how 
quickly policy returns inflation to its target rate following shocks. 
Four simple policy rules are considered. The monetary authority is assumed not to 
know the values of period t variables when setting the nominal interest rate in period t, 
so only lagged variables enter the policy rule. The four policy rules considered are: 
it = <PlYt-l + <P2 1I t-l + <P3qt-l + <p.Tt_1 
it = <PlYt-l + <P2 1I t-l + <P3qt-l 
it = <PlYt-l + <P2 1I t-l + <p.Tt_1 
i t = <PlYt-l + <P2 1I t-l 
(II) 
(12) 
(13) 
(4) 
125 
Rules 12, 13, and :4 are nested within rule II . Rule:4 represents the class of Taylor type 
rules. If a Taylor type rule were appropriate for Australia, then rules II, 12, and 13 
would offer little improvement over rule :4 in terms of the variances of output and 
inflation . Similarly, if the real exchange rate offers more information for policy 
makers than the terms-of-trade, then the efficiency frontier associated with rule 12 will 
lie closer to the origin than that for rule 13. In this Section we are interested in how the 
Taylor type rule performs relative to the fully optimal rule , and also in how rules 12 
and 13 compare to II. 
Table 6.1 presents the unconditional standard deviations for the key variables in the 
system, for each of the four policy rules , under two targeting regimes: flexible 
inflation targeting (FIT, ex = 0.5) and strict inflation targeting (SIT, ex = 0). These two 
regimes are presented to allow comparisons with previous studies (Svensson, 1998, 
and Chapter 5). For inflation, it is the unconditional standard deviation of annualized 
inflation that is shown. 
Table 6.1 
Unconditional Std. Deviations 
Regime y 1t" p q u i 
Rule 11 FIT 0.87 1.70 00 6.85 00 3.64 
SIT 0.94 1.69 00 6.70 00 4.05 
Ruleh FIT 0.98 1.74 00 6.80 00 3.90 
SIT 1.05 1.73 00 6.61 00 4.31 
Ruleh FIT 1.30 2.03 00 7.53 00 4.38 
SIT 1.35 2.02 00 7.37 00 4.74 
Rule I. FIT 1.40 2.17 00 8.18 00 4.23 
SIT 1.40 2.17 00 8.16 00 4.3 1 
Comparing first rule II with rule Iz we note that excluding the terms-of-trade from the 
policy reaction function raises the variance of output slightly while the variance of 
inflation remains essentially unchanged. In contrast, comparing rule 13 with rule II we 
observe that excluding the real exchange rate from the policy reaction function 
significantly raises both the variance of output and the variance of inflation. In fact 
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the perfonnance of rule 13 appears closer to that of rule 14 (the Taylor type rule) than it 
does to rule II, implying that the tenns-of-trade does not contain much infonnation 
over-and-above that in output and inflation . Also of interest is the fact that the 
variance of inflation does not change much as the policy regime, a , changes, for each 
of the four rules. 
The policy reaction functions associated with each rule and regime in Table 6.1 are 
given in Table 6.2. For each policy rule as we move from flexible inflation targeting 
(FIT) to strict inflation targeting (SIT) the coefficient applied to (quarterly) inflation 
rises while that applied to output falls. This result is consistent with the simulation 
studies of Svensson (1998), Chapters 4 and 5, and with the analytical work in Ball 
(1999). Note that output features significantly in the policy reaction function even 
when it is absent from the policy objective function . This result occurs because 
higher output today represents higher inflation tomorrow. By responding to current 
demand pressures policy makers can help stabilize inflation. 
Table 6.2 
Policy Reaction Function Coefficients 
Regime Yt-I 1tt·1 qt-I Tt_1 
Rule FIT 1.644 0.823 -0.581 0.232 
II SIT 1.709 0.970 -0.636 0.224 
Rule FIT 2.334 -0.418 -0.399 -
12 SIT 2.358 0.098 -0.466 -
Rule FIT 3.091 -0.747 - -0.214 
13 SIT 3.227 -0.552 - -0.271 
Rule FIT 2.8l7 0.886 -
-
I. SIT 2.795 1.168 - -
-----
A typical property of optimal policy rules is that the real interest rate must rise in 
response to higher inflation if the system is to have a unique stable equilibria. In 
tenns of the simulation results , this typically means that the feedback coefficient 
applied to inflation in the policy rule should be greater than 4 (rt, is quarterly inflation 
while i, is an annual interest rate). The policy rules in Table 6.2 to not reflect this 
theoretical property, and may seem unusual as a consequence. It is the fact that 
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dynamic homogeneity does not hold in the de Brouwer-O'Regan model that accounts 
for this unusual result. One consequence of dynamic homogeneity not holding is that 
the uncontrolled model is stable with respect to inflation. In the uncontrolled 
economy inflation does not have a unit root and thus the role for policy makers in the 
economy is reduced. 
Also of interest in Table 6.2 is the coefficient applied to the real exchange rate in each 
policy reaction function. Chapter 5 shows that the real exchange rate coefficient in 
the policy reaction should be closely related to (minus) the ratio of the real exchange 
rate and the real interest rate coefficients in the IS curve. From equation (1) this ratio 
of coefficients is 0.45 , which after allowing for the minus sign is broadly consistent 
with the results in Table 6.2.4 Observe also that with the exception of the Taylor type 
rule the coefficients on both output and inflation rise as increased weight is placed on 
inflation in the objective function. Increased weight on inflation stabilization involves 
responding to current inflation and future inflation, as indicated by demand pressures. 
To drive home the results of Table 6.1, Figure 6.1 depicts the efficiency frontiers for 
each of the four policy rules, along with that for the fully optimal rule. This figure 
clearly reveals the superior performance of rule h over rule 13 emphasizing the 
usefulness of the real exchange rate as a state variable for policy makers over that of 
the terms-of-trade. Intuitively, this result arises because the real exchange rate itself is 
influenced by monetary policy while the terms-of-trade is not. Having the real 
exchange rate in the policy reaction functions allows policy makers to partly mitigate 
the economic consequences of real exchange rate shocks. 
, The coefficient applied to the real exchange rate in the policy rule would equal -0.45 if all state 
variables entered the rule and a 100% weight were placed on output in the policy objective function. 
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Figure 6.1: Efficiency Frontiers under Inflation 
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The perfonnance of each rule is clearly and unambiguously ranked in Figure 6.1, 
where the efficiency frontiers of rules II - 14 are plotted alongside that for the optimal 
rule, which is presented as a benchmark. Of particular interest is that rule 13 is far 
superior to rule 12. This reflects the superior infonnation present in the real exchange 
rate over-and-above that in the tenns-of-trade. Another interesting feature of Figure 
6.1 is the weak influence monetary policy has over the variance of inflation. For all 
five rules (including the optimal rule) moving along the frontier brings much greater 
change in the variance of the output gap than it does the variance of inflation . A 
plausible explanation of this feature is the lack of dynamic homogeneity in the pricing 
sector of the model. The absence of dynamic homogeneity means that lagged 
inflation, which is included in all rules considered, is not very infonnative about 
future inflation. Consequently the variables contained in rules II - 14 have very little 
effect on inflation, contributing to the relatively flat efficiency frontiers. 
6.3.2) Price Level Targeting 
To complement our analysis of inflation targeting, this subsection explores whether 
the standing of the tenns-of-trade as a state variable for monetary policy is raised 
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under price level targeting. By price level targeting we mean that the monetary 
authority has the objective function: 
Loss[O,oo] = yVar[Yt] + (1- y)Var[p,]. 0:s;y:S;1 
It turns out that none of the four rules considered earlier are suitable for price level 
targeting because they omit levels variables such as unit labor costs and the price 
level. Without a variable such as unit labor costs or the price level in the policy 
reaction function the pennanence of shocks propagating into the price level cannot be 
offset. The price level then follows a random walk and has infinite unconditional 
variance (see Table 6.1) . Consequently, the rules considered under price level 
targeting are each conditioned on the price level. The following rules are examined: 
i, = 9,y,., +9 2Jt t., +9 3qt., + 94Tt., +9sp, _, 
i, = 9,y ,_, + 92 Jt t-l + 93qt-l +9 SPt_' 
i, =9,y,_, + 92 Jt t-l + 94Tt_, +9 SPt_' 
it = 9,y,_, + 92 Jt t-l +9 sp,_, 
it = 8,Y t-l +9SPt_' 
(PI) 
(P2) 
(P3) 
(P4) 
(Ps) 
Capturing our interest is the perfonnance of rules P2 and P3 relati ve to rules P I and P 4. 
Note that Taylor type rules are inappropriate for price level targeting because they 
cannot stabilize the price level. The perfonnances of these five rules under flexible 
price targeting (FPT, y = 0.5) and strict price targeting (SPT, y = 0) are summarized in 
Table 6.3. 
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Table 6.3 
Unconditional Std. Deviations 
Regime y rca p q u i 
Rule FPT 1.32 1.89 1.38 6.82 1.68 5.29 
PI SPT 2.41 2.58 1.09 7.77 1.62 10.06 
Rule FPT 1.44 1.93 1.43 6.74 1.75 5.53 
P2 SPT 2.54 2.63 1.13 7.73 1.74 10.22 
Rule FPT 1.84 2.33 1.82 7.75 2.23 6.60 
P3 SPT 3. 13 3.26 1.48 9.47 2.12 12.64 
Rule FPT 1.96 2.55 2.09 8.66 2.56 6.67 
p. SPT 3.34 3.69 1.77 11.02 2.37 13.68 
Rule FPT 1.97 2.56 2.09 8.70 2.57 6.78 
Ps SPT 2.93 3.33 1.81 10.11 2.36 11.08 
Aside from the variances of the price level and unit labor costs, the variances of all 
variables are greater under price level targeting than inflation targeting; the cost of not 
allowing bygones be bygones. Rule P 2, which contains the real exchange rate, 
produces lower variances for all variables than Rule P3, suggesting that the real 
exchange rate is more informati ve for monetary policy than the terms-of-trade. In the 
steady-state of the system unit labor costs equal consumer prices. Yet for all regimes 
considered the volatility in unit labor costs is higher than that for consumer prices. By 
targeting consumer prices the central bank prevents the price level from changing to 
clear the labor market. Instead the nominal wage rate moves to clear the labor market, 
making unit labor costs more volatile than consumer prices. 
Table 6.4 complements Table 6.3 and shows the policy reaction functions associated 
with each of the policy regimes presented above. 
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Table 6.4 
Policy Reaction Function Coefficients 
Regime Yt-l 1tt-1 qt-l Tt-l pt-l 
Rule FPT 2_116 1.866 -0_703 0.273 1.358 
PI SPT 2.568 2.092 -1.025 0.337 4.173 
Rule FPT 2.887 0.662 -0.478 - 1.302 
P2 SPT 3.509 0.543 -0.734 - 4.416 
Rule FPT 3.909 -0.711 - -0.275 1.331 
P3 SPT 5.441 -3.188 - -0.532 4.433 
Rule FPT 3.659 0.458 - - 1.352 
P4 SPT 5.519 -3.084 - - 4.883 
Rule FPT 3.817 - - - 1.446 
Ps SPT 4.427 - - - 2.950 
Table 6.4 indicates that the feedback coefficients are typically very large, implying an 
aggressive policy adjustment in response to state variables, which helps explain the 
large standard deviations in Table 6.3. The magnitude of these feedback coefficients 
typically rises as the policy regime switches from flexible price targeting to strict 
price targeting. Finally, Figure 6.2 plots the efficiency frontiers for each of the policy 
rules in price standard deviation/output standard deviation space. An efficiency 
frontier for the fully optimal rule is also provided as a benchmark. Aside from the 
fully optimal rule and Rule PI, that closest to the origin is Rule P2 - that containing 
the real exchange rate. Rule P2 clearly dominates Rule P3, which contains the terms-
of-trade in place of the real exchange rate, but is otherwise identical in structure. 
Thus under price level targeting, as with inflation targeting, the real exchange rate 
appears to be a more important variable than the terms-of-trade for the monetary 
authority to base policy on - despite the fact that the terms-of-trade is a key driver of 
real exchange rate movements. 
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Figure 6.2: Efficiency Frontiers under Price Level Targeting 
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6.4) Dynamic Homogeneity and the Shape of the Efficiency Frontier 
4 
An intriguing feature of Figure 6.1 is how flat the efficiency frontiers are. This 
flatness translates into the inflation rate being relatively impervious to the parameters 
in the policy objective function . Debelle and Stevens (1995) also found similar flat 
efficiency frontiers in their policy control simulations, using a model simpler, but not 
dissimilar, to the de Brouwer-O'Regan model. This flatness is unusual in the context 
of the literature, which typically finds the efficiency frontier to be roughly a 
rectangular hyperbola. 
One explanation for the frontiers obtained in the de Brouwer-O'Regan model is that 
they are a consequence of dynamic homogeneity not holding. With the inflation' s 
dynamic coefficients summing to much less than one, inflation has an automatic 
stabilizer. In fact inflation has finite variance even in the case where only the variance 
in the output gap is targeted. Normally with such a policy regime inflation would 
follow a unit root and have infinite variance. Moreover, without the lags of inflation 
present for dynamic homogeneity to hold, past inflation contains very little power for 
predicting future inflation. The output gap's impact on inflation through the mark-up 
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term is also small and together these features make Taylor type rules an ineffective 
stabilization tool. 
To assess the importance dynamic homogeneity has for the slope of the efficiency 
frontier, this Section imposes dynamic homogeneity on the model and constructs the 
resulting efficiency frontier assuming a Taylor type rule is used.5 The results can be 
seen in Figures 6.3 and 6.4. Figure 6.3 takes the efficiency frontier for the Taylor type 
rule from Figure 6.1 while Figure 6.4 shows the efficiency frontier with dynamic 
homogeneity imposed. 
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Figure 6.3: Taylor type rule without dynamic 
homogeneity 
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Note the scale of Figure 6.3 is such that changes to the policy objective function's 
parameterization lead to very small changes in the variances of inflation and the 
output gap. This illustrates the ineffectiveness of the Taylor type rule as a 
stabilization tool in this model. Along the frontier the variance of the output gap 
changes by more that that for inflation. 
5 There is no unique way of introducing dynamic homogeneity into the model so there is a certain 
amount of arbitrariness in this process. Nevertheless, it is likely that imposing dynamic homogeneity is 
more important for the frontier than the lag structure assumed. For this reason the results obtained are 
illustrative if not conclusive. 
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Figure 6.4: Taylor type rule with dynamic 
homogeneity 
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In comparison, Figure 6.4 shows that with dynamic homogeneity the Taylor type rule 
becomes more effective in obtaining leverage over inflation and the output gap. The 
variances of inflation and the output gap change a lot more in response to weighting 
changes in the objective function. Moreover, with dynamic homogeneity imposed the 
variance of inflation changes by much more than that for the output gap as we move 
along the frontier. Nevertheless, the efficiency frontier in Figure 6.4 is still unusual in 
the context of the literature. Only when a. rises above 0.9 does inflation really begin 
to rise to any great extent, thus the flat shape of the de Brouwer-O 'Regan model 's 
efficiency frontier is not completely explained by the absence of dynamic 
homogeneity. It may well be the case that it is the presence of the error correction 
terms, which introduces feedback from levels into growth rates, that is at the heart of 
the explanation behind the frontier's shape. 
6.5) Conclusions 
This paper takes the de Brouwer-O 'Regan model of the Australia economy and uses it 
to explore the relative infonnation content in the terms-of-trade and the real exchange 
rate. In Australia these two variables have a strong statistical association with the 
terms-of-trade the dominant force behind real exchange rate movements in the model. 
Using control theory, optimal simple rules that alternately included and excluded the 
real exchange rate and the terms-of-trade were constructed, motivated on inflation 
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targeting and price level targeting policy objectives. Altering the relative weights 
assigned to the variables in the policy objective function allowed efficient policy 
frontiers to be mapped out, with the location of these frontiers affected by the 
information content in the variables supporting each rule. 
The results obtained suggest the despite the terms-of-trade being the driving force 
behind the real exchange rate there is more information for policy makers in the real 
exchange rate. A policy rule that includes the real exchange rate at the expense of the 
terms-of-trade outperforms a rule containing the terms-of-trade at the cost of the real 
exchange rate. Intuitively this is because monetary policy can influence the real 
exchange rate and therefore partly offset real exchange rate shocks while it cannot 
influence the terms-of-trade. 
Regarding the performance of Taylor type rules, the simulations show that Taylor 
type rules perform poorly in the de Brouwer-O'Regan model, a result that is in stark 
contrast to findings from closed economy models . Intuitively this is because in open 
economy models inflation and the output gap are influenced by a greater range of 
variables than just lags of the output gap and lags of inflation. Consequently, lags of 
the output gap and inflation are poor predictors of where future inflation and excess 
demand are heading, and rules based on just these variables will naturally tend to 
perform poorly. 
In Section 6.4 we explored how the shape of policy efficiency frontiers was affected 
by whether dynamic homogeneity held in the model. The standard de Brouwer-
O'Regan model does not possess dynamic homogeneity and its efficiency frontiers are 
unusually shaped. Imposing dynamic homogeneity did remove some of this flatness, 
making the frontiers more of a standard rectangular hyperbola shape, but this was not 
the whole answer. It is possible that it is the error correction terms that the de 
Brouwer-O 'Regan model has that many monetary policy models do not have that 
provides the final piece of the answer. 
Future work analyzing Australian monetary policy might concentrate on actual 
outcomes and ask the question how close to optimal is the Reserve Bank's behavior. 
Alternatively, one could go a step further and attempt to estimate the policy 
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preference parameters assuming that they were behaving optimally. Chapter 7 
explores how these parameters might be identified and estimated. 
137 
Chapter 7 
STEPS TOWARD IDENTIFYING CENTRAL BANK POLICY 
PREFERENCES 
7.1) Introduction 
Modem analyses of central bank behavior begin with a policy objective function and 
construct policy rules by optimizing the objective function subject to a system of 
constraints. Descriptions of actual central bank behavior can also be obtained by 
estimating policy reaction functions directly. For the United States, Clarida, Gali , and 
Gertler (1998), Fuhrer (1997), and Judd and Rudebusch (1998) have all estimated 
reaction functions for the Federal Reserve. Taylor (1993) also developed a rule 
describing Federal Reserve policy decisions, popularly known as the Taylor rule. 
Clearly these estimated policy reaction functions and those developed through 
optimization are not unrelated. Optimal policy rules set the policy instrument as a 
linear function of the state vector. The feedback coefficients in these optimal rules are 
nonlinear functions of the parameters in the model constraining the optimization, as 
well as the parameters in the policy objective function. In principle it is these 
nonlinear parameter combinations that applied studies estimate. 
A better understanding of monetary policy decisions can be had if the monetary 
authority's preferences can be disentangled and extracted from estimated policy rules. 
With these preferences in hand we would know which variables enter the policy 
objective function; which aspects of the economy the central bank is concerned about; 
and how senior central bank appointments affect the policy regime in operation. 
Because they relate directly to the policy regime in place, policy preferences, not 
estimated policy rules , are more informative of the objectives and incentives 
underpinning policy decisions. 
Given a plausible economic model, and provided the estimated policy rule is the 
outcome of a constrained optimization process, it should be possible to find objective 
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function parameters such that the optimal rule closely resembles the estimated rule. 
Of course, if these implied policy objective function parameters are to be informative 
it is important that the model constraining central bank behavior realistically capture 
the relationships at work in the economy. The objective of this chapter is to present 
conditions under which a policy regime in operation can be uncovered from the data.! 
One of the most common objective functions employed in the monetary policy rules 
literature defines loss in terms of a linear combination of the unconditional variances 
of a vector of economic variables? To formalize this, let Zt be a vector of economic 
variables, including the policy instrument(s). We assume that Zt is weakly stationary 
with unconditional mean vector z\. Each element in Zt has its counterpart in z't. 
Without loss of generality z't is taken to equal the null vector3 Further, it is assumed 
that policy makers target the unconditional mean of Zt, and therefore that z\ is also the 
target vector. With this notation every variable in Zt has a nominal target value. Of 
course, for many of these variables zero weight may be applied to their deviations 
from target in the objective function. 
Denote the unconditional variance-covariance matrix of Zt by Q. Let W be a 
symmetric, positive semi-definite, matrix of policy weights; Q and W share the same 
dimensions. The infinite horizon policy objective function is: Loss[O,=J = tr[WQ], 
where 'tr' is the trace operator. In many applications W is a diagonal matrix. Given 
this objective function, a policy regime is defined by the matrix of policy weights 
(preferences), W, and the vector of targets, z·t. It is the elements in this W matrix that 
we seek to identify. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 7.2 develops the general economic 
structure within which subsequent analysis takes place. Using this general economic 
framework Section 7.3 systematically examines the conditions under which policy 
preferences can be identified. To illustrate how the identification conditions are 
applied in practice Section 7.4 considers several popular models and examines 
I Soderlind (1999) estimates the parameters in an objective function using a model of the United 
States. He does not consider identification however. 
2 See, for example, Ball (1997), Svensson (1999) , Svensson (1998) , Fair and Howrey (1996), 
Rudebusch and Svensson (1998), Clarida, Gali , and Gertler (1999), and Fuhrer (1997), among others. 
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whether their structure permits identification of the policy regime. Section 7.5 
concludes. 
7.2) A General Macroeconomic Setting 
Consider the following macroeconomic specification: 
AoYt =AIYt_1 +A 2E t_IYt+1 +A3Xt +V" VI - iid[O, L] (1) 
where YI is an nxl vector of dependent variables, XI a pxl vector of policy 
instruments, VI an nxl vector of stochastic innovations, and Et.1 is the mathematical 
expectations operator conditional upon information set 1,.1 , where It = {YI, X" I,.I}. 
Matrices Ao, A! , A2, and A3 contain structural parameters with dimensions 
conformable with YI and XI as needed. An alternative specification would have the 
expectations in (1) formed using period t rather than period t-l information. More 
will be said about this alternative specification later, particularly in Section 7.4. 
Specification (1) is more general than may first appear. Models with complicated lag 
and lead structures can be manipulated into this form (Binder and Pesaran, 1995). 
Variables that are predetermined and time changes in policy instruments may be 
included in y,. 
Assumption one: The instrument vector, XI, is set as a linear function of the state 
vector, YI.!' 
Policy therefore follows the rule: 
X t = 'I'y t-I ' (2) 
where the pxn matrix '¥ contains the policy feedback coefficients. Where necessary, 
lags of the instrument vector enter into this rule through YI.!. It is desirable to allow 
3 Normalizing z't to equal zero is without loss of generality when policy decisions are constrained by a 
system of linear equality constraints. This normalization is not appropriate if some of the constraints 
are inequality constraints, such as a constraint preventing the nominal interest rate from going negative. 
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some elements of,¥ to equal zero or be otherwise restricted, thereby accommodating 
simple rules. Let the unrestricted elements of,¥ not set to zero be represented by the 
(bxl) vector cpo 
Defining Zt = [YtT XtT]T and combining (1) and (2) produces the system: 
BOZt = B,z t_, + B2Et_tzt+1 + u t · Ut - iid[O, E] (3) 
Clearly Zt has dimensions (n+p)xl , and hence Q and W are (n+p)x(n+p) matrices. 
The central bank's behavior is formalized as follows : 
Assumption two: The monetary authority operates under the regime: W , z*t = 0 T;j t, 
and selects the unique cp E Q C ':J\b, Q convex, that minimizes Loss[O,oo] = 
tr[WQ], subject to (3). 
7.3) Identifying the Policy Preference Matrix 
This Section is central to the chapter. It provides necessary and sufficient conditions 
for identification of the policy preference matrix W. Before turning to the details of 
these identification conditions, which are presented in a sequence of propositions, it is 
useful to underline from the outset what is known and what is to be determined. 
Substituting (2) into (1) gives: 
AoYt =(A 1 +A3'1')Yt-I +A 2E t _ tYt+ l +V t · (4) 
The solution to (4) takes the form (see McCallum, 1983, or Uhlig, 1999): 
Yt =II,Yt_, +II 2 v t , (5) 
where 112 = Ao· t and 111 satisfies: 
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AoIII = Al + A3 'I' + A2II~ . (6) 
It is assumed that the reduced form parameters III, and II2 and the feedback 
coefficients in the policy rule, 'P, are known. The identification strategy that follows 
does not impose restrictions on the error variance-covariance matrix and as a 
consequence information in II2 is not employed for identification. Clearly this 
assumption could be relaxed and the information in II2 brought into play. 
Nevertheless, using just III and 'P, this Section establishes conditions for identifying 
w. 
Identification problems arise on several levels: first because the system is 
simultaneous; second because rational expectations terms are present; and third 
because the system is subject to control. As a consequence the identification strategy 
proposed below is a recursive one. 
At its most simplistic the identification problem is one of imposing enough structure 
on the system so that estimates of the structural parameters can be backed out from the 
reduced form. 4 Elements in the feedback matrix 'P are nonlinear functions of the 
structural parameters, Ao, AI, A2, and A3 , and the policy preferences, W. The 
variables in the 'p' policy reaction function(s), entering nontrivially are predetermined 
state variables so identifying 'P is not an issue. 
For ease of exposition, define: 
def 
C=A I +A3'1'· 
This C matrix is a commingling of the parameters applied to the state vector in 
equation (4). Now, variance-covariance matrix restrictions aside, (6) implies : 
4 Identification of simultaneous systems is analyzed thoroughly in Fisher (1966). Pesaran (1988) 
examines identification in rational expectations models. 
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[Ao -c [IT' ]d f -A21~i ~[H!r]=[O], (7) 
where, in matrix form 
{I ]def [C]= [A, A3L'I' = [A!A]. (8) 
7.3.1) Step One 
The first step in the recursive identification strategy involves identifying H in 
equation (7). Necessary and sufficient conditions for identifying H are summarized 
in: 
Proposition one: Let the parameters in the i'th row of H, hi (1x3n), be subject to 'ri ' 
linear inhomogeneous restrictions, hiRi = ri , where Ri has dimensions (3nxri), 
then a necessary condition for identifying H is ri ~ 2n, '<;j i E [1 , ... ,n]. A 
sufficient condition for identifying H is rank[r Rd = 3n, 'if i E [1, ... ,n]. 
Proof 
The row vector hi is subject to the following linear inhomogeneous restrictions: 
[hJRJ= [rJ (9) 
Combining (7) with (9) produces: 
[hJr Ri ]= [0 rJ 
The dimensions of hi, r , and Ri are 1x3n, 3nxn, and 3nxri respectively. Accordingly, 
hi contains 3n parameters jointly subject to n+ri restrictions. The restrictions in (9) 
include the normalization restriction arising when a dependent variable is chosen. 
Consequently, identifying hi necessarily requires ri ~ 2n. For these linear 
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inhomogeneous restrictions to be sufficient requires [r R j] to be such that ranker Rj] 
= 3n (see Fisher, 1966). 
I 
Proposition one is very intuitive. In a standard simultaneous equations system 
without rational expectations identifying an equation requires at least as many 
restrictions be imposed as there are endogenous variables (rj ~ n). With the rational 
expectations term present each equation has an additional 'n' parameters to identify, 
but the number of reduced form parameters available is unchanged. It directly follows 
that ' n' additional restrictions must be imposed to achieve identification. 
7.3.2) Step Two 
While proposition one provides conditions under which H is identified, and 
identification of H implies identification of C, it does not separately identify Al and 
A3. This leads to: 
Proposition two: Let the i' th row of A, aj (lx(n+p)), be subject to 'qj' linear 
inhomogeneous restrictions, ajQj = qj, where Qj has dimensions «n+p)xqj), 
then a necessary condition for identifying A is qj ~ p, ViE [1 , . .. ,n] . A 
sufficient condition for identifying A is that rank[A Qd = n+p, V iE [1 , ... ,n]. 
Proof 
From equation (8): 
[AIAl= [cl· (10) 
Assume further that aj is subject to 'qj ' restrictions of the form: 
[aJQ.l= [qJ (11) 
Combining (10) and (11) gives: 
[aJA Q; 1 = [C; qJ 
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The dimensions of ai, A, and Qi are 1x(n+p), (n+p)xn, and (n+p)xq; respectively. 
Therefore ai contains n+p parameters that are collectively subject to n+q; linear 
restrictions. Consequently, a necessary condition for identification is qi ~ p. A 
sufficient condition for identification of ai is rank[A Qi] = n+p. 
I 
In terms of the recursive identification strategy the role of proposition two is to 
disentangle the elements in A3 from those in AI. The elements in these two matrices 
are mingled because monetary policy is set conditional upon the state vector. In 
words propositions two states that a necessary condition for identification is that a 
restriction on the elements in Al and A3 be imposed for each control variable in the 
system. Clearly if an equation contains all state variables and an instrument is set as a 
linear function of all of the state variables, then the coefficient in A3 associated with 
that instrument in that equation cannot be identified. 
7.3.3) Step Three 
Thus far in the identification strategy information contained in the policy feedback 
matrix 'P has not been used. As long as the rank conditions of proposition one and 
two hold, then information in the reduced form coefficients, III is sufficient to identify 
all the coefficients in the structural model. In this final identification step we 
introduce 'P. If 'P is determined optimally, then its elements will be nonlinear 
functions of the structural parameters (Ao, Alo A2, and A3), and also W. Provided the 
structural parameters are identified a crucial ingredient in 'P is known. This third and 
final step establishes necessary and sufficient conditions under which knowledge of 'P 
and the structural parameters can be used to identify W. These conditions are 
summarized in: 
Proposition three: Let the column vector w = vech(W) be subject to's' linear 
inhomogeneous restrictions, STw = s, then a necessary condition for global 
'd 'f' . fW' (n+p)(n+p+l) b A ff" d" f 1 entl lcatIOn 0 IS: S ~ . su lclent con ItIOn or 
2 
global identification of W is: rank[J(w*Y S]T = k = [(n+p)(n+p+1)/2], V w** 
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E Pc 9\\, where J(w") is the Jacobian of the transform f: P ~ Q defined 
below. 
Proal 
In its most general form W is a square, symmetric, matrix containing (n+p)2 
parameters. Symmetry reduces the number of independent parameters in W to 
[(n+p)(n+p+l)]/2. In what follows let k = [(n+p)(n+p+1)/2]. 
An outcome of the policy optimization is a continuously differentiable function f: P ~ 
Q relating the policy preferences to the coefficients in the policy rule:5 
(jI = f(w). (12) 
Recall that (jI is a (bx1) vector containing the elements of,¥ that are unrestricted. w is 
also subject to's' linear inhomogeneous restrictions of the form: 
STW =s. (13) 
The policy objective function is only defined up to a scalar allowing one element of w 
to be normalized upon. This normalizing restriction is subsumed into (13). 
Remaining restrictions on w are most likely to take the form of exclusion restrictions, 
particularly on the covariance elements of Q . The non-linearity of (12) complicates 
identification. From the mean value theorem there exists a w" between w· and w, 
each elements of P, such that: 
(jI' = (jI+J(w")(w' -w) , (14) 
where J(w") is an bxk Jacobian matrix. Combining (13) and (14) allows the 
restrictions on w to be represented as: 
5 The structural parameters have been subsumed into the functional form. 
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[Jc;")]w = [~-~. + ~(w")w·]. (15) 
From (15) a sufficient condition for global identification of w is rank[J(w'Y S]T = k, 
'(j W" E P (see ·Rothenberg, 1971). Notice, however, that '(j n, p > 0, k > np ~ b. 
Therefore, rank[J(w**)] is at most 'b', which implies that a necessary condition for 
global identification is s ~ k-b, or after substituting for k, s ~ (n + p)(n + p + 1) b. 
2 
I 
The necessary condition of proposition three has a clear interpretation: the 'b ' 
coefficients in <p can be used to identify at most 'b' elements in W. An interesting 
aspect of proposition three is that the Jacobian matrix J(w**) itself need not have full 
rank for all w·· E P. A singularity in the Jacobian matrix means that there is no 
information in the functional relationship between wand <p to tie down one or more 
parameters in w. However, provided this lack of information in J(w") can be offset 
by additional outside information in the form of additional columns in S identification 
is still possible. 
7.3.4) In Addition ... 
Of course equation (2) implies that the relationship between the policy instruments 
and the predetermined variables is a deterministic one. Rarely would this be the case. 
In practice the information set used by agents to form their expectations, and that an 
econometrician uses when estimating policy reaction functions, may only be a subset 
of that available to the monetary authority when it sets policy. This can arise if the 
monetary authority uses a more recent information set than other agents. Where this 
is the case deviations between the actual path of Xt and that predicted by (2) are to be 
expected. These deviations are accommodated by adding a pxl innovation vector et, 
uncorrelated with Vt and Yt.lo to equation (2) giving: 
X, = 'l'y t-1 + et . (16) 
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Intuitively, adding this innovation vector facilitates identification of AI and A3 
because it automatically imbues Xl with volatility absent from Yl-I- The addition of the 
policy innovation term leads to: 
Proposition four: Given (1) and (16) Al and A3 are identified provided the rank 
condition of proposition one holds_ 
Prool 
Substituting (16) into (1) produces: 
AoYt =(A 1 +A 3'1')Yt-l +A 2E t-iYt+l +A 3et +V t - (17) 
Equation (16) is identified because it contains only predetermined variables and 
therefore both 'P and el are assumed to be known. The rational expectations solution 
to (17) takes the form: 
Yt =IItYt_l + II 2 vt + II 3et , (18) 
where ITz = Ao- 1, ITI satisfies (6), and IT3 = AO-1 A3. The reduced form parameter 
matrices ITI and IT3 are known and the solution to (17) asserts that once Ao is 
identified so too is A3. Proposition one presents a sufficient condition for Ao to be 
identified. 
I 
Finally, we may wonder how these identification conditions would be affected if the 
expectations in (1) were formed using period t rather than period t-l information . It is 
not difficult to show that provided variance-covariance matrix restrictions are not used 
for identification, and provided the policy rule continues to depend only on Yl-I and 
does not contain Vb propositions one - four remain unaffected. The intuition behind 
this result is that the solution for ITI is unaltered by the change to period t information. 
The solution for ITz does change, but it is not required for identification provided Vt 
does not enter the policy rule. 
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7.4) Some Examples 
This Section takes some popular models from the literature and examines whether 
they satisfy the conditions necessary for identification of policy regimes. The aims of 
this Section are twofold. First the Section aims to illustrate how propositions one, 
two, and three are applied in practice. Second, the Section aims to investigate the 
suitability of various models as vehicles for identifying policy regimes. 
All models considered contain the variables: y" 1f" and i" representing the output gap, 
inflation and the nominal interest rate respectively, and as a consequence the policy 
objective function used throughout this Section is taken to be: 
Loss[O,oo] = aVar[7C,] + (1- a)Var[y,] + crVar[i,] . 
Accordingly, the systems examined require that we identify just two policy preference 
parameters. As such, for each system S has four independent columns implying s = 4. 
7.4.1) Example One 
Consider the following system: 
y, = ~Y'-I - y[i, - E'_I7CaI] + g, ' 
7C, = 7C H + AY'_I + u,' 
i, = {j)yy ,-I + {j).7Ct-J. 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
Equation (19) is a dynamic IS curve, (20) an accelerationist Phillips curve, and (21) 
the policy reaction function. The stochastic terms - gt and Ut - are assumed to be finite 
variance white noise processes. Observe first that equations (20) and (21) are 
identified in so much as for them the rank conditions of propositions one and two 
hold. For subsequent identification of other coefficients the coefficients in equations 
(20) and (21) are assumed known. Next note that with two feedback parameters in 
(21) and two independent policy preference coefficients the necessary condition of 
proposition three is satisfied. It just remains to be seen whether propositions one and 
two hold when applied to (19). 
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In tenns of equation (4) an unconstrained representation of (19) takes the fonn: 
ThY, = Ih1t , +CIY'_I +c 21t t-l +pIEt-lY'+1 +P2E '_I 1t '+1 +g,. (22) 
The system (19) - (21) has n = 2 and p = 1. Therefore, the order condition of 
proposition one requires that (19) place at least four restrictions (ri ~ 2n) on the 
structure of (22). Relative to (22), equation (19) imposes: 111 = 1; 112 = 0; PI = 0; and 
P2 = C2/!fJn. Thus proposition one's order condition for identification is satisfied. 
Proposition two requires the number of restrictions on the elements of Ai and A3 
associated with the IS curve be greater than or equal to the number of policy 
instruments. It is useful to rewrite (22) as: 
TIIY, =TI z1t, +AIY,_I +A 21t'_1 +PIE'_IY'+I +PZEt-l1t'+1 +yi, +g ,. (23) 
In light of (23) , the restrictions on the IS curve's structural parameters take the fonn: 
[AI AZ -y{ ~ 
(jJy 
o 
!]=k Cz 0]. (jJ, 
Provided 11:,.1 enters the policy reaction function non-trivially (!fJn 7= 0) the rank 
condition of proposition two is satisfied.6 In this system the policy regime can be 
identified. 
7.4.2) Example Two 
The second example is adapted from McCallum (1997) and consists of the following 
equations for the output gap and inflation: 
6 Notice that CPy can equal zero, but not cp" and the system is still identified. Thus the optimal simple 
inflation rule i, = (jJ,TCt-l can still be examined. A policy rule where the interest rate responds only to 
the output gap might usually be expected to lead to nominal indeterminacy. In this model it produces 
an unidentified system. Moreover, with only one parameter in the policy rule the order condition for 
proposition three is not met so the two policy preference parameters cannot be identified . 
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Y t = E t_, Y t+1 - y[i t - E t_,lI t+, ] + gt 
lI t = E t_,lI t+, + AY t + Ut · 
To add some persistence both gt and Ut are assumed to follow AR(1) processes : 
[gt]=[~1 0 ][gt-t]+[~t l . u t 0 ~2 u t _ 1 U 
t 
McCallum ' s system is completed by the addition of the policy reaction function: 
it = <P ggt-I +<Puu t_l · 
(24) 
(25) 
(26) 
Analogous to example one the policy reaction function (26) is identified and contains 
two feedback coefficients. With only two independent parameters in the policy 
objective function proposition three 's order condition is meet. Unfortunately neither 
(24) nor (25) are identified. In unrestricted form equation (25) has the form : 
TlI lI t = ThY t +Thg t +114 Ut + AtlI t_t +A 2 Yt_1 +A Jg t_1 +A4Ut_1 
+p,E t_, lI t+ ' +P2E t_IYt+1 +P JE t-,gt+' +P4Et_I Ut+1 +Ut. (27) 
Comparing equation (25) with (27) the independent restrictions imposed on (27) are: 
111=1 ; 113=0; 114=0; 1..1=0; 1..2=0; 1..3 = 0 ; P1=1; P2=0; P3=0; and P4=0. These restrictions 
number ten while the order condition of proposition one requires onl y ei ght 
restrictions. In terms of this necessary condition equation (25) is over-identified. 
Appearances are deceiving, however. For while equation (25) satisfies proposition 
one' s order condition it fails the rank condition. To see this, observe that the 
restrictions listed exclude Tet.l, Yt.l, and gt. l from the system. At the same time the 
rational expectations solution to the system expresses Tet and Yt in terms of just Ut.1, 
also excluding7 Tet.l Yt.1, and gt.1. Thus three of the columns in the [r Rj ] matrix 
7 That all elements in ITl associated with ~. I and Yt.1 equal zero is clear because these two variables do 
not appear in the system ' s structure and hence only enter the system 's state vector triviall y. That the 
elements associated with gt.1 also equal zero (or for one equation Ill) is a consequence of the system 
being subject to control. 
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associated with (25) depend linearly on the others and [r R i ] has rank = 11 < 12 (3n, 
where n = 4). In a similar vein it can be shown that equation (24) is also unidentified. 
7.4.3) Example Three 
Our final example comes from Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) and is of the same 
genre to those just analyzed. It differs, however, in that the persistence in the system 
is endogenous, determined by lagged dependent variables, and not exogenous, driven 
by autocorrelated shocks. In fact the shocks gt and Ut are assumed to be finite variance 
white noise processes. 
YI =~YI-I +(1-~)EI_IYI+I -y[i , -EI_I1t I+I]+gl 
1t I = 01t t-l + (1- o)E I_I 1t 1+1 + AY I + u I 
i , = <iJyYI-I + <iJ,1t I_I 
(28) 
(29) 
Like the previous two examples the order condition of proposition three is satisfied 
because the policy reaction function contains two feedback coefficients. Now 
consider equation (28). In the structure of equation (4), at its most general, equation 
(28) becomes: 
11 IYI = 1121t, +CIYI_I +C 21t I_I +PIEI_IYI+I +P2EI_I1tI+I +gl' (30) 
Relative to (28) equation (30) imposes the four restrictions: 111 = 1; 112 = 0; C2 = -P2<iJ,,; 
and CI = 1-PI-P2<iJy, which with n = 2 means that the order condition of proposition 
one is met. Provided neither ~ nor 0 equal zero the rank condition is also satisfied.s 
Moreover, if <iJ" is non-zero the rank condition of proposition two is also satisfied 
implying that equation (28) is identified. If <iJ" does equal zero, then the order 
condition of proposition three does not hold and the policy preference parameters 
cannot be identified. 
Now consider the Phillips curve, equation (29). The unrestricted Phillips curve is: 
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ll z1t, =l1tY , +ctY,_t +c z1t t-l +PtE,-ty ,+t +P zE,_t 1t t+t +u, (31) 
Relative to (31) equation (29) imposes the restrictions: 112 = 1; CI = 0; Cz + P2 = 1; and 
PI = O. These four restrictions satisfy proposition one's necessary condition for 
identification. Like the IS curve (28), provided neither ~ nor <5 equal zero the rank 
condition of proposition one is also met. As a consequence for this system the policy 
regime is identifiable. 
What these three examples illustrate is that provided we consider only the order 
condition for identifying the policy preferences (proposition three) the major obstacle 
faced when identifying W is that of identifying the structure of the economy. 
Identifying the economy's structure is essential, however, because it constrains the 
optimization process leading to the policy rule. 
7.5) Conclusions 
The aim of this chapter was simple. We wanted to lay the foundations for estimating 
central bank policy preferences by establishing conditions under which these 
preference parameters could be identified. It was demonstrated that optimizing 
central banks apply policy rules whose feedback coefficients are nonlinear functions 
of its policy preferences. Before these policy preferences can be backed out from 
these feedback coefficients several identification conditions need to hold. As a 
consequence this chapter proposes a recursive identification strategy consisting of 
three steps. The first two steps, summarized in propositions one and two, identify the 
parameters in the structural model constraining the central bank' s optimization . Only 
once the structural model is identified can enough structure be placed on the policy 
reaction function to disentangle the policy preference coefficients. Proposition three 
provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the policy preference coefficients to 
be identified. 
8 When 13 = 0, for example, y,.t is not a state variable in the system and qJy appropriately equals zero. 
Consequently, the column of ITt associated with y,. , equals zero, leading to the rank condition of 
proposition one failing. 
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To illustrate how the conditions developed in propositions one, two and three are 
applied in practice three examples were provided and their identification properties 
examined. The identification conditions developed in this chapter are important 
because only by identifying and estimating the policy regime in operation can we tell 
what the objectives of the monetary authority truly are. In particular, this chapter 
serves to emphasize that it is not necessarily possible to say anything meaningful 
about a policy regime purely on the basis of an estimated policy rule. Future work 
will seek to identify and estimate actual policy regimes in operation, and to document 
how these policy regimes have changed over time. 
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Chapter 8 
DISCRETIONARY MONETARY POLICY WITH COSTLY INFLATION 
8.1) Introduction 
Following Kydland and Prescott (1977) it is commonly recognized that through time 
inconsistency discretionary monetary policy can lead to a positive inflation bias. 
Several authors have addressed this issue proposing methods to either reduce or 
eliminate this inflation bias. Rogoff (1985) suggests appointing an inflation averse 
central bank governor while Walsh (1995) shows that an optimal contract for the 
central bank governor can solve what is essentially a principal agent problem. Other 
approaches rely on the central bank governor either being concerned with their 
reputation as an 'inflation fighter' or making the governor deposit a nominal bond that 
is released only at the conclusion of their contract. 
More recently Pearce and Sobue (1997) demonstrate that any inflation bias present is 
lowered when the central bank is uncertain about the strength with which its policy 
instrument affects inflation. Uncertainty leads policy makers to err on the side of 
caution, resulting in cautious policy, and a lower inflation bias. 
This paper explores the implications for discretionary monetary policy of costly 
inflation. We consider a Phillips curve where a sub-optimally high inflation rate 
reduces welfare by permanently lower real output. Section 9.2 motivates the case for 
a non-vertical Phillips curve and describes the economic model used to analyze 
discretionary policy. Section 9.3 examines how costly inflation effects the magnitude 
of the discretionary inflation bias. Section 9.4 concludes. 
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8.2) Rules versus Discretion with Costly Inflation 
Many authors have suggested that there may be a negative relationship between 
inflation and output or, alternatively, between inflation and output growth. Feldstein 
(1982) argues that inflation can interact with a nominal based tax system raising the 
cost of capital and lowering investment and output. De Gregorio (1993) moots that 
firms have to hold money balances to purchase capital. The cost of holding money 
increases as inflation rises , thus high inflation retards investment, which lowers 
output. 
\ 
Another common argument is that inflation distorts price signals inducing agents to 
waste resources searching for bargains or otherwise avoiding the effects of inflation 
(menu costs, shoe leather costs, etc). Similarly, high inflation is generally thought to 
come hand-in-hand with high inflation variability, or inflation uncertainty. In the face 
of this uncertainty, Fischer (1993) argues, firms may delay investing until the 
uncertainty is resolved, and this delay lowers output. l 
It is standard in the monetary policy literature (see Walsh, 1998) for the central bank 
to choose inflation to minimize the loss function: 2 
1 '2 A '2 A Loss = Et-I ["2 (11:, -11:) +"2(Y' -ky ,) ], k>l, >0, (1) 
subject to 
y, = y; +a(1I:, -Et-I1I:,)+u" a>O. (2) 
where 1tt is the inflation rate, 1t' is the inflation target, Yt represents (logged) real 
output, y; represents (logged) potential real output, and Ut - iid[0,cr2] is a supply 
shock. Finally Et. l is the mathematical expectations operator conditional upon period 
I Further arguments regarding the costs of inflation can be found in De Gregorio (1993) and Stockman 
(1991). Alternatively, the Tobin effect suggests that inflation may not always be detrimental for output, 
Tobin (1965). 
2 We use this loss function because it is standard in the literature and because we want to explore the 
consequences of costl y inflation for the inflation bias in the context of the core literature. An 
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t-l infonnation. We assume that period t-l infonnation includes all variables dated 
period t-l or earlier as well as the structure of the economy. 
At this juncture it is useful to ask what is optimal about the inflation target rate n*, or, 
more fundamentally, why inflation is in the loss function at all? The point to be made 
is that in the economy described by equation (2) only unanticipated inflation matters. 
Anticipated inflation has no effect on the economy - even in the short run - making it 
unclear why the loss function contains inflation. Moreover, with neutral inflation any 
rate of anticipated inflation is as good as any other; any rate of inflation is optimal. 
In light of these arguments, and the literature on costly inflation discussed above, we 
respecify the (inverted) Phillips curve as 
y, = y; +a(n, -E,_,n,)-f(n,)+u" u>o (3) 
where fen,) , f ' = ~ 2: 0, represents the output cost associated with anticipated inflation. 
We assume that fen,) equals zero at n*. It is in this sense that n* is an optimal 
inflation rate - it eliminates any effect of anticipated inflation on output. A linear 
Taylor series approximation to fen,) about n* gives 
f(n , ) = fen') + ~(n , - n'). (4) 
Imposing f(n*) = 0 and substituting (4) into (3) generates the Phillips curve 
y, = y; +a(n, -E,_,n,)-~(n, -n' )+u , . (5) 
8.3) Discretionary Inflation Bias 
Substituting (5) into (1) and maximising, while holding inflation expectations 
constant, yields the inflation equation 
alternative approach might have used a utility based loss function following Cubitt (1993) or Ireland 
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• (k-l)(a-~)AY; 
1[, = 1[ + . (1- (a - ~)A~) 
(6) 
The second tenn on the RHS of (6) represents the inflation bias. If we had used the 
Phillips curve (2) in place of (5), then the inflation bias would be (k-l)aAy;. There 
are several points we can make about the magnitude and sign of the inflation bias 
when anticipated inflation is costly. 
1) When [3 = ° the bias collapses down to (k-l)aAYt*: the costless inflation case. 
2) Depending on a and [3 the inflation bias can be either positive or negative. 
When [3 = ° the inflation bias is strictly non-negative. 
3) When [3 = a the output cost of anticipated inflation completely offsets any 
benefits to surprise inflation and the inflation bias equals zero. 
4) In the limit as [3 --7 = , the inflation bias --7 ° from below. 
5) If [3 > a, then the inflation bias with costly inflation must be smaller that the 
inflation bias without the output cost. 
The inflation bias under costless inflation equals that for costly inflation when 
(a-~) = a. This occurs when [3 = 0, (a2).-I)/aA, which we denote [31 and [32 (1- (a - ~)A~) 
respectively. The first of these roots, [31, produces the familiar result that, if [3 = 0, 
equation (5) collapses to equation (2). With the second root, [32, note that the 
denominator aA is always positive, implying that [32 will be positive or negative 
depending on whether ( 2)._1 is greater or less than zero. Given our theoretical 
assumption that [3 is non-negative the only economically interesting case is that where 
( 2)._1 2: 0. 
To examine how the inflation bias changes with [3 we differentiate it with respect to [3, 
holding all else constant. Evaluating this derivative at [3 = ° gives 
d(bias) I ~=O = (k -1)A)A 2A -1)y; 
d~ 
(1997). 
(7) 
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When (121..-1 > 0, the slope of the bias equation is positive at 13 = 0, and conversely 
negative if (121..-1 < O. 
Similarly, the derivative of the bias with respect to 13, evaluated at 132, equals 
d(bias) I 
dP p=p, 
(1- k)(a 2,,-I)y; 
(1-(a-p)"p)2 
(8) 
Clearly the denominator of (8) is positive. Consequently, because k > 1, we have the 
result that at 13 = 132 the derivative is positive if (121..-1 < 0 and negative if (121..-1 > 0 
Therefore, we can make two further observations about the inflation bias 
6) If (121..-1 < 0, then so too is 132, and the only economicall y interesting point 
where the biases are equal is at 13 = O. The slope of the bias function is 
negative at 13 = 0 indicating that the bias with costly inflation is less that that 
where inflation is costless for all 13 > O. 
7) If (121..-1 > 0, then there are two economically interesting points at which the 
biases are equal. For 13 E [131. 132] the bias with costly inflation is higher than 
that for costless inflation. As 13 increases above 132 the opposite result 
prevails.3 
Of interest here is the fact that when (121..-1 > 0, for all 13 E [0, (12A.-l)/aA] the 
inflation bias actually increases despite the fact that this inflation bias has a permanent 
output cost. The inflation bias rises when (1 and A. are large and 13 is small. This is the 
case where the monetary authority places a large weight on output stabilization and 
gains a large benefit from surprise inflation. If the permanent cost of inflation is small 
then the monetary authority is prepared to incur this cost, but to offset the lost output 
due to the inflation cost the monetary authority must create a greater inflation surprise 
than it otherwise would. Consequently, the inflation bias is greater in this case than it 
would be if inflation were costless. 
Here we further assume that riA < 4 to rule out discontinuous jumps in the bias as ~ increases. 
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Figure 9.1 graphs the inflation bias (as a percent of potential output) under 
hypothesized values for ex, and k, for two values of A. as p changes. The solid line has 
ex2A.-1 < 0 while the dashed line has ex2A.-1 > O. 
To examine whether anticipated costs of inflation are likely to have any material 
impact of the size of the inflation bias we parameterize the f(n.) function using 
estimates from Fischer (1993). Table 4 of Fischer (1993) presents an estimate for p of 
0.046 using panel estimation 4 Taking P = 0.046, A. = 0.5 (inflation receives twice the 
weight of output in the loss function) , k = 1.02, and ex = 2.5 gives an inflation bias of 
0.025% of potential when inflation is not costly and a bias that is approximately 
0.026% of potential when inflation is costly. In this example the presence of an 
output cost of inflation actually raises the inflation bias by about 4%. While small this 
increase in inflation is nevertheless noteworthy, given the plausibility of the 
underlying parameters . 
8.4) Conclusions 
In this paper we have extended the standard 'rules versus discretion ' model to include 
the case where anticipated inflation has a permanent output cost. When inflation is 
costly we have shown that the inflation bias associated with discretionary policy is 
generally smaller than that when inflation is costless. Interestingly, if the marginal 
cost of inflation is large enough the inflation bias can even be negative. Finally, we 
have also shown that for some parameter values the presence of costly inflation 
actually increases the size of the bias. Interestingly, using an estimate of the cost of 
anticipated inflation we have presented an example where the inflation bias actually 
increases. 
4 Details of the sample period and countries included to generate this estimate are available in Fischer 
(1993). 
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Figure 9.1: Inflation Bias. 
Alpha = 1.5, k =1.02 
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